Rodriguez- Simmiolkjier v. U.S. Gov't
| Docket Number | 1:21-cv-00257-WAL-EAH |
| Decision Date | 10 August 2022 |
| Parties | DENISE M. SIMMIOLKJIER-RODRIGUEZ, Plaintiff, v. U.S. GOVERNMENT as Representative of the TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, and AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Virgin Islands |
Jennifer Sue Koockogey, Esq. Lee J. Rohn, Esq. On behalf of Plaintiff
Angela Tyson-Floyd, Esq., AUSA On behalf of Defendant U.S Government
Chad C. Messier, Esq. Claire Anaclerio, Esq. On behalf of Defendant American Airlines, Inc.
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO STAY
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendant American Airlines, Inc.'s Motion to Stay Pending Ruling on American's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint and Incorporated Memorandum of Law. Dkt No. 42. Plaintiff opposed the motion, Dkt. No. 45, which was discussed at the Initial Conference held July 11, 2022. Following that conference, American Airlines filed a reply. Dkt. No. 53. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant American's motion to stay discovery pending a ruling by the District Court on American's motion to dismiss.
In June 2021, Denise M. Rodriguez-Simmiolkjier (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against the U.S Government, as Representative of the Transportation Security Administration (the “Government”), and American Airlines Group, Inc. concerning a June 20, 2019 incident that occurred when she was traveling through LaGuardia Airport in New York. Dkt. No. 1. In July, the Court granted the parties' stipulated motion to amend/correct the complaint in order that American could be properly sued as American Airlines, Inc. Dkt. Nos. 10, 11. Plaintiff filed the First Amended Complaint. Dkt. No. 12. American then moved to dismiss, Dkt. No. 13, after which Plaintiff moved to amend the complaint, Dkt. Nos. 17, 18.
In October 2021, the Court granted Plaintiff's motion to amend, Dkt. No. 26, and Plaintiff filed her Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) against the Government and American, Dkt. No. 28. She asserted jurisdiction under 4 V.I.C. § 76 and the Air Carrier Access Act (“ACAA”), 14 C.F.R. § 382.91. Id. ¶ 1. She alleged that she was traveling through LaGuardia airport in New York on June 20, 2019, after having been discharged from the hospital on June 18 and was “very weak.” Id. ¶¶ 5, 6. She informed American of her condition and requested assistance “in moving through the airport.” She “reasonably expected” airline employees/ staff would “provide her with the medical assistance necessary to reach her gate for safely boarding her flight” because American was a common carrier and under the ACAA, “American had a duty to provide and ensure the assistance.” Id. ¶¶ 7-9. It also had a “duty not to leave Plaintiff unattended in the wheelchair in the airport before she boarded her flight.” Id. ¶ 12. American initially provided assistance, wheeling her to Terminal C where she was “abandoned at a gate there.” Id. ¶ 11. When no one else came to the gate, Plaintiff went to the American counter and was told her flight was leaving from Terminal D and was about to board; she requested assistance to get to Terminal D but was informed that it was “too busy.” Id. ¶¶ 13-15. She attempted to wheel herself to Terminal D; a good Samaritan observed her and arranged for someone to push her wheelchair. Id. ¶¶ 16-17.
She then had to go through TSA by herself to get to her gate. American “had a duty to assist Plaintiff in the wheelchair as she moved through TSA procedures,” but since it had abandoned her, she attempted to go through TSA on her own. Id. ¶¶ 18-19. She told TSA she was very weak, but TSA required her to stand up to go through the security machine unassisted, which alarmed; she was told to stand with her arms outstretched to be patted down. Id. ¶¶ 20-23. When the agent patted her pants area “invasively,” her pants fell to the ground; the agent did not assist her but called another TSA employee and both laughed hysterically; then other patrons and TSA employees started laughing at Plaintiff. Id. ¶¶ 2426. Plaintiff, humiliated, struggled to pull her pants up and tried to obtain the name of the agent who was laughing; but the employee covered her badge with her hand. Plaintiff went to the TSA supervisor who responded “Well, next time, hold your god damn pants up.” Id. ¶¶ 27-31. The Supervisor did not give Plaintiff his name, other than “Charles.” Plaintiff struggled back to her wheelchair and sat down, after which she was told the wheelchair had to be checked; she was wheeled to where a TSA agent was checking her bag; the agent took out cold cuts and “mimed an extremely slow check” until the time for the flight had passed. Fortunately, the flight was delayed and she was able to make her flight. Id. ¶¶ 32-42. Plaintiff called the TSA hotline, giving details so the video of what occurred could be obtained; she emailed the information, but was told that the email had not been received and the tape was destroyed. Id. ¶¶ 43-47. She asserted claims for negligence, negligence per se, breach of contract, and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing against American, and negligence and failure to provide reasonable accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act against TSA. Id. ¶¶ 49-74.
