Roderick v. State
| Decision Date | 19 April 2016 |
| Docket Number | NO. 14–15–00073–CR, NO. 14–15–00074–CR,14–15–00073–CR |
| Citation | 494 S.W.3d 868 |
| Parties | Jesse Clyde Roderick, Appellant v. The State of Texas, Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Dena Fisher, Houston, TX, for Appellant.
Heather Hudson, Houston, TX, for State.
Panel consists of Justices Jamison, McCally, and Donovan.
Martha Hill Jamison
A jury convicted appellant Jesse Clyde Roderick of two counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child. See Tex. Penal Code § 22.021
. The jury assessed appellant's punishment at life imprisonment. On appeal, appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to allow the defense to present certain defensive theories, including that of an alternate perpetrator, and committing errors in certain evidentiary rulings. We affirm.
In July 2011, the complainant, J.M., made an outcry statement to her foster mother that she had been sexually abused in the past by the appellant, a family friend. At the time of the statement, J.M. was five years old. J.M. told her foster mother that appellant made her perform oral sex on him, performed oral sex on her, penetrated her vagina and anus with his penis, and digitally penetrated her anus. J.M.'s foster mother informed her foster care agency, which then contacted the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (CPS).
During a forensic interview, J.M. reported that appellant put his finger in her vagina. She stated that it hurt when something was inside her private area, and that she developed a rash from being rubbed “down there.” J.M. also underwent a medical examination that revealed a white, triangular, anal scar consistent with blunt force trauma.
Following the investigation, appellant was indicted on two counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child under fourteen years of age. At trial, three years after her initial outcry, J.M. did not remember anything penetrating her vagina or anus, but testified that appellant pulled down her pants, put his penis in her mouth, and “peed.” J.M. drew a picture of appellant's penis and further testified that appellant touched her up at the top of her legs and her “private.” The State also presented testimony from William Floyd Kent, a jailhouse informant, who testified that the appellant bragged about what he did, specifically that he taught J.M. the proper way to perform oral sex and rubbed his penis against her anus and vagina.
At the conclusion of trial, the jury found appellant guilty and assessed punishment at life imprisonment. The trial court sentenced appellant in accordance with the jury's assessment of punishment.
Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to allow him to present defensive theories, including the defense of an alternate perpetrator.
We review a trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. See De La Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336, 343–44 (Tex.Crim.App.2009)
. If the trial court's decision was within the bounds of reasonable disagreement, we will not disturb its ruling. See
Shuffield v. State, 189 S.W.3d 782, 793 (Tex.Crim.App.2006). If the trial judge's decision is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case, however, it will be sustained. Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex.Crim.App.1990).
Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by not allowing the jury to hear evidence of possible alternate perpetrators, namely Donald Cowart and Dennis Esquivel. Specifically, appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion by 1) ruling that disclosures made to Claudia Mullin, the CPS forensic interviewer, regarding sexual abuse alleged to have been committed by Cowart against J.M. and her brothers were inadmissible; and 2) ruling that testimony regarding CPS's knowledge that Esquivel was a convicted sex offender and lived with J.M.'s mother was inadmissible. The trial judge sustained the State's objections to this evidence.
We first note that:
“[a]lthough a defendant obviously has a right to attempt to establish his innocence by showing that someone else committed the crime, he still must show that his proffered evidence regarding the alleged alternative perpetrator is sufficient, on its own or in combination with other evidence in the record, to show a nexus between the crime charged and the alleged ‘alternative perpetrator.’ ”
Wiley v. State, 74 S.W.3d 399, 406 (Tex.Crim.App.2002)
(emphasis added).
“Although it is unclear exactly how much evidence is necessary to sufficiently prove a nexus between the offense and allegedly guilty third party, Texas jurisprudence is clear that evidence of third party guilt is inadmissible if it is mere speculation that another person may have committed the offense.” Dickson v. State, 246 S.W.3d 733, 739 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. ref'd)
. Moreover, the admission of alternative perpetrator evidence is subject to the Rule 403 balancing test, according to which the trial court must weigh its probative value against its tendency to confuse the issues or mislead the jury, among other potential harms. See Tex. R. Evid. 403 ; Wiley, 74 S.W.3d at 406–07 ; Dukes v. State, 486 S.W.3d 170, 177–78, (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.], no pet.). Finally, excluding such evidence is not constitutional error unless the evidence “goes to the heart of the defense.” Wiley, 74 S.W.3d at 405.
We begin with the exclusion of Mullin's testimony recounting her interview with J.M. It is important to our analysis of the trial court's ruling to place the specific excluded evidence in context. Appellant urges that the jury was entitled to “hear about the disclosures [J.M.] made to Mullin regarding sexual abuse alleged to have been committed by Cowart against J.M.” Specifically, appellant refers to the following testimony developed by bill of exception:
The trial court excluded this evidence under Rule 403
noting that “it would be confusing to the jury to submit the requested questioning, lines of questioning, to the jury.” See Tex. R. Evid. 403. We conclude that this evidentiary ruling is not an abuse of discretion. The excerpted exchange with Mullin is ambiguous on time and identity. Specifically, it is unclear from Mullin's statements, then corrections, and uncertainty throughout this testimony whether Mullin is referring to J.M.'s recount of the offense, or some other time when Cowart “almost tried” to have sex with J.M. or take her clothes off. And, that confusion in Mullin's testimony is compounded by her uncertainty about which “he” J.M. was talking about at any particular time.
Even if we were to determine that the exclusion of this evidence constituted error, however, we would find that its exclusion did not, as appellant argues, impede his ability to present an “alternate perpetrator” defense. Specifically, during J.M.'s testimony, she acknowledged that with regard to whether it was appellant or Cowart that “did me” she “might have got the two mixed up.” J.M. also stated at one point that she did not remember who touched her, “but it was probably [appellant].” In response to defense counsel's question that “it could have been [Cowart]” J.M. testified, “[y]eah, but [Cowart] didn't do as much.” Thus, we conclude that, even if the admission was erroneous, J.M.'s own testimony about the potential alternate perpetrator afforded appellant the opportunity to...
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