Rodrigue v. Illuzzi

• Decision Date: 25 February 2022
• Docket Number: 2021-136
• Citation: 2022 VT 9
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court
• Parties: Roger Rodrigue & Tealla Rodrigue v. Vincent Illuzzi

2022 VT 9

Roger Rodrigue & Tealla Rodrigue v. Vincent Illuzzi

No. 2021-136

Supreme Court of Vermont

February 25, 2022

This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions by email at: JUD.Reporter@vermont.gov or by mail at: Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier Vermont 05609-0801, of any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.

On Appeal from Superior Court, Orleans Unit, Civil Division Mary Miles Teachout, J.

William L. Durrell of Bookchin & Durrell, P.C. Montpelier, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

John A. Serafino, Charles A. Romeo and Andrew H. Maass of Ryan Smith & Carbine, LTD., Rutland, for Defendant-Appellee.

PRESENT: Reiber, C.J., ^[1] Eaton, Carroll and Cohen, JJ., Waples, Supr. J., Specially Assigned

EATON J.

¶ 1. This is a legal-malpractice case in which plaintiff Roger Rodrigue^[2] claims defendant Attorney Vincent Illuzzi negligently advised plaintiff to sign a Vermont workers' compensation settlement that contained a general release barring recovery otherwise available from the third-party who injured him. Plaintiff appeals the trial court's dismissal of the entire original complaint for failure to state a claim, grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant on an amended legal-malpractice claim, and denial of plaintiff's request for findings following summary judgment. We affirm.

¶ 2. While a resident of Vermont, plaintiff entered into an employment contract with employer Enterprises Precision, Inc. in this state. In the course of this work, employer required plaintiff to travel to Virginia. Plaintiff was staying at a motel in Rhode Island working for employer at the time, so employer assigned coworker, another one of its employees, to drive plaintiff to and within Virginia. Employer provided coworker a car for this purpose. In Virginia, plaintiff and coworker both stayed at an employer-provided hotel and commuted together to their mutual jobsite. On September 2, 2014, coworker was driving plaintiff from their hotel to the jobsite and they were involved in a car accident; both men were injured.

¶ 3. Plaintiff hired defendant to represent him in two workers' compensation claims before the Vermont Department of Labor, one of which was for the injuries he sustained as a passenger in the car accident in Virginia. In October 2016, defendant represented plaintiff at a mediation where both compensation claims were settled for a lump-sum payment of $115, 000. Defendant advised plaintiff to sign an addendum to the settlement form that included general-release language, which stated in relevant part: "Claimant releases Defendants . . . and each and all of their respective past and present employees . . .[and] agents . . . from any and all liability for all claims arising out of the injury . . . ." The form also provided that the general release was to "be construed as broadly as possible to effectuate the purpose of releasing any and all claims."

¶ 4. In 2017, plaintiff and wife hired a different attorney to pursue common-law tort claims against coworker for injuries plaintiff received in the 2014 accident, and they filed a complaint in federal court in Vermont. Coworker's counsel provided plaintiff's attorney with the settlement and general release that plaintiff signed. Coworker then filed an answer that did not raise any affirmative defenses, did not raise choice of law as a potential issue in the case, and cited Vermont law. Nonetheless, plaintiff and wife voluntarily dismissed their complaint, believing the general release barred any third-party tort claim against coworker.

¶ 5. In May 2020, plaintiff and wife filed a complaint against defendant in Vermont superior court alleging professional negligence-the tort that encompasses legal malpractice-and violation of the Vermont Consumer Protection Act (CPA). In support of the professional-negligence claim, they alleged defendant advised plaintiff to sign the workers' compensation settlement containing the general release, that the general release was not required for the settlement, and that the release barred all plaintiff's and wife's third-party tort claims against coworker, which would have otherwise been available under Vermont workers' compensation laws.^[3] For the consumer-protection claim, they asserted defendant engaged in unfair and deceptive practices and acted in bad faith in communicating with them.

