Rockwell Spring & Axle Co. v. Romulus Tp.

• Decision Date: 16 March 1962
• Docket Number: No. 44,44
• Citation: 114 N.W.2d 166,365 Mich. 632
• Parties: ROCKWELL SPRING AND AXLE COMPANY a Pennsylvania Corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. ROMULUS TOWNSHIP, WAYNE COUNTY, Michigan; and Edmund Bizek, Treasurer, Romulus Township, Defendants and Appellees.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 166

114 N.W.2d 166

365 Mich. 632

ROCKWELL SPRING AND AXLE COMPANY a Pennsylvania Corporation Plaintiff and Appellant, v. ROMULUS TOWNSHIP, WAYNE COUNTY, Michigan; and Edmund Bizek Treasurer, Romulus Township, Defendants and Appellees.

No. 44.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

March 16, 1962.

John P. O'Hara, Jr., Coulter, O'Hara & Coulter, Detroit, for plaintiff and appellant.

Samuel H. Olsen, Pros. Atty., Aloysius J. Suchy, Asst. Pros. Atty., Detroit, for appellees, by William F. Koney, Asst. Pros.Atty., Detroit.

Before the Entire Bench.

CARR, Justice.

Plaintiff in this case is a Pennsylvania corporation authorized to carry on business within the State of Michigan. The county of Wayne owns and operates within the township of Romulus an airport designated as Detroit-Wayne Major Airport. In connection therewith there has been constructed by the board of county road commissioners of Wayne county a hangar capable of housing a number of airplanes. In November, 1953, said commission, acting on behalf of Wayne county, entered into a leasing agreement with plaintiff, covering approximately 6,500 square feet of space designed for use for hangar, shop and office purposes, to continue in effect for a 10 year period beginning with date of occupancy. Plaintiff entered into possession thereof in December of 1954.

In the following year defendant township caused the interest of plaintiff in the hangar to be assessed for county, township, and school taxes, the total valuation being fixed at $40,210, and the amount of the assessment being $1,433,89. Said assessment was made under the provisions of P.A.1953, No. 189 (C.L.S.1956, §§ 211.181 and 211,182 [Stat.Ann.1960 Rev. §§ 7.7(5) and 7.7(6)]). The tax statement rendered indicated that the assessment was based on plaintiff's right of user and its interest therein under the lease above mentioned. The tax so assessed was paid under protest, duly served on defendant township treasurer, asserting that said act of 1953 was, for several reasons named, unconstitutional. Plaintiff brought this action to recover the tax, the case being instituted under date of February 15, 1956. Following a trial before the circuit judge without a jury judgment was entered denying the right of plaintiff to recover, and it has appealed.

The statute the constitutionality of which is here involved is entitled:

'AN ACT to provide for the taxation of lessees and users of tax-exempt property.'

It reads as follows:

'Sec. 1. When any real property which for any reason is exempt from taxation is leased, loaned or otherwise made available to and used by a private individual, association or corporation in connection with a business conducted for profit, except where the use is by way of a concession in or relative to the use of a public airport, park, market, fair ground or similar property which is available to the use of the general public, shall be subject to taxation in the same amount and to the same extent as though the lessee or user were the owner of such property: Provided, however, That the foregoing shall not apply to federal property for which payments are made in lieu of taxes in amounts equivalent to taxes which might otherwise be lawfully assessed or property of any state-supported educational institution.

'Sec. 2. Taxes shall be assessed to such lessees or users of real property and collected in the same manner as taxes assessed to owners of real property, except that such taxes shall not become a lien against the property. When due, such taxes shall constitute a debt due from the lessee or user to the township, city, village, county and school district for which the taxes were assessed and shall be recoverable by direct action of assumpsit.'

The constitutionality of P.A.1953, No. 189, was involved in United States and Borg-Warner Corporation v. City of Detroit, 345 Mich. 601, 77 N.W.2d 79; 355 U.S. 466, 78 S.Ct. 474, 2 L.Ed.2d 424, and also in Township of Muskegon v. Continental Motors Corporation, 346 Mich. 218, 77 N.W.2d 799; 355 U.S. 484, 78 S.Ct. 483, 2 L.Ed.2d 436, in which this Court, the Supreme Court of the United States affirming, held that the claims of invalidity for the reasons there advanced were not tenable. In the instant case plaintiff assailed the statute on claims other than those advanced in the decisions cited. It is the position of counsel for appellant that the act violates article 10, § 6, and article 10, § 4, of the Michigan Constitution, article 2, § 16, of the Constitution of the State, and the 14th amendment to the Federal Constitution. It is also contended that the act does not apply to a hangar leased at a public airport. The trial judge considered these contentions at some length, and in a written opinion filed in the cause rejected them.

