Rodgers v. Cades

Decision Date25 March 1912
Citation146 S.W. 507,103 Ark. 187
PartiesRODGERS v. CADES
CourtArkansas Supreme Court

Appeal from Lincoln Circuit Court; Antonio B. Grace, Judge; reversed in part.

STATEMENT BY THE COURT.

The appellee sued appellant for 300,000 feet of timber at $ 4 per thousand, alleging that appellant had obtained that much timber for which he had not paid, under a contract by which appellee sold to appellant all the timber on a certain tract of land. The contract, after describing the land, provides as follows:

"For and in consideration of $ 4 per thousand feet, board measure to be paid as hereinafter set out, party of the first part has this day granted, sold and conveyed unto party of second part, his heirs and assigns, all white oak timber on said land, or so much as party of second part will be able to cut and remove within time required by State to enable them to plant and cultivate a crop on the land above described. It being understood that party of second part shall be under no obligation to cut any timber after the State authorities shall have declined to allow him any further time.

"It is further understood and agreed between the parties hereto that there is approximately 500,000 feet of timber on the above-described quarter section, and that, after the party of the second part shall have cut all the timber on said quarter section, if there should not be 500,000 feet, then and in that event the party of the second part is to have the right to cut enough timber off of the adjoining quarter section which also belongs to party of first part, to make up 500,000 feet all told."

The complaint alleged that some of the timber had been manufactured into staves of the value of $ 500, and that appellant was about to ship these away to defeat the claim of appellee. The appellee prayed for and was granted an order of attachment, and same was executed by the sheriff taking possession of the staves mentioned therein.

The appellant answered, admitting that he had cut a quantity of the timber included in the contract, of the value of $ 208.86. He specifically denied the allegations on which the attachment was issued. He set up that he had sold the entire output of the 500,000 feet of timber at a net profit of $ 8.50 per thousand feet, that appellee had failed and refused to furnish appellant the amount of timber purchased under the contract, and had thereby breached the contract, to appellant's damage in the sum of $ 3,000.00. Appellant also alleged that he was damaged by reason of the wrongful attachment in the sum of $ 300. He prayed judgment for these alleged damages.

The appellee answered the counterclaim, denying its allegations. The bill of exceptions recites as follows:

"After examining plaintiff's complaint defendant's answer and amended answer and the counterclaim against plaintiff, and plaintiff's answer to defendant's counterclaim, the court, of its own motion, before any testimony was adduced, and before opening statement of counsel, stated to the jury that the defendant was not entitled to recover on his counterclaim and that the jury should not take into consideration defendant's counterclaim in arriving at their verdict."

The undisputed evidence showed that the land on which the timber grew was the property of the State, that appellee had contracted to purchase the timber from the State. Appellant had cut the timber on the quarter section mentioned in the contract, and was proceeding to cut from the adjoining quarter when the warden in charge of the State farm stopped him. Appellant notified appellee of this, and requested appellee to "straighten the matter out," or designate some place for appellant to cut the balance of the 500,000 feet claimed by appellant. Appellee denied that he had sold appellant 500,000 feet of timber, and refused to further furnish him timber under the contract, and demanded pay for the timber that appellant had cut. Appellee then brought this suit and attached the staves in controversy.

There was evidence tending to prove that the sheriff had possession of the staves for more than a month before appellant could get them released under bond, and that during that time many were stolen, and the staves were damaged by remaining in the sun unprotected.

The appellant asked the court to dissolve the attachment and to allow the jury to assess his damages for its wrongful issuance. The court dissolved the attachment, but refused to allow the jury to assess any damages. The court...

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6 cases
  • Crocker's Heirs v. Crocker's Heirs
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • December 18, 1922
    ...the opinions are based are in evidence. 97 Ark. 457; 61 Ark. 245; 103 Ark. 220; 136 Ark. 156. The instructions given have been approved. 103 Ark. 187; 97 457; 87 Ark. 243. The hypothetical questions were properly admitted. 64 Ark. 532; 94 Ark. 75; 23 Ark. 730; 21 Ark. 349. OPINION SMITH, J.......
  • Harrison v. Fulk
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • March 26, 1917
    ... ... attachment ...           [128 ... Ark. 233] The practice under this section has been defined in ... the following cases: Rodgers v. Cades, 103 ... Ark. 187; Holliday v. Cohen, 34 Ark. 707; ... Boatwright v. Stewart, 37 Ark. 614; ... Goodbar v. Lindsley, 51 Ark. 380, 11 S.W ... ...
  • Harrison v. Fulk
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • March 26, 1917
    ...of such damages, and the cost of the attachment. The practice under this section has been defined in the following cases: Rodgers v. Cades, 103 Ark. 191, 146 S. W. 507; Holliday v. Cohen, 34 Ark. 710; Boatwright v. Stewart, 37 Ark. 614; Goodbar v. Lindsley, 51 Ark. 382, 11 S. W. 577, 14 Am.......
  • Davidson v. Mayhue
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • October 11, 1915
    ...be to follow the statute as if its provisions were construed as being mandatory and not merely directory. We so hold now. See, also, Rodgers v. Cades, supra. Legislature couched its enactment in terms that in their natural and ordinary signification are mandatory in meaning, and we can conc......
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