Dawson v. Secretary of State

• Decision Date: 20 March 2007
• Docket Number: Docket No. 264103.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
• Parties: Todd DAWSON, Ronald J. Hale, Wilbur Loew, Michael Medore, and Michelle Zainea, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. SECRETARY OF STATE and Department of Treasury, Defendants-Appellees.

739 N.W.2d 339

274 Mich. App. 723

Todd DAWSON, Ronald J. Hale, Wilbur Loew, Michael Medore, and Michelle Zainea, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. SECRETARY OF STATE and Department of Treasury, Defendants-Appellees.

Docket No. 264103.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted February 8, 2006, Lansing.

Decided March 20, 2007, at 9:15 a.m.

Released for Publication August 1, 2007.

Henry L. Guikema, P.C. (by Henry L. Guikema), Grand Rapids, for the plaintiffs.

Michael A. Cox, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, and Michael F. Murphy and Melissa R. Christianson, Assistant Attorneys General, for the defendants.

Before: WILDER, P.J., and ZAHRA and DAVIS, JJ.

WILDER, P.J.

Plaintiffs appeal as of right a Court of Claims order granting defendants' motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10). On appeal, plaintiffs seek to have the matter remanded for a class certification of all persons assessed fees under subsections 2(a) and (b) of the driver responsibility law, MCL 257.732a, arguing that the provisions violate the double jeopardy and equal protection clauses of the United States and Michigan constitutions. Plaintiffs also challenge subsections 2(a) and (b) on the grounds that the provisions violate the uniformity of taxation clause, art. 9, § 3, and the "distinct statement" clause, art. 4, § 32,¹ of the Michigan Constitution. Because we hold that subsections 2(a) and (b) of the driver responsibility law do not violate those constitutional provisions, we affirm.

I. The Law at Issue

Michigan's driver responsibility law (DRL) became effective October 1, 2003. 2003 PA 165. Subsequent amendments of it became effective May 1, 2004.² The DRL provides for a fee assessment against drivers who are convicted of specific misdemeanor or felony offenses or who accumulate seven or more qualifying points on their driving records.³ MCL 257.732a(1) and (2). Under the DRL, the Secretary of State assesses the fee and "shall transmit the fees collected . . . to the state treasurer," who credits the money received to the general and the fire protection funds. MCL 257.732a(10). The fees assessed by the Secretary of State are in addition to any fines, fees, and costs imposed in court.

The Secretary of State "shall" suspend the driver's license of an individual who fails to pay the fee assessed or establish an installment plan within the time limits specified by MCL 257.732a(3) and (5). The suspension of driving privileges is removed upon the payment of the delinquent assessment and any other fees. MCL 257.732a(5).

II. Facts and Procedural History

Each plaintiff was convicted of an enumerated driving offense or an equivalent local ordinance referred to in MCL 257.732a(2)(a)(i) to (v)⁴ or MCL 257.732a(2)(b)(i) to (iv).⁵ Accordingly, each plaintiff was assessed either a "$1,000.00 driver responsibility fee each year for 2 consecutive years" under MCL 257.732a(2)(a) or a "$500.00 driver responsibility fee each year for 2 consecutive years" under MCL 257.732a(2)(b).⁶

Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint seeking a declaration that subsections 2(a) and (b) are constitutionally invalid, alleging that the provisions violate federal and state double jeopardy and equal protection guarantees. Plaintiffs further alleged that the driver responsibility fees constitute a tax imposed on an arbitrary class of taxpayers, in violation of the uniformity of taxation clause, Const. 1963, art 9, § 3, and that the tax is unconstitutional for failing to identify the DRL as a "tax" as required by Const. 1963, art 4, § 32. In addition, plaintiffs sought an order certifying a class of similarly situated persons and a refund of all driver responsibility fees paid.⁷ Defendants filed a motion for summary disposition, and plaintiffs responded with a countermotion for summary disposition, requesting that their claim be permitted to proceed on the issues of class certification and remedy.

Following a hearing, the Court of Claims dismissed plaintiffs' claims, concluding that no double jeopardy violation occurred because the Legislature intended to impose a civil, and not a criminal, penalty. The Court of Claims further concluded that the DRL fees do not violate equal protection guarantees, given the statute's purpose to raise revenue, and that a rational basis existed for assessing fees against persons who drain state resources by committing offenses related to driving. In rejecting plaintiffs' claim that subsections 2(a) and (b) impose a tax without distinctly identifying it as a tax in violation of art. 4, § 32 of the Michigan Constitution, the court determined that the label "tax" was not necessary because the object of the assessments is apparent. Accordingly, the court concluded that plaintiffs' request for class certification was moot and granted defendants' motion for summary disposition. Plaintiffs now appeal.

