Rodriguez v. Cuomo
| Decision Date | 09 November 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 89 Civ. 8541(VLB).,89 Civ. 8541(VLB). |
| Citation | 751 F. Supp. 363 |
| Parties | Balbina RODRIGUEZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Mario CUOMO, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Michael D. Hamden (John T. Hand, of counsel), Westchester Legal Services, Inc., Yonkers, N.Y., for plaintiffs.
Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen. of the State of N.Y., Judy E. Nathan, Asst. U.S. Atty., New York City, for defendants.
At issue in this action is whether the State of New York's program for distributing federal funds through its Home Energy Assistance Program ("HEAP")1 violates the federal Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 8621-8629 ("LIHEAA"). At the oral argument on this matter on September 28, 1990 I found that it did.2 This memorandum order supplements the reasons given on the record for that determination.
Plaintiffs are subsidized housing tenants whose heating costs are included in and paid as a part of their rent, but who make separate payments for gas and electric utilities.3 Under the New York State regulations in effect prior to the 1988-89 heating season, plaintiffs qualified for HEAP payments. The State amended its regulations effective May 26, 1989; under the amended regulations plaintiffs were excluded from receiving HEAP moneys. The challenged portion of the state regulation, as amended, reads:
An earlier dispute regarding payments for the 1988-89 season was settled. At stake in this action is whether plaintiffs should be eligible to receive benefits with respect to the 1989-90 heating season.
Plaintiffs have claimed that the amended regulation violates both the federal LIHEAA and the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.4 Because I find that the regulation in question violates the LIHEAA, I do not reach the constitutional claims.
The relevant part of the Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Act as to eligibility reads as follows:
Thus under the federal statutory scheme, households whose income exceeds 150% of the poverty level for the State are effectively barred from receiving HEAP funds, and households whose income is less than 110% of the poverty level for the State must be eligible. Consequently, the State has some leeway in defining which households will be eligible to receive HEAP funds; it may not, however, draw the eligibility line above the 150% poverty level figure or below the 110% poverty level figure.
The State points out that a low household income is only one of the requirements for eligibility to HEAP payments. On this accurate premise, the State builds its flawed argument that persons who reside in government housing where heat costs are included in their rent, and whose total payment for both rent and heat is strictly a function of their income, do not qualify for HEAP payments because they do not make payments toward heat, nor are they are vulnerable to increased heat costs. The State's arguments are not persuasive: whereas making payments toward heat is a legitimate prerequisite, the plaintiffs in this action all meet that requirement; and while increased heating costs might validly be taken into consideration in awarding emergency HEAP payments, immunity to increased costs (and I am not persuaded that the plaintiffs are so immune) is not a valid basis for exclusion from regular HEAP payments.
To qualify for any part of the federal funds distributed to the states under the LIHEAA, an applicant family must be making payments for heat. The term "household" for LIHEAA purposes means "any individual or group of individuals who are living together as one economic unit for whom residential energy is customarily purchased in common or who make undesignated payments for energy in the form of rent";5 thus to qualify for LIHEAA funds a "household" must pay for energy,6 either directly to the company that supplies heat to its dwelling, or through "undesignated payments for energy in the form of rent." Plaintiffs directly spend between 13 and 27 percent of their income to pay for combined charges of rent and heat,7 with the heat component undesignated. Although payment for heat is "undesignated" and "in the form of rent," this form of payment is sufficient to constitute each plaintiff in this action a "household" under the LIHEAA.
The State contends that plaintiffs cannot complain about the challenged State regulation because they are not economically at risk for rising costs of home energy. The LIHEAA does not, however, require households to demonstrate vulnerability to increased payments for heat. Under the statutory scheme, the federal government makes LIHEAA grants to the states "to assist eligible households to meet the costs of home energy."8 Since the plaintiffs are both "eligible" and "households," the plaintiffs are among the intended recipients of LIHEAA funds.
Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 8624(b)(8)
42 U.S.C. § 8624(b)(2)(B) focuses only on who may be "eligible," and eligibility does not necessarily mean automatic entitlement to HEAP payments. Under § 8624(b)(8), however, the State must agree to "provide assurances that (A) the State will not exclude households described in clause (2)(B) of this subsection from receiving home energy assistance benefits under clause (2)...."9 This must mean that, absent some other overriding clause, every household described in 42 U.S.C. § 8624(b)(2)(B) must receive some part of the federal funds that have been earmarked to help pay heating and cooling costs. So long as these low-income households are themselves paying, directly or indirectly, for some part of their heating costs, they are entitled to share in the federal funds that have been granted to the state for precisely this purpose.
The State appears to find an overriding clause in 42 U.S.C. § 8624(b)(5), which requires that "the highest level of assistance ... be furnished to those households which have the lowest incomes and the highest energy costs in relation to income, taking into account family size."10 Without passing on whether the State program correctly applies the requirements of this clause, for purposes of this memorandum order it is sufficient to point out that § 8624(b)(5), in indicating who should receive "the highest level of assistance," simply addresses how the federal funds should be distributed among those receiving aid. The clause focuses upon the proportion of funds going to each of the recipients. It does not deal with who should be disqualified from being a recipient, and it does not nullify § 8624(b)(8).
Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 8624(f)(1)
The State has excluded plaintiffs from its HEAP program because plaintiffs receive certain housing subsidies. Excluding plaintiffs on this basis indirectly violates the mandate of § 8624(f)(1) of the LIHEAA, which provides as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law unless enacted in express limitation of this paragraph, the amount of any home energy assistance payments or allowance provided directly to, or indirectly for the benefit of, an eligible household under this subchapter shall not be considered income or resources of such household (or any member thereof) for any purpose under any Federal or State law, including any law relating to taxation, food stamps, public assistance, or welfare programs.
42 U.S.C.A. § 8624(f)(1) (West Supp. 1990).
The Eighth Circuit in Clifford v. Janklow11 has already addressed this issue, concluding that LIHEAA funds cannot be withheld from eligible households on the basis of the receipt by those households of other forms of public assistance:
I agree with the Clifford court. In apportioning HEAP funds among the various recipients, it is a corollary to § 8624(f)(1) that the State may not take into consideration the rent subsidies received by the applicants. By excluding the plaintiffs from receiving HEAP funds based on their receiving rent subsidies, the State is in violation of Section 8624(f)(1) of the LIHEAA.13
The State argues that it is too late to make payments for the 1989-90 heating season because such payments would be retroactive and compensatory, which would be inconsistent with the remedial purpose of the HEAP statute.14 Nevertheless, precisely because the plaintiffs pay for heating as a component...
To continue reading
Request your trial
- Advanced Fiber Techs. (Aft) Trust v. J&L Fiber Servs., Inc.
-
Rodriguez v. Cuomo
...held that the regulation violated clauses (b)(8) and (f)(1) of the Act, but did not reach or decide the constitutional claims. 751 F.Supp. 363 (S.D.N.Y.1990). The Governor of New York State and the Commissioner of the New York State Department of Social Services appeal from that judgment. M......
-
Hill v. Perales
...social services officials to "furnish assistance which duplicates assistance already granted ...". See, also, Balbina Rodriguez v. Cuomo, 751 F.Supp. 363 (S.D.N.Y., 1990); Clifford v. Janklow, 733 F.2d 534 (8th Nor are we persuaded that a result other than that we reach here is suggested by......