Rockwell Stock & Land Co. v. Castroni
| Decision Date | 14 October 1895 |
| Docket Number | 841 |
| Citation | 6 Colo.App. 528,42 P. 182 |
| Parties | ROCKWELL STOCK & LAND CO. v. CASTRONI. |
| Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Weld county court.
Action by Joseph M. Castroni against the Rockwell Stock & Land Company. There was a judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed.
L.C. Rockwell, for appellant.
Chas M. Bice, for appellee.
As suggested in the antecedent opinion (42 P. 180), Joseph Castroni's suit was tried with Martha's action, and before the same jury. The record in this case shows some irregularities other than what appears in the wife's suit. Probably this comes from the circumstance of counsel's reliance on the main error committed in the trial of the suit brought by the other plaintiff, while in this he preferred to preserve all the questions. Some of them are probably not of sufficient gravity to upset the judgment but they seem to require some little discussion in the settlement of the issue between the parties. No narration of the history of the case, other than what is contained in the statement preceding the other opinion, will be given, save to particularize some matters which were incidental to our conclusions in that matter. The alleged hiring on which Joseph sued occurred, if at all, at the time of the arrangement between the company and his wife, Martha, with reference to the establishment of the hennery. It was insisted on behalf of the plaintiff that when the discussion occurred in the latter part of August Mr. Rockwell hired him to go out to the farm and labor at whatsoever he might be called upon to do at an agreed price of $25 per month and his board. It was Joseph's contention that he was in no manner connected with the negotiations entered into between the company and his wife with reference to the establishment of the traffic in hens, but that he was hired independently, as a farm hand, to work at fixed wages. He insists he went out to the farm, and labored from that time on, until the disagreement between the parties in January, when he was discharged. The defendant company insists there was no agreement of this sort, but that he was simply hired, while the harvesting was going on, to do a specific class of work, for which he was to receive $1 per day and board. The company claimed to have paid him for all the time he worked. The issue was thus sharply defined as to the existence or nonexistence of a contract of hiring for a definite period at a fixed wage. The testimony was directed to this end, though, in the progress of the trial, the plaintiff offered testimony to show the value of his services, and thereby established his right to recover for work and labor done upon a quantum meruit. When the case was concluded, the court, over the objection of the defendant, instructed the jury upon both hypotheses. The jury were told, if they should find the agreement to have been made as the plaintiff alleged, they were bound to find for him at the rate of $25 a month and his board, making whatever deduction was proper for any payments which had been made. The jury were further told, even though they might find from the evidence there was no such agreement as the plaintiff attempted to show, if they found he had done work for the company from the time of going out there to the day of his discharge, and found its value to be of a certain sum, they should return a verdict in accordance with such finding. Under the instructions, the jury were bound to find for the plaintiff, even though they might find there was no contract made, if they found he had done work which was of an ascertainable value. The case was tried on the 9th of February. On the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict that the company was indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of $15, which had been paid. The court refused to accept it, sent the jury back to their rooms, and they found a general verdict for $1 for the plaintiff. This verdict was promptly set aside. The court proceeded to retry the case at 2 o'clock of the day on which the verdict was returned, whereupon the company moved to continue it for a reasonable time to procure witnesses to meet the plaintiff's contention that he was entitled to recover on the basis of the value of his services, regardless of the special contract which he had attempted to prove. The showing would seem to make it clear that a severe snowstorm had occurred, which prevented the running of trains, and the procurement of witnesses in time to testify. The motion was overruled. The court proceeded to try the case, and the plaintiff had judgment for $114.46. The defendant company made the same application for security of costs in this case as in the other. The account which was filed before the justice, and which stood for the pleading in the county court, was simply: "The Stock and Land Company, debit, to four months' labor at $25 a month, and 18 days, and board."
Some of the chief difficulties which have been encountered in this case proceed from the circumstance that both cases were begun before a justice without written pleadings. Since both these cases must go back for a new trial, it is suggested to the county court that both parties be ordered to file pleadings setting up their causes of action and defenses, respectively thereby putting the case in such shape as to relieve the appellate court, in case of any future appeal, of the difficulties which are experienced on the present hearing. Of course, it is true there is no difference, with respect to the principles which must be applied, in the trial of a case which comes by appeal to a court of record from a justice, and one which originates there, and is heard on written pleading. The legal rights of the parties are precisely the same. They must be determined on the same principles, and the plaintiff is bound to establish his cause by the same proofs. Stout v. Tribune Co., 52 Mo. 343. There is a well-recognized distinction between the forms of pleading by which a party is permitted to recover a debt under the Code, and those which must have been observed by him when the common-law procedure was in full force. The distinction between the common-law forms of assumpsit are thoroughly settled, and were well understood by lawyers who practiced under that system. The difference between the declaration in an action upon a special contract and one upon a quantum meruit was well-defined and thoroughly recognized. Of course, it was true, even under that...
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...* * *' Defendant then cites and quotes from certain authorities which he contends sustain his position. Rockwell Stock & Land Co. v. Castroni, 6 Colo.App. 528, 42 P. 182; 5 Bancroft's Code Pleading, 4511, § 2457 (Work and Those authorities are not in point under the facts of this case. The ......
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...while he had declared on an express contract. The legal proposition is correctly stated, as this court decided, in Land Co. v. Castroni, 6 Colo.App. 528, 42 P. 182. As we read the complaint, there is no allegation of express contract. It is averred that the defendant agreed through its agen......