Rockefeller v. First National Bank of Brunswick

• Decision Date: 10 July 1957
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 469.
• Citation: 154 F. Supp. 122
• Parties: Nancy Carnegie ROCKEFELLER v. The FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF BRUNSWICK et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia

154 F. Supp. 122

Nancy Carnegie ROCKEFELLER v. The FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF BRUNSWICK et al.

Civ. A. No. 469.

United States District Court S. D. Georgia, Brunswick Division.

July 10, 1957.

Edward E. Dorsey and James N. Frazer, of Powell, Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy, Atlanta, Ga., and Bernard Nightingale, of Nightingale & Liles, Brunswick, Ga., for plaintiff.

Charles L. Gowen and Chris B. Conyers, of Gowen, Conyers, Fendig & Dickey, Brunswick, Ga., for defendant bank as trustee.

Robert B. Troutman and Furman Smith, of Spalding, Sibley, Troutman, Meadow & Smith, Atlanta, Ga., for Glidden Co., intervenor.

Spencer Connerat and Malcolm Maclean, of Connerat, Dunn, Hunter, Cubbedge & Houlihan, Savannah, Ga., for Coleman C. Perkins, as guardian of Florence Carnegie Perkins, one of defendants, and for intervenors Coleman C. Perkins and Margaret Perkins Laughlin.

Alexander A. Lawrence, of Bouhan, Lawrence, Williams & Levy, Savannah, Ga., for Mrs. Lucy C. Ferguson, one of the defendants.

L. J. Bennet, of Reese, Bennet & Gilbert, Brunswick, Ga., for Mary Bayles Ricketson and others, defendants.

Weldon Shouse, of Shouse, Barker and Coplin, Lexington, Ky., for Margaret J. Wright and others.

William B. Watson, Jr., Gainesville, Fla., for Carter Carnegie, one of defendants.

Gertrude Schwartz, of Beer, Richards, Lane, Haller & Buttenwieser, New York City, for Andrew Carnegie III and Thomas M. Carnegie, defendants.

SCARLETT, District Judge.

This is an action by Mrs. Nancy Carnegie Rockefeller, for declaratory judgment and injunction, to prevent the carrying out of a mineral lease approved and ordered executed by the Superior Court of Camden County, Georgia.

The First National Bank of Brunswick was appointed successor trustee under the will of Mrs. Lucy C. Carnegie for certain property on Cumberland Island, Georgia. The trustee learned that there were minerals of great value on the property. After extensive investigation and negotiation it applied to the Superior Court of Camden County, Georgia for leave to execute a mineral lease with the Glidden Company as lessee. All beneficiaries of the trust were made parties and served. The plaintiff, Mrs. Rockefeller, being a non-resident, was served by publication and by mailing to her by registered mail a copy of the petition and order. She appeared and filed demurrers and answer opposing the execution of the lease. The Superior Court of Camden County overruled her demurrers and she appealed to the Supreme Court of Georgia by writ of error, which is now pending in the Supreme Court of Georgia. After a full hearing, in which Mrs. Rockefeller participated and presented evidence, the Superior Court of Camden County entered an order authorizing and directing the trustee to enter into the proposed lease with the Glidden Company. The lease has been executed by both parties and the initial payment therein required has been paid by the Glidden Company to the trustee.

While the proceedings were pending in the Superior Court of Camden County, Georgia, Mrs. Rockefeller filed her complaint in this court praying a declaratory judgment. The first count prayed for declaratory judgment declaring that the trustee had no right to enter into the mineral lease, for which leave was prayed in the state court, and that the state court had no power to authorize execution of such lease. The second count prayed an order declaring the trust executed and requiring the trustee to make distribution of the trust assets. By amendment Mrs. Rockefeller added a third count in which she prayed that this court issue its permanent injunction against the trustee and the Glidden Company prohibiting them from carrying out the provisions of the lease executed pursuant to the order of the Superior Court of Camden County, Georgia.

While the complaint prays that the Glidden Company be enjoined from carrying out the provisions of the lease, it was not made a party to the complaint. It filed a motion to be allowed to intervene, to which plaintiff objected. The Court is of the opinion that the intervention of the Glidden Company should be allowed.

Plaintiff filed a motion to strike all of the beneficiaries of the trust who had been made parties defendant. Certain of the beneficiaries objected to being stricken as defendants. The beneficiaries of the trust appear to me to be necessary parties. See Commonwealth Trust Co. of Pittsburg v. Smith, 266 U.S. 152, 45 S.Ct. 26, 69 L.Ed. 219; Baird v. Peoples B. & T. Co., 3 Cir., 120 F.2d 1001(3), 136 A. L.R. 693. The court is of the opinion this motion should be overruled.

Coleman C. Perkins and Margaret Perkins Laughlin filed motion for leave to intervene. They are the children of Mrs. Florence Carnegie Perkins. As such they are remaindermen under the trust and interested therein. The Court holds that they should be allowed to intervene.

The trustee, the Glidden Company, and certain beneficiaries of the trust have filed motions to dismiss.

It is obvious that the relief prayed by plaintiff, if granted, would bring this court into irreconcilable conflict with the Superior Court of Camden County, Georgia and with the Supreme Court of Georgia if that court affirms the judgment of the Superior Court of Camden County, Georgia. The state court has ordered the trustee to execute the mineral lease with the Glidden Company. The purpose, and effect if granted, of the relief prayed by the plaintiff in this case would be to frustrate the judgment of the Superior Court of Camden County, Georgia.

Sec. 2283 of Title 28, U.S.C.A. prohibits the grant of injunction to stay proceedings in a state court, with certain exceptions not here applicable. The restraint of that section cannot be avoided by framing the action as a declaratory judgment action rather than for injunction, or by seeking to restrain the parties rather than the state court. H. J. Heinz Co. v. Owens, 9 Cir., 189 F.2d 505; Ballard v. Mutual Life Insurance Co., 5 Cir., 109 F.2d 388.

Moreover, both the proceeding in the state court and this proceeding necessarily involve the control and disposition of specific property, the property of the trust located on Cumberland Island, Georgia. It is well settled that where a proceeding is brought, either in the state or federal court, in rem or quasi in rem, which involves the control or disposition of specific property, the court which first acquires jurisdiction may maintain and exercise that jurisdiction to the exclusions of the other, and that the later proceedings brought in the other court must be dismissed. Princess Lida of Thurm and Taxis v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456, 59 S.Ct. 275, 83 L.Ed. 285. The Supreme Court has said that the principle there laid down "is a principle of right and of law, and therefore, of necessity. It leaves nothing to discretion or mere convenience". Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U.S. 226, 43 S.Ct. 79, 81, 67 L.Ed. 226.

The state court proceeding necessarily required control of the specific property. The whole purpose of the proceeding was to dispose of the property or a portion thereof. That court could not order the disposition of the property without control of the property. And the purpose of the proceeding in this court is to prevent the disposition of the property by the State Court, and thus to control the...