Rodgers v. Rodgers, No. M2004-02046-COA-R3-CV (TN 5/17/2006)
| Decision Date | 17 May 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. M2004-02046-COA-R3-CV.,M2004-02046-COA-R3-CV. |
| Parties | MURIEL A. RODGERS v. JODY A. RODGERS. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Appeal from the Chancery Court for Rutherford County; No. 02-5326DR; Royce Taylor, Judge.
Judgment of the Chancery Court Vacated.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Stuart F. Wilson-Patton, Senior Counsel; and Warren A. Jasper, Assistant Attorney General, for the appellants, Tennessee Attorney General and the Tennessee Department of Human Services.
Wm. Kennerly Burger, Ben Hall McFarlin, III, and M. Keith Siskin, Murfreesboro, Tennessee, for the appellee, Jody A. Rodgers.
Diana Benson Burns, Murfreesboro, Tennessee, for Muriel A. Rodgers.
William C. Koch, Jr., P.J., M.S., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Patricia J. Cottrell and Frank G. Clement, Jr., JJ., joined.
This appeal involves the constitutionality of the Tennessee Department of Human Services' child support enforcement and collection procedures. In September 2003, the Chancery Court for Rutherford County ordered the father to pay $375 per month in child support directly to the mother. In April 2004, the Department of Human Services issued an ex parte order attempting to require the father's employer to begin deducting both the current and past due child support from his salary and to remit these funds to the Department. The father filed a petition against the wife and the Department requesting the trial court to vacate the Department's orders and to enjoin the Department from issuing further orders or to otherwise modify the final divorce decree. The trial court issued a temporary restraining order and, following a hearing, vacated the Department's orders with regard to the father's child support and enjoined the mother from further attempts to collect child support without first seeking relief from the court. The court also dismissed the Department on the ground that it was not a proper party, and then denied the motion of the Attorney General and Reporter to intervene to defend the constitutionality of the Department's administrative child support enforcement procedures. The Department and the Attorney General appealed to this court. While this appeal was pending, the father and the mother compromised and settled their child support dispute. We have determined that this appeal is now moot because there is no continuing justiciable controversy regarding child support.
Jody A. Rodgers and Muriel Ann Rodgers were married in June 1987. Their only child was born five months later. In September 2002, Ms. Rodgers filed for divorce in the Chancery Court for Rutherford County. Following a trial in June 2003, the trial court entered a final divorce decree on September 5, 2003 granting Ms. Rodgers a divorce on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct. The court also mandated a shared custody arrangement that envisioned that the parties' child would reside with each parent essentially equal amounts of time. In light of the shared parenting, the trial court ordered Mr. Rodgers to pay $375 per month in child support directly to Ms. Rodgers.
The parties and their 15-year-old son moved to Bedford County following the divorce. Despite the trial court's order, Mr. Rodgers declined to pay any child support to Ms. Rodgers. On March 22, 2004, Ms. Rodgers submitted a handwritten affidavit to the Bedford County office of the Tennessee Department of Human Services stating that Mr. Rodgers had told her that he would never pay child support and that, in fact, he had paid no child support since June 2003.1 Based on this affidavit, the Department determined that Mr. Rodgers's child support arrearage was $3,375. On April 2, 2004, the Department issued an "Order/Notice to Withhold Income for Child Support" to Titan Mortgage Company, Mr. Rodgers's last known employer, directing the company to begin deducting $562.50 per month2 from Mr. Rodgers's wages and to pay these funds to the Department.3
The Department filed a copy of this "Order/Notice" with the trial court. It also notified Mr. Rodgers of its action and informed him of his right to request an administrative appeal. On April 15, 2004, Mr. Rodgers faxed a request for an administrative hearing to the Department asserting as grounds for his appeal that "DHS does not have jurisdiction to modify ct. [court] orders." On April 22, 2004, the Department acknowledged the receipt of Mr. Rodgers's appeal and informed him that a hearing would be convened in due course.4
On April 17, 2004, after Titan Mortgage informed the Department that Mr. Rodgers was no longer an employee, the Department issued a second "Order/Notice" to First Community Mortgage, Inc. requesting the company to begin deducting $562.50 per month from Mr. Rodgers's wages and to pay these funds to the Department. Like Titan Mortgage, First Community Mortgage informed the Department that Mr. Rodgers was no longer an employee. As far as this record shows, the Department has not issued another "Order/Notice" to any other employer of Mr. Rodgers.
