Rodgers v. Reserve Life Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 15 February 1956 |
| Docket Number | Gen. No. 10887 |
| Citation | 132 N.E.2d 692,8 Ill.App.2d 542 |
| Parties | Florence A. RODGERS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RESERVE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, a Corporation, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Victor & Ghent, Rockford, for appellant.
Foltz, Haye & Keegan, Rockford, for appellee.
Appellee, Reserve Life Insurance Company, on September 24, 1952, issued its policy of insurance, by the provisions of which it agreed to pay to Florence A. Rodgers, mother of James O. Rodgers, the sum of $1,000 in the event James O. Rodgers lost his life resulting directly and independently of all other causes from accidental bodily injury sustained while the policy was in effect. On September 25, 1954, while the policy was in full force and effect, James O. Rodgers, twenty-one years of age, accompanied by Patricia Allen, eighteen years of age, and Judy Gorman, seventeen years of age, was driving a 1950 Chevrolet Convertible automobile with a 1954 motor. The car in which they were riding left the pavement and was overturned and James O. Rodgers was killed.
On January 14, 1955, Florence A. Rodgers, the beneficiary, filed the instant complaint to recover under the provisions of the policy. The defendant answered, admitting the issuance of the policy and that it was in effect on September 25, 1954, and admitted the death of James O. Rodgers on that day, but denied that he died from accidental bodily injuries and set up as an affirmative defense that Rodgers drove his automobile on a country road at night at a speed of 100 miles per hour while approaching a curve in disregard of the protests and warnings from the passengers in his car and from these allegations the pleader concluded that Rodgers' death resulted from his wilful and wanton driving of an automobile under circumstances which exhibited a reckless disregard for his own safety. The plaintiff replied, denying the allegations of the affirmative defense and the issues made by the pleadings were submitted to the court, without a jury, resulting in a finding and judgment for the defendant and the plaintiff appeals.
There is no conflict in the evidence. The defendant, by its insurance policy, agreed to pay the plaintiff $1,000 in the event her son, James O. Rodgers, lost his life, resulting directly and independently of all other causes, from accidental bodily injury. On the evening of September 25, 1954, James O. Rodgers attended a party with a group of young people near a forest preserve. About eleven o'clock that evening he left the party in his automobile accompanied by Lee Johnson, Patricia Allen, and Judy Gorman. Johnson was in the back seat, but his presence was not revealed to Patricia Allen or Judy Gorman, who occupied the front seat with Rodgers, until Rodgers stopped the car in front of the home of Johnson in Rockford. Rodgers got out of the car there and let Johnson out. He, Rodgers, then reentered the car, and he and his two guests intended to return to the party. While Rodgers, upon the return trip, was driving along Kishwaukee Street near an intersection his car hit the rear end of a Cadillac car driven by a lady whose name does not appear in the record. Rodgers got out of his car, and the lady driving the Cadillac left her car, and some words were exchanged. Rodgers returned to his car and drove rapidly in an easterly direction on Corlett Road, which is a twenty-foot paved highway. As he approached a curve in the road, Patricia Allen testified that she heard Judy Gorman tell Rodgers to watch out as there was a curve ahead; that she, Patricia Allen, looked at the speedometer and it registered 100 miles per hour; that she then told Rodgers that he was going too fast to go around a curve and Rodgers answered, saying 'Yes' or 'Yup.' A few seconds thereafter the car left the paved portion of the highway at the beginning of the curve and travelled approximately 400 feet on the east shoulder as the road curved to the right in a southerly direction. The car hit a steel guard rail, turned over on its top and skidded another 50 feet before it came to rest. Rodgers was thrown from the car, and his dead body was found under the guard rail.
The sole question presented by this record is whether, under the detailed facts, the death of the insured was an accident within the meaning of provisions of the policy.
The terms 'accident' and 'accidental' as used in insurance policies covering accidental death mean 'happening by chance; unexpectedly taking place; not according to the usual course of things or not as expected.' 45 C.J.S., Insurance, § 753, p. 777. The author of the Article on Insurance in 29 Am.Jur. sec. 931, pp. 706, 707, states that the words 'accident' and 'accidental' have never acquired any technical significance in law and, when used in an insurance contract, are to be construed and considered according to the ordinary understanding and common usage and speech of people generally; that the courts are practically agreed that these words mean that which happens by chance or fortuitously, without intention or design and which is unexpected, unusual and unforeseen. 'The definition,' says this authority, 'that has usually been adopted by the courts is that an accident is an event that takes place without one's foresight or expectation--an event that proceeds from an unknown cause, or is an unusual effect of a known cause, and therefore not expected.'
Counsel for appellee insists that the evidence discloses that the insured drove his automobile with wilful disregard of his own safety and that his death resulted from his own deliberate misconduct and, therefore, there can be no recovery, citing Cory v. Woodmen Accident Company, 333 Ill. 175, 164 N.E. 159, which was an action upon an accident insurance policy. The facts in the Cory case disclosed that Cory and another person were engaged in an argument in front of Cory's home. Cory advanced toward the other person and was told by the other person, who pulled a revolver from his pocket, that if he, Cory, came closer he would shoot him. Cory continued to advance and was shot and killed. In holding that there could be no recovery the court stated that a person with ordinary intelligence and prudence would have heeded the warning and would reasonably expect and foresee that if he continued to advance the other person might shoot and cause serious injury, the court quoted from Prudential Casualty Co. v. Curry, 10 Ala.App. 642, 65 So. 852 (333 Ill. at page 181, 164 N.E. at page 161), viz.: "An 'accident' may be said to be an unforeseen or unexpected event of which insured's own misconduct is not the natural and proximate cause, and hence a result ordinarily and naturally flowing from the conduct of insured cannot be said to be accidental, even when he may not have foreseen the consequence, and the happening of an event to be termed an 'accident' must not only be unforeseen, but without the design and aid of the insured."
Thompson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 84 Ga.App. 214, 66 S.E.2d 119, 123, also cited by appellee, was an action by the mother of Robert L. Thompson to recover double indemnity provided in two policies of insurance issued by the defendant company upon the life of her son in the event the insured should come to his death as the result, directly and independently of all other causes, of bodily injuries effected solely through external, violent, and accidental means. It appeared from the evidence that the insured was a boy sixteen years of age, and on the evening of August 6, 1949, obtained a revolver and inquired of another boy friend whether he wished to play 'Russian Roulette.' His friend answered in the affirmative, and then the insured removed all the cartridges from the cylinder of the revolver except one, spun the cylinder around, and then handed the revolver to his friend, who said: ' Robert, the insured, then said: "'All right, I will do it first"', and he put the end of the barrel to his head and fired it and was killed. In affirming a judgment rendered upon a directed verdict in favor of the defendant, the court said: ...
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