Rodgers v. Corporation of Harpers Ferry

• Decision Date: 18 July 1988
• Citation: 179 W.Va. 637,371 S.E.2d 358
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: Lewis Scott RODGERS v. CORPORATION OF HARPERS FERRY, etc., et al. No. cc973.

Page 358

371 S.E.2d 358

179 W.Va. 637

Lewis Scott RODGERS v. CORPORATION OF HARPERS FERRY, etc., et al.

No. cc973.

Supreme Court of Appeals of

West Virginia.

July 18, 1988.

Syllabus by the Court

All claims filed in West Virginia pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are personal injury actions governed by the two-year statute of limitations set forth in W.Va.Code § 55-2-12(b) (1981).

Gilbert L. Hall, Charles Town, for Lewis Scott Rodgers.

Walter M. Jones, III, James M. Matzureff, Susan R. Snowden, Martin & Seibert, Martinsburg, for Corp. of Harpers Ferry.

BROTHERTON, Justice:

This case is before the Court on the following certified question from the Circuit Court of Jefferson County:

Does the one-year statute of limitations--West Virginia Code § 55-2-12(c)--or the two-year statute of limitations--West Virginia Code § 55-2-12(b)--apply to Section 1983 actions arising out of events occurring in the State of West Virginia?

For the reasons set out below, we affirm the circuit court's ruling that the two-year statute of limitations contained in W.Va.Code § 55-2-12(b) (1981) applies to actions filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Lewis Scott Rodgers, the plaintiff, was arrested by police officers from the Corporations of Harpers Ferry and Bolivar, Jefferson County, West Virginia, on August 8, 1983. The plaintiff was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol, assault, battery, and obstruction of an officer. ¹ On August 6, 1985, the plaintiff filed suit against the defendants, the Corporation of Harpers Ferry and others, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ² The plaintiff alleged that violations of his civil and constitutional rights resulted from his arrest on August 8, 1983, and charged the defendants with the use of excessive force, assault and battery, malicious prosecution, false arrest, false imprisonment, abuse of process, defamation, and gross negligence. ³ The defendants moved to dismiss the action, arguing that the statute of limitations applicable to civil rights actions in the State of West Virginia is the one-year statute of limitations contained in W.Va.Code § 55-2-12(c) (1981). The plaintiff argued that the two-year statute of limitations provided in W.Va.Code § 55-2-12(b) (1981) was applicable to his claim. Relying on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985), the Circuit Court of Jefferson County denied the defendants' motion to dismiss and ruled that the two-year statute of limitations set forth in W.Va.Code § 55-2-12(b) (1981) governed the plaintiff's § 1983 claim.

The Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts do not contain a specific statute of limitations governing § 1983 actions. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 1941-42, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985) (footnote omitted). Congress enacted a companion statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982), ⁴ to guide federal courts to the appropriate statute of limitations to apply in a federal civil rights action. Courts have interpreted § 1988 as providing "a three-step process" for determining the statute of limitations applicable to civil rights claims. Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 47-48, 104 S.Ct. 2924, 2928, 82 L.Ed.2d 36, 43 (1984). Courts are first to look to federal law in determining the statutes of limitations applicable to civil and criminal civil rights statutes. Where no appropriate federal law exists, state "common law, as modified and changed by the Constitution and statutes," is applied. However, state law is applied only when federal law provides no statute of limitations and only if the state law is not "inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States." Id.

After the enactment of § 1988, confusion resulted from what courts perceived to be a directive to apply the state statute of limitations governing cases "most analogous" to the cause of action asserted by the plaintiffs when federal law was not available. ⁵ Courts were uncertain about whether claims should be characterized according to federal or state law and whether a particular characterization should depend upon the specific facts at issue in each case. Banks v. Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company, 802 F.2d 1416, 1419 (D.C.Cir.1986). In Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985), the Supreme Court attempted to simplify the selection of the appropriate state statute of limitations in § 1983 actions.