On April 27, 2004, Mr. Rodgers filed a petition in the trial court against Ms. Rodgers and the Department requesting the trial court to vacate the Department's "Order/Notice" and to enjoin the Department from "enforcing the aforementioned order, and/or attempting to modify any other Order of this Court." Mr. Rodgers also requested the trial court to declare Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-501(b)(1) (2005) unconstitutional because it violated the Separation of Powers doctrine and the Due Process Clause of the state and federal constitutions. The trial court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the Department from "taking any actions to enforce the Administrative Order regarding JODY A. RODGERS issued on April 1, 2004" and from "attempting to modify any other Orders of this Court." It also set a hearing for May 10, 2004.
On May 4, 2004, the Department filed a motion to dissolve the temporary restraining order. The Department argued (1) that the order itself was defective, (2) that the Department was not a proper party to the proceeding, and (3) that the Department had not been properly joined as a party. The trial court heard the Department's motion on May 5, 2004 and, on May 10, 2004, filed an order concluding (1) that the Department lacked authority to change the court's child support orders, (2) that the Department was not a proper party to the proceedings, and (3) that the Department could no longer represent Ms. Rodgers because it had a conflict of interest. Accordingly, the trial court declared the Department's April 1, 2004 "Order/Notice" "null and void ab initio," dismissed the Department as a party, and enjoined Ms. Rodgers from "taking any action to collect child support until such time as she files a Petition in this Court requesting relief." The court also denied the Department's oral motion for a Tenn. R. App. P. 9 interlocutory appeal with regard to its decision that the Department lacked authority to modify child support orders.
On June 8, 2004, the Department filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59.04 motion, and the Attorney General and Reporter moved to intervene in the case to defend the constitutionality of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-501(b)(1). Following a hearing on June 25, 2004, the trial court mailed the parties a letter denying the Department's post-trial motion as well as the Attorney General's motion to intervene. An order consistent with the letter was entered on July 21, 2004.5 Both the Department and the Attorney General filed timely notices of appeal from the July 21, 2004 order.6
In the meantime, on June 28, 2004, Ms. Rodgers filed a criminal contempt petition against Mr. Rodgers for willful failure to pay $4,500 in child support. On August 8, 2004, Mr. Rodgers responded to the contempt petition, asserting that he had "provided support for the parties' minor child above and beyond the arrearage amount currently requested by the Plaintiff." He later filed a counter-petition against Ms. Rodgers seeking to hold her in contempt for failing to turn over a $7,259 dining room table that had been awarded to him in the divorce. The parties eventually compromised and resolved their dispute over child support, and on February 14, 2005, the trial court entered an order stating, in part:
the parties have reached an agreement and their agreement appearing proper, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Defendant shall convey to Plaintiff the 1989 BMW 235 [sic], free and clear of any outstanding lien, in satisfaction of the outstanding child support. The Petition for Contempt shall be dismissed with the costs taxed against the Defendant.7
Mr. Rodgers, the party who originally challenged the constitutionality of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-501(b)(1), now seeks to abandon his claim. He suggests that the case is now moot because he and Ms. Rodgers have settled their dispute over child support. While it is not commonplace for a plaintiff to suggest mootness, we have determined that Mr. Rodgers's suggestion is well taken.
Tennessee's courts do not have a constitutional limitation on their jurisdiction similar to the requirement in Article III of the United States Constitution. They have, however, recognized justiciability doctrines similar to those developed by the United States Supreme Court to determine when courts should hear a case. 13 CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3529 (2d ed. 1984); Barbara Kritchevsky, Justiciability in Tennessee, Part One: Principles and Limits, 15 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 1, 3 n.5 (1984). These doctrines address not only the court's power to hear a case, but also the wisdom of doing so. Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 316, 111 S. Ct. 2331, 2336 (1991); Martin v. Washmaster Auto Ctr., Inc., No. 01A01-9305-CV-00224, 1993 WL 241315, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 2, 1993) (No Tenn. R. App....
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