Roche v. McDonald

• Decision Date: 16 October 1925
• Docket Number: 19340.
• Citation: 239 P. 1015,136 Wash. 322
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: ROCHE v. McDONALD.

239 P. 1015

136 Wash. 322

ROCHE v. McDONALD.

No. 19340.

Supreme Court of Washington

October 16, 1925

Department 1.

Appeal from Superior Court, Spokane County; Huneke, Judge.

Action by John H. Roche against D. K. McDonald. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

F. W. Girard and Roche & Ayres, all of Spokane for appellant.

Graves Kizer & Graves, of Spokane, for respondent.

PARKER J.

The plaintiff, Roche, commenced this action in the superior court for Spokane county seeking recovery from the defendant McDonald, upon a judgment rendered by the circuit court of the state of Oregon for Marion county, which judgment was rendered by that court upon a judgment rendered by the superior court of this state for Spokane county. A hearing upon the merits resulted in judgment denying to the plaintiff the relief prayed for, from which he has appealed to this court.

The conceded and proven controlling facts, in so far as we need here notice them, may be summarized as follows: Appellant and respondent have both been residents of Spokane county for a period of more than 30 years past. In the year 1917, one Dart commenced an action in the superior court for Spokane county seeking recovery of damages from respondent and others. Such proceedings were had therein that on June 24, 1918, judgment was rendered by that court in favor of Dart and against respondent and his codefendants, awarding recovery in the sum of $12,750. No action seeking revival of, or recovery upon, that judgment in any court has ever been taken other than the Oregon suit here in question, and we assume that no part of the obligation so evidenced has ever been paid. On February 27, 1924, Dart duly assigned that judgment, and all sums due thereon, to appellant. On March 15, 1924, appellant commenced an action in the circuit court of Oregon, for Marion county, seeking recovery on that judgment. At that time, appellant was temporarily in Oregon where he was personally served with summons in that action, so as to give that court jurisdiction over his person and the controversy, in so far as the facts pleaded in the complaint might authorize the rendering of a judgment against him.

The record before us is not very certain as to just what respondent did in the way of appearing in that action. It is conceded, however, by statements made in appellant's brief filed upon this appeal, that he did nothing more than demur to the complaint soon after the commencement of the action, which demurrer was by the court overruled, evidently before the expiration of a period of six years following the rendering of the judgment of the Washington court, and that thereafter he made no further response to the complaint and elected not to plead further. Thereafter on October 1, 1924, the Oregon court rendered judgment in that action in favor of appellant and against respondent in the sum of $18,283, evidently the amount of the Washington judgment, with interest from the time of its rendition. It is alleged in respondent's affirmative defense in this action, and not denied in appellant's reply thereto, that 'there was no other foundation for the Oregon judgment sued upon herein than the judgment rendered by the Washington court on June 24, 1918.' Thus we are led to conclude that the judgment of the Oregon court was rendered against respondent solely upon the judgment of the Washington court, because of respondent's failure to answer upon the merits.

In view of our principal problem being as to whether or not the Oregon judgment was a judgment within the power of the Oregon court to render at the time of its purported rendition, let us first inquire and decide as to whether or not that judgment was anything more than a mere default judgment, having for its support only the allegations of the complaint upon which it was rendered. It has, we think, been made plain by our above summary of the facts that the complaint in that action did not set up the semblance of a cause of action, other than the judgment of the Washington court; that there was no answer controverting the facts alleged in the complaint in that action; and that the judgment of the Oregon court was rendered solely upon the judgment of the Washington court for want of answer to the merits on the part of respondent in that action. There was no trial in the Oregon court participated in by respondent, and hence no possible trial amendments to the complaint. Therefore, the judgment of the Oregon court here sued upon was a default judgment, as completely so as if respondent had not appeared in the action and demurred to the complaint. 34 C.J. 147.

It has become the settled law of this state, and we think generally elsewhere in this country, that a judgment rendered by default, rested solely upon the allegations of a complaint so deficient in substance as to conclusively negative the existence of a cause of action at the time of its rendition, is void, or in any event voidable, and that such a judgment may be successfully assailed collaterally or otherwise, whenever it is sought to be made the foundation of a claim of right. State ex rel. First Nat. Bank v. Hastings, 120 Wash. 283, 207 P. 23.

Does it appear in this case that the judgment of the Washington court, which was the sole foundation of the judgment of the Oregon court, was, at the time of the rendering of the judgment of the Oregon court, no longer of any force and effect? We think it affirmatively clearly so appears by the allegations of the complaint in the Oregon case, in that it thereby appears that the judgment of the Washington court was rendered on June 24, 1918, and that the judgment of the Oregon court was rendered thereon more than six years thereafter. In chapter 29, Laws of 1897, relating to the duration of judgments, referring to sections of Remington & Ballinger's Code, we read:

'Section 459. After the expiration of six years from the rendition of any judgment it shall cease to be a lien or charge against the estate or person of the judgment debtor.

'Section 460. No suit, action, or other proceedings shall ever be had on any judgment rendered in the state of Washington by which the lien or duration of such judgment, claim or demand, shall be extended or continued in force for any greater or longer period than six years from the date of the entry of the original judgment.'

This statute, we think, is not a mere statute of limitation affecting a remedy only. It is more than that. It not only makes a judgment cease to be a 'charge against the person or estate of the judgment debtor' after six years from the rendering of the judgment, but also in terms expressly takes away all right of renewal of or action upon the judgment looking to the continuation of its duration or that of the demand on which it rests, for a longer period than six years from the date of its rendition. It does not tell us when an action upon a judgment may be commenced. It simply tells us that no judgment can be rendered extending the period of duration of a judgment or of the claim or demand upon which it rests beyond the period of six years following its rendition. We have given full force and effect to this statute. Burman v. Douglas, 78 Wash. 394, 139 P. 41; Ball v. Bussell, 119 Wash. 206, 205 P. 423. We noted that in Burman v. Douglas this...