Rockbridge Associates, Ltd. v. Pruitt

• Decision Date: 30 September 1971
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 14483.
• Citation: 341 F. Supp. 703
• Parties: ROCKBRIDGE ASSOCIATES, LTD., a Georgia Limited Partnership, v. W. R. (Dudge) PRUITT et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia

341 F. Supp. 703

ROCKBRIDGE ASSOCIATES, LTD., a Georgia Limited Partnership, v. W. R. (Dudge) PRUITT et al.

Civ. A. No. 14483.

United States District Court, N. D. Georgia, Atlanta Division.

September 30, 1971.

Troutman, Sams, Schroder & Lockerman, Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiff.

Stark & Stark, Lawrenceville, Ga., for defendant.

ORDER

EDENFIELD, District Judge.

Plaintiff, a Georgia limited partnership, is the owner of a parcel of land in Gwinnett County, Georgia. A portion of plaintiff's property is presently zoned R-85 (residential); another portion is zoned C-2 (commercial). In June, 1970, plaintiff applied to the Gwinnett County Planning Commission to have the property rezoned to an RM (apartment) classification. Though the Planning Commission recommended approval of the rezoning request, the Gwinnett County Commissioners refused to follow this recommendation and the application for rezoning was denied. The complaint alleges that the decision of the county commissioners violates plaintiff's equal protection and due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.¹ Specifically, it is alleged that (1) the decision of the County Commissioners was arbitrary, capricious, and amounted to a taking of property without due process in that it arbitrarily interfered with plaintiff's rights in and use of its property and deprived plaintiff of a major portion of the value of its property; (2) the decision of the County Commissioners was not based upon competent evidence establishing that the proposed rezoning was inconsistent with the objectives of the county's zoning resolution; (3) the decision of the Commissioners discriminated arbitrarily between plaintiff's property and property similarly situated; (4) plaintiff was denied certain procedural safeguards; and (5) the delegation of zoning authority by the State to local governing bodies denies citizens, who do not live within the County, the right to participate effectively in zoning matters, since they cannot vote for the County Commissioners.

Defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. At plaintiff's request a hearing was held at which plaintiff candidly clarified its contentions and the facts in this case. Upon considering the allegations of the complaint in light of the facts and contentions presented at the hearing, the court concludes that no substantial federal question is presented and the complaint must therefore be dismissed.

At the outset it should be noted that the federal district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. It is not their function to serve merely as a zoning appeal board. The individual merits of local zoning matters are appropriately left to the sound discretion of local zoning authorities. This court is charged only with the responsibility of insuring that zoning decisions are not made in a manner which contravenes the mandates of the United States Constitution. Since the decision of local zoning authorities is an exercise of judgment legislative in character, these decisions are subject to judicial control only if arbitrary or if interested parties have been denied procedural due process. Diedrich v. Zoning Commission of the District of Columbia, 129 U.S.App.D.C. 265, 393 F. 2d 666 (1968); Hot Shoppes, Inc. v. Clouser, 231 F.Supp. 825 (D.D.C.1964).

While it is true that the decision of local zoning authorities restricts the uses of certain property and in some instances may cause the property to be used for other than its most profitable use, these factors do not cause the decision to be unconstitutional, unless the decision is arbitrary. Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 82 S.Ct. 987, 8 L.Ed. 130 (1962); City of St. Paul v. Chicago, St. Paul, M. & O. Ry., 413 F.2d 762 (8th Cir. 1969); McCleskey v. Barrett, 386 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1967). In denying plaintiff's rezoning request the County Commissioners assigned reasons² for their action which are consistent with the objectives of the zoning resolution.³ Therefore, in the absence of a showing that there was no evidence to support the decision, the action taken by the County Commissioners cannot be found to be arbitrary.

Not only does the record indicate that evidence was presented at an August 25, 1970 hearing before the Commissioners but plaintiff does not assert that there was no evidence to support the decision. What plaintiff specifically complained of at the hearing is that the evidence considered by the Commissioners was "secret evidence", not competent to support the decision. The charge...