Shortly thereafter, American filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that the SAC was devoid of any factual allegations establishing a nexus between American's conduct and her injury at the hands of TSA, thereby failing to allege plausible proximate cause. Dkt. No. 30 at 1-5. The allegations showed that American provided a wheelchair, it could not transport her to Terminal D, and its failure to provide such assistance (thereby abandoning her) prompted a good Samaritan to help her get to Terminal D. Id. at 5-6. However, American took no part in the situation at the TSA checkpoint; even if Plaintiff had pleaded such allegations, American's conduct was too remote to be a substantial factor in bringing about the harm caused by TSA, which operated independently to cause Plaintiff's injuries. Id. at 6-7. In addition, Plaintiff could not assert a private cause of action for negligence per se under the ACAA and, even if she could, she did not allege a disability under the Act, and did not establish causation. Id. at 7-12. Finally, the breach of contract and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing claim failed to state claims, as TSA caused the damages (causing her pants to fall to the ground, causing people to laugh and yell at her, performing a slow check, and destroying its surveillance tapes). Id. at 13. She did not allege that American refused to honor a contractual obligation or deprived her of a service under her contract. Id. Being too busy to transport her did not allege any improper purpose or ill motive, warranting dismissal of the breach of the duty of good faith claim. Id. at 14.
Plaintiff opposed, arguing that the detailed factual allegations in the SAC stated plausible claims: (1) American owed Plaintiff a duty of care as her air carrier; it conceded it breached the duty by depriving her of wheelchair assistance “required by law due to her disability” to get to her gate; the “independent intervening cause” is an affirmative defense; causation and other elements of negligence were issues for the jury; the natural consequences of American's negligence (leaving her at the wrong gate and failing to assist her) subjected her to mental anguish, physical pain and suffering; and whether American and TSA were concurrent tortfeasors was a jury question; (2) she stated a negligence per se claim, based on D.E. v. American Airlines, Inc., 2020 WL 877812, at * 3 (D. Or. Feb. 21, 2020); and (3) she stated a valid claim for breach of contract, any affirmative defense concerning lack of a causal connection between Plaintiff's injury due to TSA's alleged conduct was premature, and she did not have to show fraud or deceit for her claim of breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. Dkt. No. 31 at 3-19.
In its Reply, American maintained that Plaintiff must plead facts showing plausible proximate cause and the Court may assess the sufficiency of those allegations on a motion to dismiss; it did not concede any elements of negligence, as it owed no duty to assist her through TSA without interference by TSA; its motion was not based on superseding cause, as its alleged failure to cause an attendant to push her from Terminal C to D did not cause TSA to mistreat her; and if she was arguing that American was only responsible for causing her emotional distress associated with not wanting to miss her scheduled flight for the limited time when she was left at Terminal C before a good Samaritan transported her to Terminal D, then she could not plead damages because she did not plead that she suffered any bodily harm. Dkt. No. 32 at 3-7. Further, case law uniformly held that the ACAA did not create a private right of action; the court could address her breach of contract claim on a motion to dismiss; and a claim for breach of good faith and fair dealing required acts amounting to fraud or deceit, which were not alleged. Id. at 7-13.
On June 23, 2022, the parties submitted a report of the Rule 26(f) planning meeting. Dkt. No. 38. Thereafter, the Government filed an Answer. Dkt. No. 40.
On June 29, 2022, American filed a motion to stay discovery pending a ruling on its motion to dismiss the SAC. Dkt. No. 42. It argued that the four-pronged test for such a stay was met here: (1) Plaintiff would not suffer undue prejudice or a tactical disadvantage if the court granted the motion, as she could not identify a risk different in kind or quantity from risks present in all litigation, she waited nearly two...
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