Rochford v. Town of Cheshire
| Citation | 979 F.Supp. 116 |
| Decision Date | 11 September 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV.3:96CV00717(PCD).,CIV.3:96CV00717(PCD). |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
| Parties | David ROCHFORD, Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF CHESHIRE, Defendant. |
Christopher G. Santarsiero, Moynahan, Ruskin, Mascolo, Mariani & Minnella, Waterbury, CT, for Plaintiff.
Gary S. Starr, Kainen, Starr, Garfield, Wright & Escalera, Hartford, CT, Stephen P. Fogerty, Thomas P. O'Dea, Jr., Halloran & Sage, Westport, CT, for Defendant.
RULING ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Defendant Town of Cheshire ("defendant" or "Town") moves for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) on plaintiff David Rochford's ("plaintiff" or "Rochford") discrimination claim under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12201 et seq. ("ADA"). For the following reasons, defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted.
Plaintiff was employed by defendant as a Public Works Maintainer ("maintainer") on November 2, 1992, when he injured his back on the job. Plaintiff returned to work on November 23, 1992 after physical therapy and was placed on "light duty" operating a truck. On December 7, 1992, he went on injury leave.
After a functional capacity examination at the Performance Evaluation and Assessment Center ("PEAC") in late December, plaintiff's doctor, Dr. Finn diagnosed his injury as a lumbar strain. He recommended PEA's physical therapy, "work-hardening" program for a month. A functional capacity exam in late January revealed improvement in plaintiff's physical condition. His ability to lift above shoulder height had increased from 45.5 to 63 pounds, from desk to chair level, 68 to 88 pounds, and from chair to floor level 30 to 70 pounds.
He returned to work with a weight restriction of 50 pounds and a two-month prohibition on truck driving. In April 1993, he reinjured his back shoveling snow. His weight restriction was dropped to 35 pounds. On June 4, 1993, Dr. Finn assessed plaintiff as having a 10% permanent partial disability of his back and that he had reached maximum improvement. He recommended that plaintiff undergo vocational rehabilitation and not return to full heavy duties.
During his light duty, Rochford worked with another maintainer, Thomas McKenzie, who was permanently assigned to building maintenance.
During latter July, plaintiff injured himself falling on stairs at home and missed additional time at work. At this time, Thomas Crowe, the Director of Public Works ("Crowe"), asked Dr. Finn to complete a work restriction form evaluating plaintiff's condition. Dr. Finn advised that plaintiff was no longer under his care, but that he would complete the form if he had the results of a recent PEAC exam.
On August 18, 1993, Crowe's secretary told plaintiff that a PEAC exam was scheduled for him later that day. Plaintiff allegedly protested the exam because of his recent injury from the fall at home. Crowe would not reschedule. The exam revealed a reduced ability to lift, carry and stand.
Dr. Finn reviewed these results, completed the work restriction form, and forwarded it to Crowe. Based on this evaluation, Crowe discharged plaintiff, stating that the Public Works Department "does not have permanent positions whose essential components are free from the tasks prohibited by your doctor." Plaintiff filed a grievance with the Town which was dismissed. Plaintiff then filed a complaint with the EEOC which granted him permission to sue on January 26, 1994.
Plaintiff claims that defendant violated the ADA. He seeks damages, back pay, and reinstatement. Defendant moves for summary judgment contending that 1) plaintiff was not disabled, and 2) plaintiff was not able to perform the essential functions of his job as maintainer with or without reasonable accommodation.
In a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must establish that there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A factual issue is "material" if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law...." Id. A dispute is "genuine" if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. All reasonable inferences are drawn against the moving party. Donahue v. Windsor Locks Bd. of Fire Comm'rs, 834 F.2d 54, 57 (2d Cir.1987).
