Rock House Farm, Inc. v. Ridgeway Lion's Club
| Decision Date | 14 March 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. WD,WD |
| Citation | 894 S.W.2d 262 |
| Parties | ROCK HOUSE FARM, INC., Appellant, v. RIDGEWAY LION'S CLUB, Respondent. 49486. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
John R. Sanderford, Kansas City, for appellant.
Roscoe E. Moulthrop, Jr., Bethany, for respondent.
Before BRECKENRIDGE, P.J., and ELLIS and LAURA DENVIR STITH, JJ.
Rock House Farm, Inc. ("Rock House"), is the owner of certain real property which includes part of a lake in Harrison County, Missouri. In January, 1976 the Ridgeway Lion's Club ("Ridgeway") leased 8.18 acres of the property, which is adjacent to and part of the lake, for a term of 99 years. The lease provided that Ridgeway would use the land for a park and recreational area consistent with the purposes of the Ridgeway Lions Club, and further that it would have the right to use the lake portion of the leased premises for fishing, boating, water skiing, and recreational purposes, and that it could permit others to use the leased premises.
Since 1990, this lease has been the subject of three lawsuits brought by Rock House against Ridgeway regarding Ridgeway's use of the leased property and adjoining lake. The first suit was filed on June 27, 1990. In that case, Rock House, in Count I, sought to have the lease terminated for inadequate consideration and in Count II contended the lease was ambiguous and asked the court to construe it. On January 25, 1991, the circuit court entered judgment in favor of Ridgeway on both counts, finding adequate consideration and no ambiguity.
On November 12, 1991, Rock House filed a second two-count suit against Ridgeway. Count I of this petition contended Rock House had properly withdrawn its offer to lease to Ridgeway the waters of the lake prior to Ridgeway's acceptance of the offer because Ridgeway failed to deliver the agreed consideration of $500.00 to Rock House. Under this count, Rock House claimed Ridgeway's use of the land was trespass. Count II sought an injunction to prohibit certain activity on the lake waters which Rock House claimed unreasonably deprived it of its peaceful enjoyment of the lake and surrounding property owned by Rock House. Ridgeway filed an answer and cross-petition in that action. The cross-petition alleged Rock House had interfered with Ridgeway's rights under the lease agreement and sought damages. Ridgeway also filed a motion for summary judgment, contending Rock House's petition was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. On May 18, 1992, the trial court granted the Motion for Summary Judgment as to Count I but overruled the motion as to Count II as to acts or conduct allegedly committed by Ridgeway after January 25, 1991. On October 23, 1992, Rock House filed a dismissal without prejudice pursuant to Rule 67.02, and the case proceeded to trial only on Ridgeway's cross-petition. On December 21, 1992, the trial judge issued findings of fact and entered judgment dismissing Count II of Rock House's petition without prejudice and holding Ridgeway's cross petition for naught, "with the sole exception that the status of the parties be, and hereby is subject to the findings of fact as set forth herein." 1
On May 12, 1993, Rock House filed a third two-count petition against Ridgeway. In Count I, Rock House admitted the existence of the lease dated January 19, 1976, but contended that the leased property had been used for purposes other than those specified in the lease agreement and that under the terms of the lease, this unauthorized use resulted in reversion of the property to Rock House. In Count II, Rock House again sought an injunction to abate certain activities on the waters of the lake as a temporary nuisance. Ridgeway filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, contending both Count I and Count II were barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Rock House filed a reply to the motion for summary judgment and an affidavit detailing some of the activities which had occurred on the lake waters and in the park which were not specified in the lease. On February 9, 1994, after a hearing on Ridgeway's Motion for Summary Judgment, the trial court granted summary judgment as to both Count I and Count II. Rock House now appeals the trial court's granting Ridgeway's Motion for Summary Judgment in the third suit.
"Summary judgment is designed to permit the trial court to enter judgment, without delay, where the moving party has demonstrated, on the basis of facts as to which there is no genuine dispute, a right to judgment as a matter of law." ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid-Am. Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. banc 1993). The propriety of summary judgment is purely an issue of law which we review de novo on the record submitted and the law. Id.
When reviewing the entry of summary judgment, we view the evidentiary record in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was granted, determine if any genuine issue of fact exists which would require a trial, and determine if the judgment is correct as a matter of law. We will affirm if the judgment is sustainable as a matter of law under any theory.
State ex rel. Conway v. Villa, 847 S.W.2d 881, 886 (Mo.App.1993); Rule 74.04(c). A genuine issue of fact exists where the record contains competent evidence that two plausible but contradictory accounts of essential facts exist. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp., 854 S.W.2d at 382.
Rock House raises two points on appeal. First, it contends the trial court erred in sustaining Ridgeway's motion for summary judgment as to Count I on the basis of res judicata because Count I of the third petition raised new legal and factual issues. Specifically, Rock House claims that the January 25, 1991 judgment found the lease agreement to be unambiguous and supported by adequate consideration. The action filed in May, 1993, Rock House argues, did not question the underlying validity of the lease agreement or raise the issue of ambiguity or sufficiency of consideration, but rather Count I admits the existence of the lease agreement and raises the claim that Ridgeway's activities on the property are of such a nature that the property should, by the terms of the lease, revert to Rock House.
In its second point, Rock House contends the trial court erred in sustaining Ridgeway's motion for summary judgment as to Count II on the basis of res judicata because Count II of the May, 1993 petition raised new legal and factual issues based on conduct occurring on the premises. Rock House asserts the January 25, 1991 judgment addressed the issues of ambiguity and adequate consideration while the current petition to abate temporary nuisance addresses specific conduct occurring on the premises. It argues that the claim under Count II was first raised in the second suit in November, 1991. In that second suit, Ridgeway's motion for summary judgment was overruled on that count as to activities...
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