Rodriguez v. Burnside

• Decision Date: 30 June 2022
• Docket Number: 20-11218
• Citation: 38 F.4th 1324
• Parties: Hjalmar RODRIGUEZ, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Edward H. BURNSIDE, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

38 F.4th 1324

Hjalmar RODRIGUEZ, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.Edward H. BURNSIDE, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 20-11218

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Filed: June 30, 2022

Atteeyah Hollie, Ryan Primerano, Gerry Weber, Southern Center for Human Rights, Atlanta, GA, Hjalmar Rodriguez, Jr., Valdosta SP - Inmate Legal Mail, Valdosta, GA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Roger A. Chalmers, Christopher Michael Carr, Jordan A. Weber, Assistant Attorney General, Attorney General's Office, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant-Appellee Edward H. Burnside.

Roger A. Chalmers, Angela Ellen Cusimano, Attorney General's Office, Atlanta, GA, for Defendants-Appellees Commissioner, Georgia Department of Corrections, Warden, Eric Sellers, a.k.a. Cellars, Warden, Telfair State Prison, June Bishop, Deputy Warden, GDCP, William Powell, Deputy Warden of Security, GDCP, Gary Caldwell, Deputy Warden of Care and Treatment, GDCP, Rufus Logan, Unit Manager, GDCP, Fredrick Sutton, Kitchen Director, GDCP, Pauline Martin, Sharon Lewis, Medical Director, GDOC, Mary Gore, Nurse, GDCP, Linda Adair, Nurse, GDCP, David Butts, Medical Director, GDCP, Williams, GDOC, Karen Forts, Counselors, GDCP, Darrel Reid, Counselors, GDCP, Michael Cannon, Warden and or Superintendent of GDCP, Theresa Thornton, Deputy Warden of Care and Treatment, GDCP.

Before Jill Pryor, Grant, and Marcus, Circuit Judges.

GRANT, Circuit Judge:

To test whether a state prison regulation violates an inmate's constitutional rights, courts ask whether the regulation is reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest. That inquiry is intended to ensure that prison officials respect constitutional boundaries without frustrating their efforts to fulfill the difficult responsibility of prison administration.

Here we consider two Georgia prison policies that control how officers transport inmates to showers, and we ask whether those policies interfere with an inmate's First Amendment right to free exercise of religion. Although the inmate suggests ways the prison could make an exception to accommodate his religious requests, he does not show that the policies were unconstitutional in the first place. And even if they were, qualified immunity would protect the officials because the types of shower rights the inmate seeks are not clearly established. We affirm the district court.

I.

Hjalmar Rodriguez was imprisoned at Hays State Prison after he was convicted of voluntary manslaughter. While he lived there, Rodriguez killed another inmate by stabbing him with a knife during a fight. Understandably concerned that he was a safety risk, prison officials moved him into the Special Management Unit at the Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Prison. That unit handles "offenders who commit or lead others to commit violent, disruptive, predatory, or riotous actions, or who otherwise pose a serious threat to the security of the institution." The unit's rigorous policies reflect the greater risk those inmates pose to prison safety and security.

For most of his time in that unit, Rodriguez was housed in wings with single-occupancy cells. These cells were not equipped with showers, but prison policy was to escort each inmate to a separate shower three times per week. To ensure safety and security during the shower transports, prison officers in the unit followed a set of strict procedures. To start, each transport required the dedicated attention of between two and five officers.

Clothing was also kept to a minimum—inmates could wear only boxers and shower shoes when walking to the shower, and could not bring along any other clothes. Before leaving their cells, inmates handed any necessary items through a cell-door port so that an officer could "thoroughly check" for contraband. Only the bare necessities were allowed—soap and a towel. Once the items were searched, the officers handcuffed the inmate through the door port, opened the door, and finally secured the inmate in leg shackles.

Only then could an inmate be taken to the shower. With yet another step-by-step process, the inmate was unshackled, locked in the shower, and unhandcuffed. After the shower, the process then went in reverse—the inmate was again searched and secured before being taken back to his cell by a group of officers.

Though tedious, these steps were meant to ensure "that the escorting officers were safe and that the prison remained secure." As the deputy warden explained, the "shower security protocol" helped stop the flow of contraband and weapons that could be hidden in clothing and taken to the shower.

