Roddy Mfg. Co. v. Olsen
| Decision Date | 19 December 1983 |
| Citation | 661 S.W.2d 868 |
| Parties | RODDY MANUFACTURING CO. v. Martha B. OLSEN, Commissioner of Revenue. COCA COLA BOTTLING COMPANY OF MEMPHIS, Tennessee v. Martha B. OLSEN, Commissioner of Revenue. COCA COLA BOTTLING COMPANY OF WEST TENNESSEE v. Martha B. OLSEN, Commissioner of Revenue. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Mack A. Gentry, Gentry & Wagner, Knoxville, for appellee Roddy Mfg.
Michael A. Robinson, Glankler, Brown, Gilliland, Chase, Robinson & Raines, Steven H. McCleskey, Glankler, Brown, Gilliland, Chase, Robinson & Raines, Memphis, for appellee Coca Cola Bottling.
William M. Leech, Jr., Atty. Gen., J. Robert Walker, Asst. Atty. Gen., Nashville, for appellant.
The primary issue in these consolidated cases is whether a 1981 amendment of T.C.A. § 67-4102, Item B, that imposes a privilege tax on soft drink bottlers, allows bottlers a credit for all franchise and excise taxes paid regardless of the source of the business revenue or limits the credit to the franchise and excise taxes paid on that portion of business revenue derived solely from the manufacture and sale of bottled soft drinks.
The Roddy case involves a second issue, to-wit: did the 1981 amendment of T.C.A. § 67-4102 Item B have the effect of amending by implication T.C.A. § 67-4203, Item 65(c)(1) that imposes a vending machine tax, and provides for the same credit "codified in Item B of § 67-4102," which section was not specifically amended nor referred to directly or indirectly in the amendment of T.C.A. § 67-4102 Item B.
The Knox County chancellor held that the clear and unambiguous language of the 1981 amendment required an interpretation that soft drink bottlers were entitled to credit for all franchise and excise taxes paid and awarded Roddy recovery for the additional assessment of taxes paid under protest after the Commissioner recomputed its taxes allowing credit only for that portion of the franchise and excise taxes attributable to the manufacture and sale of bottled soft drinks. The chancellor did not specifically address the second issue involving the proper credit allowable against the vending machine tax but in awarding Roddy a monetary judgment based upon allowance of full credit for franchise and excise taxes implicitly held that the 1981 amendment also amended Item 65(c)(1) of § 67-4203.
The Shelby County chancellor awarded the two Coca-Cola companies a judgment on the pleadings for the amount of taxes paid under protest, based upon the same interpretation of the 1981 amendment as that of the Knox County chancellor.
T.C.A. § 67-4102, Item B, imposes a privilege tax upon bottlers and manufacturers of soft drinks and other related substitute beverages. The tax is levied upon the gross receipts derived from such businesses for the privilege of being allowed to engage in said businesses. Prior to 1981, section 5 to the statute in question provided for a credit as follows:
(5) There shall be credited upon the tax hereby imposed by this item any taxes paid on the business of manufacturing and producing any bottled soft drinks under the franchise tax law and under the excise tax law during the calendar year in which the tax hereby levied becomes due.
However, Chapter 307 of the Public Acts of 1981 amended the credit provision, in pertinent part, as follows:
(5) Any taxes paid pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 27 and 29 of this title shall be a credit against the tax imposed by this item.
(a) The credit taken on any return shall not exceed seventy-eight and ninety-five hundreths percent (78.95%) of the tax liability shown on any tax return.
In addition to changing the credit allowance, the Act increased the gross receipts tax rate from 1.5 percent to 1.9 percent for the "sole purpose of funding programs for the collection of litter and trash along county, state and interstate roads and highways within the respective counties."
The Commissioner takes the position that amended Item B(5) allows the appellees credit for only that portion of their franchise and excise taxes which is attributable to the manufacture and sale of bottled soft drinks. In short, the commissioner says that the 1981 amendment made no change whatever in the base for computation of the franchise and excise tax credit. That position obviously ignores the legislative change of language from, any taxes "paid on the business of manufacturing and producing any bottled softdrinks" to any taxes "paid pursuant to the provisions of chapter 27 and 29 of this title." Chapter 27 imposes excise taxes on corporations and chapter 29 imposes franchise taxes on corporations.
We think the commissioner's interpretation is contrary to the plain language of the amended credit provision. It is clear that the Legislature replaced the former qualitative limit, that is, a credit for franchise and excise taxes paid "on the business of manufacturing or producing any bottled soft drinks," with a quantitative limitation, that being, a credit for "any" franchise...
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Kendrick v. Kendrick
...is clear, our examination need proceed no further because the courts must give effect to unambiguous statutes. Roddy Mfg. Co. v. Olsen, 661 S.W.2d 868, 871 (Tenn.1983); Anderson v. Outland, 210 Tenn. 526, 532, 360 S.W.2d 44, 47 If, however, the legislative purpose is unclear, then our role ......
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Crites v. Smith
...further because both the courts and the agency must give effect to the unambiguously expressed legislative intent. Roddy Mfg. Co. v. Olsen, 661 S.W.2d 868, 871 (Tenn.1983); Anderson v. Outland, 210 Tenn. 526, 532, 360 S.W.2d 44, 47 If, however, the General Assembly has not directly addresse......
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State v. Stanton, No. E2003-02675-CCA-R3-CD (TN 4/15/2005)
...judicial interpretation of a statute is restricted to the natural and ordinary meaning of the language used. Roddy Mfg. Co. v. Olsen, 661 S.W.2d 868, 871 (Tenn. 1983). "Legislative enactments must be interpreted in their natural and ordinary sense without a forced construction to either lim......