Rocha v. State
| Decision Date | 03 April 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 05-18-00161-CR,05-18-00161-CR |
| Parties | MANUEL ROCHA, JR, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 5 Dallas County, Texas
Before Justices Brown, Schenck, and Pedersen, III
Opinion by Justice Schenck
Manuel Rocha, Jr. appeals his conviction for the murder of A.G. In five issues, appellant argues (1) the evidence is legally insufficient to establish he committed the offense, (2) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting certain surveillance video recordings, (3) the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request for a spoliation instruction, (4) the trial court erred in charging the jury on an unsupported theory of causation, and (5) the judgment should be reformed to accurately reflect that he was found guilty of murder, not capital murder. By cross-appeal, the State argues the judgment should be modified to show the jury convicted appellant of first-degree murder under section 19.02 of the penal code, and to reflect appellant's proper state identification number. We affirm the trial court's judgment as modified by this opinion. Because all issues are settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.
Approximately six months prior to her death, 20-year-old A.G. met Bryan Casillas through an internet dating site. Before meeting Casillas, A.G. worked for UPS and maintained a close relationship with her family. But that all changed after she met Casillas. A.G. quit her job at UPS, and in March 2015, she and Casillas began posting advertisements featuring A.G. on Backpage, an internet site for escorts. Some of the ads included a picture of A.G. wearing lingerie. The ads included a description of A.G.'s services, which ranged from "hanging out" to more illicit activities. When she went on dates, A.G. sent Casillas "drop pin" notifications through an application on her cell phone so he would know where she was.
On June 19, 2015, appellant, having seen A.G.'s escort ad on Backpage, arranged to have A.G. come to his house in Richardson for a "date." Appellant lived with his mother, two sisters, and a brother-in-law. A.G. arrived at appellant's house just after 2:00 a.m. on June 20. She had just completed another "date" in Flower Mound. At that time, appellant, his mother, sister, and brother-in-law were present in the house. Only appellant was awake. Appellant walked to A.G.'s car shortly after she arrived, and A.G. got out of her car and followed appellant into the house.
Approximately three hours later, a neighbor's surveillance camera captured images showing appellant moving A.G.'s car to the driveway of a house adjacent to his own and walking back to his house. About twenty minutes later, appellant went back to A.G.'s car, repositioned it in the driveway so that the rear of the car backed up against the adjacent house. He opened the hatchback and then walked back to his house. A few minutes later, appellant returned to the vehicle and loaded something large into the back of the car, closed the hatchback, and walked back to the house. At approximately 6 a.m., appellant returned to the car with what appeared to be a gasoline can and drove away.
A surveillance video recorded A.G.'s car arriving at a janitorial supply business in Dallas at 7:32 a.m. Ten minutes later, the same surveillance camera recorded a person leaving the scene on foot, walking at first, and then running away.
Meanwhile, a man working at a bakery located near the janitorial supply business heard an explosion. He opened the back door of the bakery and saw smoke coming from a grassy area. He also saw a Hispanic male walking away from the scene.
Police and firefighters were called to the scene. They discovered a green Fiat, the car A.G. drove, parked in a grassy area, on fire. After the fire was extinguished, they discovered the partially burned remains of A.G. and retrieved appellant's identification and credit card from the vehicle.
Later that morning, appellant went to the home of his girlfriend and asked for a ride to work. She drove him to the yard where she normally takes him, but his work crew had already left. At the time, appellant had visible injuries on his body. He told his girlfriend the injuries were the result of a robbery and an accident. Upon discovering that his crew had already left their meeting spot, appellant used his girlfriend's phone to text his supervisor to report that he was in an accident, claiming that he had lost everything and had been unable to call previously. He made no mention of a robbery. Appellant's girlfriend then drove him to his house. No one saw appellant again until the police arrested him.
Appellant was indicted, and a jury trial ensued. At trial, the State offered video recordings from appellant's neighbor's surveillance system. Appellant's neighbor (the "Neighbor") testified that he programmed the camera to activate in response to motion and that after the murder, he collected all of the video that corresponded to the relevant time span and turned it over to the police. Because the camera did not continuously record, appellant objected to the admission ofthe video recordings, arguing the State failed to properly authenticate them. The trial court overruled the objection and admitted the video recordings.
The State also offered a video recording from the janitorial supply business capturing the Fiat traveling to the area where it was ultimately discovered and the man leaving the scene. Appellant did not object to its admission. The State called the bakery employee to identify the man leaving the scene as a Hispanic male.
The State also called the medical examiner to testify about the autopsy of A.G. He provided the sole evidence of the cause of A.G.'s death. In his report, he concluded that A.G. died from strangulation and blunt-force trauma. During cross-examination, the medical examiner, stated that the blunt-force trauma probably by itself would not have been fatal, but it definitely could have played a role in the death, and that strangulation could have been fatal by itself.
At the charge conference, appellant requested a spoliation instruction regarding his Neighbor's surveillance video recordings and objected to the inclusion of a blunt-force-trauma theory of causation in the charge. The trial court denied the requested spoliation instruction and overruled appellant's objection to the inclusion of the blunt-force-trauma theory of causation.
The jury found appellant guilty of murder and the court sentenced him to 60 years' imprisonment. This appeal followed.
In his first issue, appellant challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction for murder, urging the State failed to prove he was the perpetrator of the crime.
In assessing the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction, we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether, basedon that evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational juror could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979); McCay v. State, 476 S.W.3d 640, 647 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, pet. ref'd). We must give deference to the responsibility of the trier of fact to fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Id. Our role is only to ensure that the jury reached a rational conclusion, not to re-evaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence. See Muniz v. State, 851 S.W.2d 238, 246 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
A person commits murder if he intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §19.02(b)(1). A person intentionally causes the death if it is his conscious objective or desire to do so. Id. §§ 6.03(a), 19.02(b)(1). A person knowingly causes the death of an individual if he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to yield that result. Id. §§ 6.03(b), 19.02(b)(1). A jury may infer intent from any facts that tend to prove its existence, including the method of committing the crime and the nature of wounds inflicted on the victim. Hart v. State, 89 SW.3d 61, 64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
Appellant does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding that someone murdered A.G. Instead, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding that he was the perpetrator of the crime. The evidence established appellant, his mother, sister, and brother-in-law were the only persons present in the house at the time A.G. was murdered. A reasonable inference from this evidence, which appellant acknowledges, is that one of them was the perpetrator of this crime. Appellant contends that the State's only incriminating evidence was that appellant tried to cover up A.G.'s murder, and urges because two of his family members were also involved in the cover-up—namely his sister and brother-in-law who, appellant now contendsdrove to Lewisville and disposed of A.G.'s phone—it was pure speculation, he claims, for the jury to find he committed the crime.1
There is no question that the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is the person who committed the crime charged. See Johnson v. State, 673 S.W.2d 190, 196 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). Identity may be proved by either direct or circumstantial evidence or by reasonable inference. Gardner v. State, 306 S.W.3d 274, 285 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). When there is no direct evidence of the perpetrator's identity elicited from trial witnesses, no formalized procedure is required for the State to prove the identity of the accused. See Sepulveda v. State, 729 S.W.2d 954, 957 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg 1987, pet. ref'd)....
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