A party opposing summary judgment "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Although all reasonable inferences must be drawn against the moving party, "the burden on the moving party may be discharged by `showing'-that is, pointing out to the district court-that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553-54, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
To sustain a claim under the ADA, plaintiff must prove that: (1) he was disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) he was qualified, with or without reasonable accommodation, to perform his job; and (3) that he was discharged because of his disability. White v. York Int'l Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 360-61 (10th Cir.1995).
1. Disability under the ADA
Under the ADA, disability requires, "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of [an] individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) [the individual is] regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). Plaintiff asserts that he falls under definitions (A) and (C). Because he falls under (A), whether he falls under (C) as well is not addressed.
"Major life activities" include "caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning and working." 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630.2(i)(emphasis added). Plaintiff asserts that he was substantially limited in the major life activity of working.
While it is undisputed that plaintiff is physically impaired — a 10% permanent partial disability of the back — the parties disagree as to whether he is substantially limited.
With respect to the major life activity of working ... [t]he term substantially limits means significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities. The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.
29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (emphasis in original).
Defendant argues that plaintiff is not substantially limited in the major life activity of working because his physical impairment only excludes him from a narrow range of jobs. Plaintiff argues that it excludes him from all heavy lifting jobs and thus constitutes a substantial limitation.
Courts differ as to whether a back condition which prevents lifting and performing heavy duty jobs constitutes a substantial limitation on working. In Frix v. Florida Tile Indus., Inc., 970 F.Supp. 1027 (N.D.Ga.1997), the court addressed this issue where plaintiff claimed a substantial limitation in a 25 pound weight-lifting restriction:
Defendant argues that Plaintiff is not substantially limited in the major life activity of working because Plaintiff is precluded from performing only a narrow range of jobs.... A growing body of case law supports Defendant's argument. Williams v. Channel Master Satellite Sys., Inc., 101 F.3d 346, 349 (4th Cir.1996) () ( plaintiff failed to show plaintiff was substantially limited in major life activities where "a 25-pound lifting restriction was the only medical limitation placed upon [plaintiffs] activities"); Ray v. Glidden Co., 85 F.3d 227, 228, 229 (5th Cir.1996) (); Wooten v. Farmland Foods, 58 F.3d 382, 384, 386 (8th Cir.1995) ().
This court, however, rejects Defendant's arguments, and the case law supporting the argument, because the Court believes Plaintiff's back impairment prevents Plaintiff from performing an entire class of jobs. "[A]n individual who has a back condition that prevents the individual from performing any heavy labor job [is] substantially limited in the major life activity of working because the individual's impairment eliminates his or her ability to perform a class of jobs." 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(j) (1996).
The Frix analysis is persuasive. Here plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence, which, if credited, would establish that he is substantially limited from working because he is excluded from heavy labor jobs.2 The work restriction form indicates that he could lift 26 pounds above shoulder height, 34.5 pounds from desk to chair levels, and 21.5 from chair to floor levels. In the push/pull assessment, his capability was 91.5 pounds. (Pl.'s Ex. Y.) He could carry 47 pounds with each hand. (Id.) Dr. Finn noted that plaintiff could only occasionally bend/stoop,...
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...associated with back impairment that prevented him from performing heavy and medium labor jobs was disabled); Rochford v. Town of Cheshire, 979 F.Supp. 116, 119-20 (D.Conn.1997) (denying summary judgment because plaintiff was excluded from heavy labor jobs and thus was substantially limited......
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...could not arrive to work "on time or often enough to perform essential functions of job," even with flextime); Rochford v. Town of Cheshire, 979 F.Supp. 116, 122 (D.Conn.1997) (same, where plaintiff adduced no evidence suggesting that he could perform essential functions of job after eight-......
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Zarzycki v. United Technologies Corp., 3:96-CV-1782 (GLG).
...This Court has also held that a 10% permanent partial disability of the back is a physical impairment. Rochford v. Town of Cheshire, 979 F.Supp. 116, 119 (D.Conn.1997) (Dorsey, C.J.). Construing the facts in a light most favorable to plaintiff, we find that plaintiff had a physical impairme......