Roco Refining Co. v. State

• Decision Date: 30 April 1936
• Docket Number: No. 4928.,4928.
• Citation: 94 S.W.2d 1214
• Parties: ROCO REFINING CO. et al. v. STATE et al.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

94 S.W.2d 1214

ROCO REFINING CO. et al. v. STATE et al.

No. 4928.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Texarkana.

April 30, 1936.

Error from District Court, Gregg County; C. G. Dibrell, Judge.

Suit by the State of Texas and others against the Roco Refining Company and others. To review a judgment, defendants bring error.

Affirmed.

F. W. Fischer and Mayfield & Grisham, all of Tyler, for plaintiffs in error.

Wm. McCraw, Atty. Gen., and Tom D. Rowell, Jr., and Marvin Trevathan, Asst. Attys. Gen., for defendants in error.

JOHNSON, Chief Justice.

The state of Texas and the Railroad Commission through the Attorney General filed this suit against appellants Roco Refining Company, a copartnership composed of L. B. Cohen and Harvey Hunter, and against said L. B. Cohen and Harvey Hunter individually, to recover statutory penalties for alleged violation of certain conservation orders of the Railroad Commission dated February 15, 1933, and April 3, 1934, which required filing of daily reports by each purchaser, handler, or refiner of crude petroleum, and that no oil produced in the East Texas oil field should be delivered, accepted, transported, or otherwise handled by any firm, person, or corporation without first obtaining a tender from a duly authorized agent of the Railroad Commission. The petition states the specific dates upon which the defendants are charged with violating the orders. Defendants answered by general and special exceptions and a general denial. Trial to the court without a jury resulted in judgment that the Railroad Commission take nothing and that the state of Texas recover of the defendants jointly and severally the sum of $6,600. The defendants have by writ of error removed the case to this court for review.

Appellants in their first proposition challenge the validity of the orders, as being an assumption by the Railroad Commission of legislative power in violation of the Constitution of Texas and void, in that, and for the particular reason, it is contended, the orders failed to recite upon their face any findings of fact showing a necessity or reason for their promulgation and adoption.

The order of February 15, 1933, in part provides:

"Special Order Amending Order of September 29, 1932, Requiring Reports.

"For the purpose of more effectively carrying out the intent and purposes of an order entered by this Commission on September 29, 1932, requiring reports to be made concerning the production, purchase, transportation and handling of crude oil in the East Texas field, the necessity for which has been disclosed by testimony adduced at hearings held in the Cities of Austin and Tyler, Texas, pursuant to notice duly given December 15, 1932:

"It is hereby ordered that said order of September 29, 1932, be and the same is hereby amended in the following particulars. * * *" The statutes in force at that time, articles 6049c, § 7, par. 3 (Acts 1931, 42d Leg., 1st Called Sess., p. 46, chap. 26, as amended by Acts 1932, 42d Leg., 4th Called Sess., p. 3, chap. 2, § 5), authorized the Railroad Commission to amend its orders without notice, "Provided the subject matter of the amendment was considered at the hearing made the basis for such rule, regulation or order." The order of September 29, 1932, is an order requiring reports and contains express findings of facts developed upon hearing which are sufficient as the basis for the order as well as the February 15, 1933, amendment thereto; among facts so found and expressed being: "That there is a large amount of oil being produced, transported, and otherwise handled in the East Texas field, including the Counties of Upshur, Gregg, Smith, Rusk and Cherokee, in violation of the conservation orders, rules and regulations of the Railroad Commission and of section 14, art. 6049c, Vernon's Annotated Statutes of Texas [Acts 1931, 1st Called Sess., c. 26, § 14], and that the withdrawal of these excess amounts is raising the rapid decline in the reservoir pressure, and an unequal encroachment of water in said areas from which the excessive withdrawals are being made." These are facts defined by the statute to be "waste," and judicially defined, when they do exist, to constitute waste. Danciger Oil Co. v. Railroad Commission (Tex.Civ.App.) 49 S.W.(2d) 837. Hence we do not think the amendment is void for failure to within itself restate the findings of fact upon which it is based.

The order of April 3, 1934, of the Railroad Commission is one requiring "that the owner, manager, or operator of each refinery and/or processing plant, refining and/or in any wise processing crude oil and its by-products, shall make a daily report to the Railroad Commission, * * *" the facts required by the order to be contained in the reports are such facts as the statute empowers the commission to require of the persons affected by the order. The order is based upon Acts 1934, 43d Leg., 2d Called Sess., p. 104, c. 45, § 1, which in part provides: "It shall be the duty of all persons, companies, or corporations producing, storing, transporting, refining, reclaiming, treating, marketing, or processing crude oil or natural gas, to keep accurate records as to the amount of such products produced, stored, transported, refined, reclaimed, treated, marketed or processed by...