¶ 6. Defendant moved to dismiss the professional-negligence claim for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted, arguing plaintiff and wife could not show he caused their injuries. The trial court granted defendant's motion, concluding that Virginia law applied in the federal diversity case and that, even absent a release, the claim against coworker was barred under Virginia law. Defendant then filed a motion to dismiss wife as a plaintiff in the case, arguing there was no attorney-client relationship between her and defendant, and to dismiss the consumer-protection claim, because it was based on legal advice and opinions not subject to the CPA. The trial court granted the motion, dismissing both wife's claims and the consumer-protection claim for the reasons defendant argued.

¶ 7. To attempt to remedy the reasons for dismissal, before entry of judgment plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to remove wife as a plaintiff, remove the CPA claim, and add factual allegations to support the legal-malpractice claim. The trial court granted plaintiff's motion, and he filed an amended complaint accordingly. Following discovery, defendant moved for summary judgment and filed a statement of undisputed material facts. Plaintiff opposed defendant's motion but did not contest defendant's statement of facts. In the summary-judgment motion, defendant again argued that plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case for professional negligence because, as a matter of law, he could not prove defendant had caused his injuries. In support, he argued third-party tort claims against coworkers, such as plaintiff's, are barred under Virginia workers' compensation laws. Plaintiff countered that Vermont law, which permits such claims, applied in the underlying case, and that even if Virginia law applied, his claim would not have been barred as a matter of law based on the undisputed facts. The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment "based on the analysis set forth in defendant's motion and reply memoranda." The court did not state its findings or provide further explanation for its decision.

¶ 8. Noting the trial court's failure to state its findings of fact and conclusions of law in granting defendant's summary-judgment motion, plaintiff filed a motion for findings pursuant to Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 52. The trial court denied this request as moot, explaining that it was not called upon to make findings of fact when granting defendant's motion for summary judgment.

¶ 9. On appeal, plaintiff argues the trial court erred in three ways: granting defendant's motions to dismiss; granting defendant's motion for summary judgment; and denying plaintiff's request for findings. We conclude that the trial court properly granted defendant's motion for summary judgment because plaintiff could not establish defendant caused his alleged injuries as a matter of law. Furthermore, because summary judgment in favor of defendant was proper, if there was any error in dismissing the original claim for professional negligence or wife's claims, it was harmless. Turning to the CPA claim, we conclude that it was properly dismissed because the statute does not regulate the conduct alleged in the complaint. Finally, we hold that the trial court was not required to make findings pursuant to defendant's Rule 52 request. We therefore affirm. I. Motion for Summary Judgment

¶ 10. We review a trial court's decision on a motion for summary judgment without deference, which shall be granted where "there is no genuine dispute of material fact and judgment is appropriate as a matter of law." Hum. Rts. Def. Ctr. v. Correct Care Sols., LLC, 2021 VT 63, ¶ 8, __ Vt. __, 263 A.3d 1260; V.R.C.P. 56(a).

¶ 11. To succeed in a legal-malpractice case, a plaintiff must show that "(1) the attorney owed a professional duty of care to the client; (2) the attorney breached the duty; (3) the attorney's act was a proximate cause of the client's injury; (4) and that the client suffered damages as a result of the injury." Sachs v. Downs Rachlin Martin PLLC, 2017 VT 100, ¶ 17, 206 Vt. 157, 179 A.3d 182. At issue in this case is the third element-causation. To establish proximate cause, a plaintiff must "prove it is more likely than not that, but for the attorney's negligent conduct, the plaintiff would not have been harmed." Id. ¶ 19. In this case, plaintiff must show that but for the general release, his negligence claim against coworker would have succeeded.

¶ 12. Because of differences in the substantive law, the potential viability of plaintiff's underlying negligence claim against coworker depends on whether the law of Virginia or Vermont applies to the claim. As explained more fully below, when a choice-of-law issue is raised, our inquiry begins with whether there is a conflict between the laws of the relevant states. If there is a conflict, we then apply choice-of-law principles to determine which state's law applies.

A. Presence of a Conflict

¶ 13. In diversity actions, federal courts determine the governing law by looking to the forum state's choice-of-law principles. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). The threshold question in...