III. Standards of Review

This Court reviews de novo questions of law involving statutory interpretation. Michigan Muni Liability, Prop. Pool v. Muskegon Co. Bd. of Co. Road Comm'rs, 235 Mich.App. 183, 189, 597 N.W.2d 187 (1999). This Court also reviews de novo the trial court's grant of summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10). See Maiden v. Rozwood, 461 Mich. 109, 119-120, 597 N.W.2d 817 (1999). Whether a statute violates the federal constitution is a question of law reviewed de novo. Westlake Transportation, Inc. v. Pub. Service Comm., 255 Mich.App. 589, 616, 662 N.W.2d 784 (2003).

IV. Legal Analysis

A. Double Jeopardy

The first question before us is whether the automatic assessment of driver responsibility fees under subsections 2(a) and (b)⁸ of the DRL upon a conviction of a qualifying misdemeanor or felony offense violates the United State and Michigan constitutions' prohibitions against double jeopardy. We hold that there is no double jeopardy violation.

Statutes are presumed to be constitutional unless their unconstitutionality is readily apparent. See Neal v. Oakwood Hosp. Corp., 226 Mich.App. 701, 719, 575 N.W.2d 68 (1997). A party challenging the constitutionality of a statute has the burden of proving its unconstitutionality. Complete Truck & Auto Parts, Inc. v. Secretary of State, 264 Mich.App. 655, 659, 692 N.W.2d 847 (2004). The primary objective of constitutional interpretation is to realize the intent of the people by whom and for whom the constitution was ratified and to interpret the constitution according to the intent of the voters who ratified it. Wayne Co. v. Hathcock, 471 Mich. 445, 468, 684 N.W.2d 765 (2004).

The primary goal of judicial interpretation of statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Neal v. Wilkes, 470 Mich. 661, 665, 685 N.W.2d 648 (2004). This Court gives effect to the Legislature's intent as expressed in the statute's terms, giving the words of the statute their plain and ordinary meaning. Willett v. Waterford Charter Twp., 271 Mich.App. 38, 48, 718 N.W.2d 386 (2006). "If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, judicial construction is neither required nor permitted, and courts must apply the statute as written." USAA Ins. Co. v. Houston Gen. Ins. Co., 220 Mich.App. 386, 389, 559 N.W.2d 98 (1996). Nothing will be read "into an unambiguous statute that is not within the manifest intent of the Legislature as derived from the language of the statute itself." Roberts v. Mecosta Co. Gen. Hosp., 466 Mich. 57, 63, 642 N.W.2d 663 (2002).

Plaintiff's attack on the constitutionality of subsections 2(a) and (b) of the DRL is framed in the abstract, not based on the application of the particular facts. Thus, plaintiffs challenge the facial validity of the provisions. A party bringing a facial challenge "must show that no circumstances exist under which [the challenged statutory provision] would be valid." People v. Sands, 261 Mich.App. 158, 160-161, 680 N.W.2d 500 (2004). Because plaintiffs bring a facial challenge to the law, our decision is narrow.

Both the United States and Michigan constitutions prohibit placing a person twice in jeopardy for the same offense. U.S. Const., Am. V;⁹ Const. 1963, art. 1, § 15.¹⁰ Michigan's Double Jeopardy Clause is "essentially identical" to its federal counterpart and is "construed consistently with the corresponding federal provision." People v. Nutt, 469 Mich. 565, 575, 594, 677 N.W.2d 1 (2004). "The prohibition against double jeopardy provides three related protections: (1) it protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2) it protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and (3) it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense." Id. at 574, 677 N.W.2d 1 (emphasis added).

Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99, 118 S.Ct. 488, 139 L.Ed.2d 450 (1997), noted that the Double Jeopardy Clause "protects only against the imposition of multiple criminal punishments for the same offense, and then only when such occurs in successive proceedings." (Internal citations omitted; second emphasis added.) Here, there were not successive proceedings, but only one criminal adjudicative proceeding in each case, followed by the ministerial act of the imposition of fees by the Secretary of State. By the plain language of MCL 257.732a(2), liability for a driver responsibility fee attaches automatically upon conviction of a relevant crime. Therefore, as in Hudson, there is no second prosecution or proceeding in violation of double jeopardy. Hudson, supra at 99, 118 S.Ct. 488.

We also conclude there is no multiple punishment double jeopardy violation. Generally, if alleged multiple punishment is involved, the Double Jeopardy Clause restrains prosecutors and courts, not the Legislature. People v. Mitchell, 456 Mich. 693, 695, 575 N.W.2d 283 (1998); People v. Ford, 262 Mich.App. 443, 448, 687 N.W.2d 119 (2004). "Where the issue is one of multiple punishment rather than successive trials, the double jeopardy analysis is whether there is...