Rodrigues v. Genlyte Thomas Group LLC

• Decision Date: 29 September 2005
• Docket Number: No. CIV.A. 200411512RBC.,CIV.A. 200411512RBC.
• Citation: 392 F.Supp.2d 102
• Parties: Raymond v. RODRIGUES, Plaintiff, v. GENLYTE THOMAS GROUP LLC d/b/a/ Lightolier, Karen Pacheco, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

392 F.Supp.2d 102

Raymond v. RODRIGUES, Plaintiff, v. GENLYTE THOMAS GROUP LLC d/b/a/ Lightolier, Karen Pacheco, Defendants.

No. CIV.A. 200411512RBC.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

September 29, 2005.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Mark B. Dubnoff, Edwards & Angell, LLP, Boston, MA, for Genlyte Thomas Group LLC, Karen Pacheco, Defendants.

Christopher C. Trundy, New Bedford, MA, for Raymond C. Rodrigues, Plaintiff.

Timothy P. Van Dyck, Edwards & Angell, LLP, Boston, MA, for Genlyte Thomas Group LLC, Karen Pacheco, Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION (# 15)

COLLINGS, United States Magistrate Judge.

I. Introduction

This matter is before the Court on the plaintiff's, Raymond C. Rodrigues', motion to remand for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). (# 15). The plaintiff originally filed this action in Bristol County (Massachusetts) Superior Court on May 5, 2004, claiming that he was sexually harassed while an employee of the defendant, Genlyte Thomas Group LLC d/b/a/ Lightener ("Genlyte"). He asserts claims of sex discrimination and sexual harassment against Genlyte (# 1, Complaint — Count I) and claims of sexual harassment (Count II) and intentional interference with contract (Count III) against the individual defendant Karen Pacheco ("Pacheco"). On July 1, 2004, Genlyte and Pacheco (hereafter "the defendants") filed a notice of removal to the United States District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 and §. 1446.(# 1). Pacheco simultaneously filed a motion to dismiss all claims against her. (# 2). Genlyte asserts that federal subject matter jurisdiction is anchored in 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because complete diversity exists between Rodrigues, a Massachusetts citizen, and Genlyte, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Kentucky. (# 1 at 1). Although Pacheco is a Massachusetts resident (# 1, Complaint ¶ 3), and thus shares citizenship with the plaintiff, the defendants maintain that diversity jurisdiction exists because Pacheco was fraudulently joined as a defendant in this action. (# 1 at 2). The plaintiff never submitted an opposition to Pacheco's motion to dismiss. On September 18, 2004, Judge Wolf, the district court judge to whom the case was then assigned, granted Pacheco's motion to dismiss.¹ On January 21, 2005, Rodrigues filed the present motion to remand this case (# 15), arguing that the defendants improperly removed this action, and that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because Pacheco is properly joined as a defendant. Genlyte has filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Remand (# 18), essentially reiterating the arguments previously made in its notice of removal and in Pacheco's motion to dismiss. The plaintiff has filed a reply memorandum (# 19) and the motion to remand is therefore ripe for disposition.

II. Discussion

A. Remand, Waiver and Other Preliminary Considerations

The plaintiff has moved pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) to remand this case to state court. That section states in relevant part:

A motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect in removal procedure must be made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal under section 1446(a). If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.

Here, the plaintiff does not argue that the removal petition was procedurally defective; he argues that removal was improper because the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction ab initio. Pacheco, the plaintiff asserts, is a proper defendant in this action and complete diversity is therefore lacking.

The remand statute is clear that a motion to remand may be made at any time prior to the entry of final judgment See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). However, there is an additional wrinkle here. Along with the defendants' notice of removal, Pacheco filed a motion to dismiss. The plaintiff never responded to that motion to dismiss, and on September 18, 2004, Judge Wolf granted the motion to dismiss all claims against Pacheco, the only Massachusetts defendant. Thus, the Court first examines Genlyte's preliminary argument, viz., that Rodrigues has waived any challenge to Pacheco's dismissal from the suit by failing to file an opposition to Pacheco's motion to dismiss, as required by Local Rule 7.1(b)(2),² and by failing to move previously for reconsideration of the Court's dismissal of the claims against Pacheco.