Rodriguez, however, disagreed with those policies and believed that the restrictions infringed his constitutional rights. As a Muslim, Rodriguez practiced ghusl , a ritual bathing that involves washing the whole body multiple times and that must be completed every 24 hours. He complained that ghusl was impossible to perform using the sink and towel in his cell because it "requires a large amount of water" and would have produced a slipping hazard. Rodriguez conceded that the sink and towel were helpful, enabling him to perform a simpler and more frequent religious washing called wudu . But because prison officials were not providing him with daily showers, they were—at least as he saw it—violating his First Amendment right to freely exercise his religion.

Rodriguez's religious beliefs also dictated that he dress modestly "by wearing garments that cover from mid-stomach or the naval to the bottom of the knees" around anyone but immediate family. Of course, the shower transport policy did not allow for that much clothing—he could wear only boxers and shower shoes. The policy thus contravened his religious modesty obligations by requiring him to expose both his lower stomach and a portion of his leg above his knee.

To challenge these policies and raise a host of other complaints, Rodriguez sued several prison officials under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. In his complaint, Rodriguez claimed that the shower policies intruded on his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

The district court granted summary judgment to the prison officials on his shower policy claims. Adopting the magistrate judge's report, the court held that prison officials had not violated Rodriguez's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights when they enforced the prison's shower policies. The policies were "reasonably related to the legitimate penological interests in securing the prison." It also held that he was not entitled to relief under RLUIPA because his injunctive claims were mooted when he was transferred out of the Special Management Unit.

Rodriguez appeals, contending that the shower policies fail First Amendment scrutiny. The prison officials disagree, and argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity in any event. Rodriguez also argues that the magistrate judge was incorrect to reject motions related to discovery requests and appointment of counsel.

II.

We review de novo the district court's grant of summary judgment to the prison officials on Rodriguez's free exercise claim. See Jurich v. Compass Marine, Inc. , 764 F.3d 1302, 1304 (11th Cir. 2014). We view all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and summary judgment is proper when the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.

A.

"Prison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates from the protections of the Constitution." Turner v. Safley , 482 U.S. 78, 84, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987). But those protections can be limited, because they sometimes conflict with an inmate's "status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system." Pesci v. Budz , 935 F.3d 1159, 1165 (11th Cir. 2019) (quotation omitted); see also Pell v. Procunier , 417 U.S. 817, 822, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 41 L.Ed.2d 495 (1974).

Deciding what limits are permissible is tricky—running a prison "is an inordinately difficult undertaking that requires expertise, planning, and the commitment of resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive branches of government." Turner , 482 U.S. at 84–85, 107 S.Ct. 2254. Respect for the separation of powers thus requires us to exercise "judicial restraint regarding prisoner complaints." Id. at 85, 107 S.Ct. 2254 (quotation omitted). And when critiquing a state penal system, principles of federalism "bolster that deference." Pesci , 935 F.3d at 1165.

To allow prison officials "to remain the primary arbiters of the problems that arise in prison management," we evaluate a prisoner's constitutional claim under a "unitary, deferential standard." Shaw v. Murphy , 532 U.S. 223, 229–30, 121 S.Ct. 1475, 149 L.Ed.2d 420 (2001). Under that standard, a prison regulation burdening an inmate's exercise of constitutional rights must be "reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." Turner , 482 U.S. at 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254.

To succeed on a constitutional claim, an inmate must show that "the logical connection between the regulation and the asserted goal is so remote as to render the policy arbitrary or irrational." Id. at 89–90, 107 S.Ct. 2254. We do not inquire whether the prison could make an individualized exception for the complaining inmate—we assess "only the relationship between the asserted penological interests and the prison regulation." Shaw , 532 U.S. at 230, 121 S.Ct. 1475.

The Supreme Court in Turner outlined four factors that frame our analysis. To decide whether the prison's policies impermissibly burden Rodriguez's First Amendment right to free exercise, we ask

(1) whether there is a "valid, rational connection between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it";

(2) whether "alternative means" of exercising the right "remain open to prison inmates," such

...