South Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt, 71-3420
Decision Date | 03 December 1973 |
Docket Number | No. 71-3420,71-3421.,71-3420 |
Citation | 482 F.2d 389 |
Parties | SOUTH GWINNETT VENTURE, a partnership composed of South Gwinnett Apartments, Inc., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. W. R. (Dudge) PRUITT et al., Defendants-Appellees. ROCKBRIDGE ASSOCIATES, LTD., a Georgia Limited Partnership, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. W. R. (Dudge) PRUITT et al., Defendants-Appellees. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Robert F. Cook, Dean Booth, Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiffs-appellants.
Homer M. Stark, Lawrenceville, Ga., for defendants-appellees.
Before WISDOM and INGRAHAM, Circuit Judges and BOOTLE, District Judge.
These appeals arose from suits filed in the district court by the respective plaintiffs, each against the Commissioners and the Chief Building Inspector of Gwinnett County, Georgia, each praying that certain portions of the zoning ordinance enacted by the Commissioners be declared unconstitutional and that the Chief Building Inspector issue building permits for the constructions of apartments upon the subject property. The district court dismissed the suits upon the motions of the defendants, holding that the rezoning applications called for a quasi legislative judgment by the zoning board, and as such the district court was without subject-matter jurisdiction to review the actions for anything more than arbitrariness and interest on the part of the board members.
The use of non-record secret evidence by the Gwinnett County Commissioners in denying appellants' application for the rezoning of certain tracts of land from single family residential classification to multi-family apartment use designations has projected purely local land use questions into a federal forum.
Contending that their applications had been denied by the Commissioners on evidence dehors the record and that the Commissioners' reliance on such evidence deprived them of due process, the appellants brought suit against the County Commissioners in federal district court asserting jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a). The district court, noting that federal courts are properly loathe to stretch their limited jurisdiction to become super zoning boards of appeal, found the denial of an application for rezoning to be a quasi-legislative act. As such, the court reasoned it was not impermissible for the quasi-legislators to use non-record materials in exercising their judgment. Consequently, the court dismissed appellants' complaint. 341 F.Supp. 703 (N.D.Ga., 1971).
We differ in only one salient regard from the decision of the district court. Our difference concerns the nature of an application for the rezoning of a tract of land. As we recently noted in Higginbotham v. Barrett, 473 F.2d 745 (5th Cir., 1973) 1973:
The adoption of a legislative plan for the entire community must be distinguished from the treatment which a specific tract of land receives when its owner petitions for reclassification under that plan. As the record in this case demonstrates, consideration of that petition is an exercise of legislative power in a case by case adjudicative setting. Compare, Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 28 S.Ct. 708, 52 L.Ed. 1103 (1908) with Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 36 S.Ct. 141, 60 L.Ed. 372 (1915). See, Hot Shoppes, Inc. v. Clouser, 231 F.Supp. 825 (D.C., 1964), affirmed 120 U.S. App.D.C. 353, 346 F.2d 834 (1965); and Donovan v. Clarke, 222 F.Supp. 632 (D. C., 1963). Cf. State ex rel. Ludlow v. Guffey, 306 S.W.2d 552 (Mo., 1957); Morton v. Mayor and Council of Clark Township, 102 N.J.Super. 84, 245 A.2d 377 (1968). See, generally, K. Davis Administrative Law Text. Thus distinguished from the legislative action of adopting a comprehensive zoning plan, the adjudicative decision inherent in tract rezoning requires the decision maker to adhere to concepts of minimal due process. Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir., 1964); Hot Shoppes, Inc. v. Clouser, supra; Donovan v. Clark, supra. Here, appellants' complaint alleged that rezoning of the property had been denied by the Commissioners without a statement of their reasons and by recourse to evidence which was not in the record. Such administrative action has long been condemned, Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 58 S.Ct. 773, 82 L.Ed. 1129 (1938); Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 301 U.S. 292, 57 S.Ct. 724, 81 L.Ed. 1093 (1937); United States v. Abilene & Southern Ry. Co., 265 U.S. 274, 44 S.Ct. 565, 68 L.Ed. 1016 (1924); Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & Nashville RR Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33 S.Ct. 185, 57 L.Ed. 431 (1913); Hornsby v. Allen, supra, and we do so here.
The orders of the district court are reversed and the causes remanded for proceedings consistent herewith.
I would affirm for all reasons stated by the Trial Court in his memorandum opinion, Rockbridge Associates, Ltd. v. Pruitt, 341 F.Supp. 703 (N.D.Ga.1971), plus an additional reason to be stated. I agree with the Trial Court "that plaintiff was afforded procedural due process in connection with the various hearings before local zoning authorities" and that "there is nothing to indicate that the decision of the Commissioners could be found to be arbitrary." The majority opinion groups these two cases together and over-reacts, I think, to the contention of one of the plaintiffs that as to it the County Commissioners in star chamber fashion used non-record secret evidence. I, naturally, have examined that charge carefully. First, it must be noted that only Rockbridge Associates, Ltd. makes this contention. South Gwinnett Venture's case was considered by the Commissioners on November 24, 1970, and again on December 1, 1970, and there is no contention that any secret evidence was used in the consideration of that case. The Rockbridge case was considered by the Commissioners earlier on August 25, 1970 and September 9, 1970, and it is in connection with these earlier hearings that Rockbridge claims the use of secret evidence. Secondly, I think this charge is unsubstantiated. What happened is this: at the August 25, 1970 hearing one of the Commissioners moved to "table the decision for two weeks so that he could obtain additional studies and consult with the Engineering Department." This does not sound star chamberish. His intentions were announced in open meeting. The postponement was for two weeks. The Engineering Department of Gwinnett County is probably not so large that plaintiffs could not have ascertained whatever information it furnished the Commissioners had they so desired. Nor does any reason appear why they did not inquire at the resumed hearing on September 9, 1970 as to what additional studies, if any, the Commissioners had obtained. Rockbridge argues that the Commissioners have refused to disclose the contents of their conversation with the Engineering Department and the additional studies. Nothing in the record substantiates this argument. Nor was there any request by plaintiffs for any more complete or detailed findings of fact by the Commissioners. All this suggests that plaintiffs' desire to make a federal case exceeded their fear of deprivation of due process.
An additional reason not specifically assigned by the Trial Court for dismissing the complaint is failure of the plaintiffs to exhaust their administrative remedies. While a litigant normally need not exhaust his state "judicial" remedies, normally he must exhaust his state "legislative" or "administrative" remedies before challenging state action in federal court. See Wright, Federal Courts, § 49, p. 187 (2d ed.). Under the applicable zoning ordinance plaintiffs had the right to appeal to the Zoning Board of Appeals from any decision of the Chief Building Inspector, and said Board of Appeals is empowered:
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