Rodarte v. State
Decision Date | 09 June 1993 |
Docket Number | No. 1498-92,1498-92 |
Citation | 860 S.W.2d 108 |
Parties | Rolando RODARTE, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee. |
Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
George Scharmen, San Antonio, for appellant.
Steven C. Hilbig, Dist. Atty. and Barbara Hervey, Asst. Dist. Atty., San Antonio, Robert Huttash, State's Atty., Austin, for the State.
Before the court en banc.
OPINION ON APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
Appellant was convicted of the offense of capital murder and his punishment assessed at life imprisonment. The Fourth Court of Appeals dismissed his appeal for want of jurisdiction. Rodarte v. State, 840 S.W.2d 781 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1992). The court of appeals held that appellant's notice of appeal, coming thirty-one days after "the day sentence is imposed ... in open court," was untimely. Tex.R.App.Pro., Rule 41(b)(1). Along the way the court of appeals rejected appellant's argument that the thirty days within which the Rule requires that notice of appeal be filed should commence either when "the day sentence is imposed or suspended in open court," or the day the judgment is signed, that being "the day an appealable order is signed," whichever is later. Appellant contends that his notice of appeal came within thirty days of the day the judgment was signed, and was therefore timely. We granted his petition for discretionary review to address this question of first impression. Tex.R.App.Pro., Rule 200(c)(2).
Rule 41(b)(1) reads:
As we understand it, appellant argues that the rule is ambiguous in that in cases of direct appeal from a judgment of conviction the rule seems to set up more than one beginning point for calculating timeliness of a notice of appeal. The thirty days may begin on the day sentence is imposed or suspended in open court; or it may begin on the day the judgment, "an appealable order," is signed. 1 To avoid the confusion he contends is bound to arise from more than one commencement point, appellant urges us to hold that in cases of direct appeal from a judgment of conviction, the starting point for calculating timeliness of a notice of appeal is the day the trial court signs the judgment, which contains the sentence. See Article 42.02, V.A.C.C.P.
The disadvantage of appellant's proposed solution, as the court of appeals noted, is that it effectively reads the phrase "the day sentence is imposed or suspended in open court" out of the rule. Rodarte v. State, supra at 784. In any event we decline to adopt his solution because, like the court of appeals, we disagree that Rule 41(b)(1) engenders the confusion appellant claims it does in the first place. The court of appeals construed the rule to provide:
We agree. That Rule 41(b)(1) provides for notice of appeal within thirty days of imposition or suspension of sentence in open court "or" the signing of an appealable order does not mean that either event will trigger the running of the thirty days in any case in which a party has occasion to appeal. The "or" in Rule 41(b)(1) is not inclusive; rather, it is context dependent. That is to say, deciding which of the two starting points for calculating timeliness of the notice of appeal applies depends upon what is being appealed. In the "ordinary" appellate context, where the defendant appeals a judgment of conviction, the thirty days begin to run on the day sentence is imposed or suspended in open court--unless appellant files a motion for new trial, in which case he is provided ninety days from the day sentence is imposed or suspended in open court to file his notice of appeal. 2 Shute v. State, 744 S.W.2d 96, at 98, n. 1 (Tex.Cr.App.1988) (Clinton, J., concurring). See also Stokes v. State, 688 S.W.2d 539 (Tex.Cr.App.1985); Ex parte Renier, 734 S.W.2d 349, at 365-66 (Tex.Cr.App.1987) (Teague, J., dissenting). In other appealable criminal cases--appeal by the State under Article 44.01, supra, and appeal from an adverse order after the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus other than a post-conviction application for habeas corpus brought under Article 11.07, V.A.C.C.P.--the timetable for notice of appeal begins on the day of the signing of the appealable order, e.g., the order dismissing the indictment, granting a new trial, suppressing evidence, or denying habeas corpus relief. 3
Appellant reminds us that in State v. Rosenbaum, 818 S.W.2d 398 (Tex.Cr.App.1991), we held that a State's notice of appeal from an order dismissing a portion of the indictment begins on the day the trial court signed the order. For purposes of Article 44.01(d), V.A.C.C.P., we construed "entered by the court" to mean "signed by the trial...
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