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and therefore are obligated to police their own jurisdiction. See Fafel v. Dipaola, 399 F.3d 403, 410 (1st Cir.2005). Subject matter jurisdiction "is never presumed.'" Id. (quoting Viqueira v. First Bank, 140 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1998)). Here, the plaintiff seeks remand on the theory that the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter the dismissal and the judgment is therefore void. Thus, although the plaintiff did not specifically invoke Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(4), which grants relief for a judgment or order that is void because the rendering court lacks jurisdiction, see, e.g., Hoult v. Hoult, 57 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.1995), his motion to remand encompasses such an argument, and the Court will consider the plaintiffs argument pursuant to this Rule. See e.g., M & K Welding, Inc. v. Leasing Partners, LLC, 386 F.3d 361, 363 n. 2 (1st Cir.2004) (applying Rule 60(b)(4) although parties did not invoke Rule where party attacked default judgment as void for lack of personal jurisdiction); Fafel, 399 F.3d at 409 (same). Cf. also Farm Credit Bank of Baltimore v. Ferrera-Goitia, 316 F.3d 62, 67 (1st Cir.2003) (a judgment is void pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4) if the rendering court lacked subject matter jurisdiction); United States v. One Rural Lot No. 10,356, 238 F.3d 76, 78 (1st Cir.2001) ("A judgment is void, and therefore subject to relief under Rule 60(b)(4), only if the court that rendered judgment lacked jurisdiction ....") (internal quotations and citation omitted).

Further, because the merits of the motion to dismiss are so closely intertwined with the jurisdictional question, Genlyte's argument that the plaintiff waived his right to challenge the dismissal of the claims against Pacheco is tantamount to arguing that the plaintiff has waived his right to challenge the Court's subject matter jurisdiction-and, of course, a federal court may not acquire subject matter jurisdiction through waiver or estoppel, and "`a party does not waive the requirement by failing to challenge jurisdiction early in the proceedings.'" Fafel, 399 F.3d at 410 (quoting Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702, 102 S.Ct. 2099, 72 L.Ed.2d 492 (1982)). Rather, motions to set aside a judgment for lack of jurisdiction may be made at any time. Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Ceramica Europa II, Inc., 160 F.3d 849, 852 (1st Cir.1998) (and cases cited). The plaintiffs failure to challenge the dismissal and subject matter jurisdiction four months after the order of dismissal does not, standing alone, provide a basis for denying a Rule 60(b)(4) motion. See id.

Furthermore, the First Circuit has noted that "it is not clear whether Local Rules for the District of Massachusetts require a non-moving party to respond to a motion to dismiss," Pomerleau v. West Springfield Public Schools, 362 F.3d 143, 146 (1st Cir.2004), and indeed that the Court's own "caselaw points in different directions on this question." Id. (citing cases). The First Circuit has also stated that "the mere fact that a motion to dismiss is unopposed does not relieve the district court of the obligation to examine the complaint itself to see whether it is formally sufficient to state a claim.'" Pomerleau, 362 F.3d at 146 (quoting Vega-Encarnacion v. Babilonia, 344 F.3d 37, 41 (1st Cir.2003)). Further, "[t]his obligation means that a court may not automatically treat a failure to respond to a 12(b)(6) motion as a procedural default." Id. (and cases cited). Here, the previous order of dismissal did not reference the local rule, and did not reach the merits of the motion to dismiss or the jurisdictional question. For that reason and because, as noted, the merits of Pacheco's motion to dismiss go to the heart of the fraudulent joinder and jurisdictional questions, the proper course, despite the plaintiff's unexplained dilatoriness, is to examine the merits of the fraudulent joinder issue.³ Indeed, a district court, in deciding a motion challenging subject matter jurisdiction brought under Rule 60(b)(4), "ha[s] no discretion because a judgment is either void or it is not.'" Fafel, 399 F.3d at 409-410. See also 11 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2nd § 2862, at 322-323.

B. Standard for Fraudulent Joinder

In general, a federal court has diversity jurisdiction only when complete diversity exists between the parties. See, e.g., Casas Office Machines, Inc. v. Mita Copystar America, Inc., 42 F.3d 668, 673 (1st Cir.1994). Thus, if any plaintiff and any defendant share citizenship of the same state, diversity is incomplete and federal jurisdiction is lacking. Id. The parties do not dispute that Pacheco and Rodrigues share the same citizenship. Thus, if Pacheco was properly joined, diversity in this case is lacking.

The doctrine of fraudulent joinder is meant to prevent the improper joinder of a party in order to defeat federal jurisdiction. See Carey v. Board of Governors of the Kernwood Country Club, 337 F.Supp.2d 339, 341 (D.Mass.2004). "The linchpin of the fraudulent joinder analysis is whether the joinder of the non-diverse party has a reasonable basis in law and fact." Mills v. Allegiance Healthcare Corp., 178 F.Supp.2d 1, 4 (D.Mass.2001). "`In order to show that naming a non-diverse defendant is a "fraudulent joinder" effected to defeat diversity, the defendant must demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence,...