In Wilson, as in the case at bar, the respondent alleged various civil rights violations stemming from an allegedly unlawful arrest. Id. at 263, 105 S.Ct. at 1940. The respondent filed his claim two years and nine months after the events giving rise to the claim purportedly occurred. The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on grounds that the claim was barred by a two-year statute of limitations in the New Mexico Tort Claims Act. ⁶

Though the district court held a residual four-year statute applicable to § 1983 actions brought in New Mexico, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit applied New Mexico's three-year personal injury statute. ⁷ The Tenth Circuit commented on the perpetual conflict in the courts over the interpretation of § 1983 claims:

[T]he courts vary widely in the methods by which they characterize a section 1983 action, and in the criteria by which they evaluate the applicability of a particular state statute of limitations to a particular claim. The actual process used to select an appropriate state statute varies from circuit to circuit and sometimes from panel to panel.

731 F.2d 640, 643 (10th Cir.1984). ⁸

Persuaded by the Tenth Circuit's reasoning in Wilson, the Supreme Court affirmed its decision. The Court held that for statute of limitations purposes the characterization of a § 1983 claim under § 1988 is governed by federal rather than state law. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 268, 269, 105 S.Ct. at 1942-43, 1943. Because it could be argued that multiple statutes of limitations apply to the various claims that comprise a typical § 1983 action, ⁹ the court found § 1988 to be "fairly construed as a directive to select, in each State, the one most appropriate statute of limitations for all § 1983 claims." Id. 471 U.S. at 275, 105 S.Ct. at 1947. ¹⁰ The court concluded that even though constitutional claims alleged under § 1983 encompass numerous and diverse topics, a claim brought under § 1983 is best characterized as a tort action for the recovery of damages for personal injuries. Id. at 278-79, 105 S.Ct. at 1948-49. ¹¹

Turning to the case at bar, West Virginia Code § 55-2-12 (1981) provides that:

Every personal action for which no limitation is otherwise prescribed shall be brought: (a) within two years next after the right to bring the same shall have accrued, if it be for damage to property; (b) within two years next after the right to bring the same shall have accrued, if it be for damages for personal injuries; and (c) within one year next after the right to bring the same shall have accrued if it be for any other matter of such nature that, in case a party die, it could not have been brought at common law or against his personal representative.

The defendants argue that the one-year statute of limitations in W.Va.Code § 55-2-12(c) applies to intentional tort actions such as defamation, false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution and other personal tort actions and that the plaintiff's § 1983 action should therefore be subject to the one-year statute of limitations. We do not find this argument persuasive. The primary statute of limitations for personal injuries in West Virginia is the two-year statute of limitations in W.Va.Code § 55-2-12(b). The one-year statute of limitations in W.Va.Code § 55-2-12(c) applies to civil actions which do not survive the death of a party. Consequently, personal tort actions such as libel, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution take the one-year statute of limitations because they are excluded from statutory survivability under W.Va.Code § 55-7-8a(a) (1981), ¹² and not because of a statutory distinction between intentional and unintentional torts. ¹³

With its decision in Wilson v. Garcia, the United States Supreme Court directed courts to characterize all § 1983 claims as personal injury actions for purposes of selecting the one most appropriate statute of limitations for all § 1983 claims. ¹⁴ Consistent with that mandate from our nation's highest court, we hold that all claims filed in West Virginia pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are personal injury actions governed by the two-year statute of limitations set forth in W.Va.Code § 55-2-12(b) (1981). ¹⁵ We affirm the ruling of the circuit court on the question certified, and remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Certified question answered; case remanded for disposition.

1 All criminal charges made against Rodgers on August 8, 1983, were eventually dropped.

2 Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity or other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, an Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.

3 Rodgers later filed for a voluntary dismissal of the defamation, abuse of process, false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution claims.

4 Title 42 U.S.C. § 1988 provides, in part:

The jurisdiction ... conferred on the district courts by the [civil and criminal Civil Rights Titles] for the protection...