Rodgers v. Slmpd Arresting Officers
| Decision Date | 09 May 2022 |
| Docket Number | 4:22-cv-00184-SPM |
| Parties | TORK RODGERS, Plaintiff, v. SLMPD ARRESTING OFFICERS, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
This matter comes before the Court on the motion of plaintiff Tork Rodgers for leave to commence this civil action without prepayment of the required filing fee. (Docket No. 2). Having reviewed the motion, the Court finds that it should be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Additionally, for the reasons discussed below, the Court will dismiss this action without prejudice. See 28 U.S.C § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if it is frivolous malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim for relief which is more than a “mere possibility of misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 679 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw upon judicial experience and common sense. Id. at 679. The court must “accept as true the facts alleged, but not legal conclusions or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Barton v. Taber, 820 F.3d 958, 964 (8th Cir. 2016). See also Brown v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 820 F.3d 371, 372-73 (8th Cir. 2016) ().
When reviewing a pro se complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court must give it the benefit of a liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A “liberal construction” means that if the essence of an allegation is discernible, the district court should construe the plaintiff's complaint in a way that permits his or her claim to be considered within the proper legal framework. Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015). However, even pro se complaints are required to allege facts which, if true, state a claim for relief as a matter of law. Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980). See also Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914-15 (8th Cir. 2004) (). In addition, affording a pro se complaint the benefit of a liberal construction does not mean that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation must be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).
Plaintiff is a self-represented litigant who is currently on GPS monitoring and awaiting trial on state criminal charges. On August 26, 2018, the State of Missouri filed a complaint accusing him of unlawful use of a weapon, armed criminal action, and unlawful possession of a firearm. State of Missouri v. Rodgers, No. 1822-CR02960 (22nd Jud. Cir., City of St. Louis).[1] The charges stemmed from an August 6, 2018 incident in which plaintiff allegedly discharged a firearm at a motor vehicle.
On October 25, 2018, plaintiff was indicted by a grand jury. State of Missouri v. Rodgers, No. 1822-CR02960-01 (22nd Jud. Cir., City of St. Louis). Initially, he was ordered held without bond. Despite being appointed an assistant public defender, plaintiff filed numerous pro se motions with the circuit court, seeking - among other things - a reduction in his bond, the dismissal of his attorney, and the dismissal of his case for the violation of his right to a speedy trial. On February 6, 2020, the circuit court denied plaintiff's motion to proceed pro se and his motion to dismiss for violation of his speedy trial right. However, the circuit court changed his bond to personal recognizance, with the condition that he report to EMASS for GPS monitoring. Plaintiff was ordered released from custody on that date.
Since being released on electronic monitoring, there have been numerous counsel status hearings. During this time, plaintiff periodically received permission to travel out-of-state. At some point, his GPS monitoring switched from EMASS to Total Court Services. Plaintiff's case is still pending, with a status hearing scheduled for May 20, 2022.
On February 11, 2022, plaintiff filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Docket No. 1). The complaint was typewritten on a Court-provided form, and named the following defendants: SLMPD Arresting Officers; EMASS; Total Court Solutions; the Judges of the 22nd Division; Prosecutors; and the Public Defender's Office. Plaintiff did not indicate the capacity in which defendants were sued. The complaint alleged violations of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments stemming from plaintiff's 2018 arrest. (Docket No. 1 at 3).
In the “Statement of Claim, ” plaintiff asserted that his due process rights had been violated from August 25, 2018 to the present day. (Docket No. 1 at 5). More particularly, he alleged that he was illegally searched and seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment; that an ankle monitor was placed on him “past [his] discharge date”; that he was not given his Miranda rights, in violation of the Fifth Amendment; that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel; and that the Fourteenth Amendment was violated when his case was not discharged on August 11, 2019.
Based on these allegations, plaintiff sought discharge of his case, $2 million in damages, and an Impala car.
On April 28, 2022, plaintiff filed a document that was construed as an amended complaint. (Docket No. 4). An amended complaint supercedes an original complaint, and renders the original without legal effect. See In re Wireless Tel. Fed. Cost Recovery Fees Litig., 396 F.3d 922, 928 (8thCir. 2005). Therefore, the Court will treat the amended complaint as the operative pleading.
Plaintiff's amended complaint is typewritten and not on a Court-provided form. It is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and names twenty-two separate defendants in the caption including: (1) Officer Wolfe; (2) Officer Anderson; (3) Officer Hawkins; (4) “3 Ofc Illegal Seizure at Wanted”; (5) Officer Driving Van; (6) “Judges [Who] Set Bail”; (7) “Judge [Who] Denied Bond”; (8) Judge Hogan; (9) Judge Millikan; (10) Judge Whyte; (11) Prosecutor Kim Gardner; (12) Prosecutor Stroescu; (13) “Atty at Release Feb. 2020”; (14) Prosecutor Alexander Polta; (15) Public Defender Mary Fox; (16) Public Defender Matthew Mahaffey; (17) Public Defender Anthony Davidson; (18) Public Defender Kevin McCoy; (19) Public Defender Legomsky; (20) St. Louis City; (21) EMASS; and (22) Total Court Services.[2] (Docket No. 4 at 1). Plaintiff does not indicate the capacity in which defendants are sued. As in the original complaint, the amended complaint contains allegations regarding plaintiff's 2018 arrest and subsequent detention.
The amended complaint is twenty-four pages long, and is broken into several different sections. Within these sections, plaintiff intermingles factual allegations with legal conclusions and legal arguments. To better understand the amended complaint, the Court will go through it section-by-section, as plaintiff has presented it.
In the “Summary” section of his amended complaint, plaintiff asserts that he “was detained by police” on August 25, 2018, based on “a wanted placed by” St. Louis Metropolitan Police Officer Wolfe. He states that the “wanted” was “against documented police facts and based on unfounded suspicion, ” and that a “false affidavit was filed after he was arrested, ” constituting an “illegal seizure” in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Following his arrest, plaintiff “was taken to the police station on” North Jefferson, where he was allegedly “threatened” by Detective Hawkins and Detective Anderson. He also claims that he was “denied an attorney” and not read his Miranda rights, in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. (Docket No. 4 at 1-2).
In addition, plaintiff contends that his right to effective assistance of counsel, his right to trial, his right to represent himself, and his right to a speedy trial have all been violated. (Docket No. 4 at 2). He also states that he has been “denied bond many times for no reason, ” resulting in pretrial incarceration for 537 days. This has been followed by ankle monitoring since February 6, 2020, resulting in “travel restrictions that are in place right now keeping [him] away from his family and work.” Plaintiff closes his “Summary” by asserting that “[t]here is a class of one and Monell pattern for each component of the overdue due process, ” and that the governmental agencies who placed him on electronic monitoring after August 11, 2019 “are liable for violating [his] rights.”
In the section in his amended complaint titled “Cause of Action/Allegations of Fact, ” plaintiff recites the statutory language of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, presents the elements of a § 1983 claim, notes that an “official capacity claim represents nothing more than a suit against the Federal, state or local government entity itself, ” and concludes by alleging “a...
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