Article 10, § 6, of the Constitution of this State provides as follows:

'Every law which imposes, continues or revives a tax shall distinctly state the tax, and the objects to which it is to be applied; and it shall not be sufficient to refer to any other law to fix such tax or object.'

The purpose of the legislature in the adoption of P.A.1953, No. 189, is obvious. It was to declare subject to taxation, as other property is taxed for public purposes, a right to the use of property which is not subject to taxation as such, subject to the exceptions specified in section 1 and to the manner of collection set forth in section 2. The legislature obviously deemed it proper that the right of user of exempt property should be considered in the same category as property generally that is subject to taxation under the laws of the State. The purpose was to fix the status of the right of user with reference to taxation. That such right is a valuable one is not open to question, and the legislature deemed that the possessor thereof should be required to assume liability to contribute by way of taxes on an equal basis with property owners generally. Act No. 189 does not create a new tax applicable to specific property for a specific object, nor does it continue or revive a tax. Bearing in mind the purpose of the act and the object sought to be achieved by the constitutional requirement imposed, it may not be said that Act No. 189 is in conflict with the section of the Constitution on which appellant relies.

This Court in Westinghausen v. People, 44 Mich. 265, 6 N.W. 641, considered an objection to the requirement of a statute enacted in 1879 requiring the payment of a tax for the privilege of selling intoxicating liquor, the objection being based on article 14, § 14, of the Constitution of 1850, the language of which was repeated in the present State Constitution in article 10, § 6. In rejecting the claim advanced by the appellant, it was said with reference to the purpose and scope of the constitutional provision:

'Its intent is manifest to prevent the legislature from being deceived in regard to any measure for levying taxes, and from furnishing money that might, by some indirection, be used for objects not approved by the legislature. Inasmuch as the constitution in another place confines all statutes to single objects, the restriction is less important than under the old constitution. It receive a reasonable construction to carry out its design. The statute in question does not, we think, violate that design. The tax, it is admitted, is definite enough. It is to be received by the county treasurer of each county and placed by him to the credit of the contingent fund of the township, city, or village from which it is collected, and paid over to the proper local officer to be used for the purposes of that fund. Pub.Acts 1879, p. 297.

'We can see no reason why the increase of the contingent fund of a corporation is not a specific object. The constitution certainly does not contemplate, but rather forbids, any reference to a city or village charter in terms; and it would be a gross abuse to insert in such a statute as this a copy of the multifarious purposes of a contingent fund, mentioned in any or all of the local charters at length. There is no uncertainty in a provision which names the classes of beneficiaries, and devotes the taxes to their use in a fund which is perfectly understood by every one as devoted to non-specified purposes, some of which could not be readily foreseen. If this objection is good it would be difficult to understand why a city charter, allowing money to be paid into a contingent fund, would not come within similar difficulties. A nice objector might say that paying money over to a city or township for general purposes would be uncertain. We must treat these provisions sensibly, and not hypercritically; and when the purpose is named and unmistakable, and it is impossible for the legislature to be misled concerning it, no other practical requirement can be found.'

As before suggested, the statute in question here was designed to subject a certain type of property to general taxation, necessarily implying that such taxes should be used for the general purposes of government in the same manner as other tax money is required to be used. Its language is specific and may not be said to be ambiguous in any respect. Certainly there could have been no misunderstanding on the part of the legislature as to either the purpose of the act or the objects to which the tax imposed should be devoted. We conclude that the claim of invalidity based on a violation of the requirement of article 10, § 6, of the present State Constitution is untenable.

The further claims that P.A.1953, No. 189, violates article 10, § 4, of the Constitution because lacking in uniformity, and also article 2, § 16, of the Michigan Constitution, and the 14th amendment to the Federal Constitution, are based primarily on the provision in section 1 of the act excepting property 'of any state-supported educational institution.' The argument is advanced in support of such claims that plaintiff may not be required to pay a tax on the...