Rodriguez v. Ford Motor Co.

• Decision Date: 30 September 2022
• Docket Number: 5:22-cv-01056-SSS-MAAx
• Parties: SANJUANITA RODRIGUEZ, Plaintiff, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of California

SANJUANITA RODRIGUEZ, Plaintiff,
v.
FORD MOTOR COMPANY et al., Defendants.

No. 5:22-cv-01056-SSS-MAAx

United States District Court, C.D. California

September 30, 2022

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND [DKT. 9]

SUNSHINE S. SYKES UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

1

Before the Court is Plaintiff Sanjuanita Rodriguez's (“Plaintiff”) Motion to Remand (“Motion”). [Dkt. 9].

Plaintiff originally filed this action in San Bernadino County Superior Court on August 31, 2021. On June 27, 2022, Defendant Ford Motor Company (“Defendant” or “FMC”) filed a Notice of Removal in this Court. It asserts that federal jurisdiction over this matter is proper under 28 U.S.C. §1332 (a)(1), which provides that “the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between.. .citizens of different States.” [Dkt. 1 at ¶ 3]. On July 29, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion opposing removal.

Plaintiff does not contest that there is complete diversity between the parties. She argues only that Defendants have not demonstrated a sufficient amount in controversy to establish federal jurisdiction. Defendant maintains that it is clear from the face of Plaintiff's Complaint that she seeks more than $75,000 in damages. [Id. at ¶ 8]. In the alternative, Defendant argues that it has provided sufficient extrinsic evidence to demonstrate that the damages Plaintiff has alleged, if awarded, would more than likely exceed this jurisdictional minimum. [Id. at ¶ 9-20].

Plaintiff also submits two Requests for Judicial Notice (“RJNs”) [Dkt. 10, 15] in connection with her Motion, as well as an Evidentiary Objection to the Declaration submitted by Defendant's attorney Michael Mortenson in support of Defendant's Notice of Removal [Dkt. 1-1]. [Dkt. 14-1]. Defendant has requested the Court take judicial notice of one exhibit filed with its Notice of Removal. [Dkt. 12 at 9 n.1; Dkt. 12-1 at ¶ 5].

The Motion is fully briefed. [Dkt. 12, 19]. After considering the papers, the Court finds it appropriate for resolution without a hearing. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 78; L.R. 7-15.

2

For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's Motion is DENIED.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In February 2017, Plaintiff purchased a Ford Fusion (the “Vehicle”) from car dealership Sunland Ford. The Vehicle was manufactured and distributed by FMC. [Dkt. 1-2 at ¶ 4, 5, 9].

Plaintiff alleges that, during the Vehicle's warranty period, it began to exhibit defects that “substantially impair[ed] [its] use, value or safety[.]” [Id. at ¶ 11]. She returned the Vehicle to Sunland Ford or another in-state agent of FMC (the Complaint does not specify) who has not successfully repaired the Vehicle, provided a replacement, or offered either restitution or any other remedy. [Id. at ¶ 12].

Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in San Bernadino Superior Court. See Sanjuanita Rodriguez. v. Ford Motor Co., et al., Case No. CIVSB2125348. She brought seven total Causes of Action against FMC and Sunland Ford. Five of the seven arise under California's Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, which allows "any buyer of consumer goods who is damaged by a failure to comply with any obligation under [the Act] or under an implied or express warranty or service contract [to] bring an action for the recovery of damages and other legal and equitable relief." Cal. Civ. Code § 1794. Plaintiff seeks relief including actual damages, civil penalties of double her actual damages as authorized under Cal. Civ. Code § 1794(c) and/or (e), and attorney's fees. [Dkt. 1-2 at ¶ 13-17, 21-25, 29, 34, 48].

On May 27, 2022, Plaintiff dismissed Sunland Ford from the suit. [Dkt. 1-5]. Defendant filed its Notice of Removal with this Court one month later. [Dkt. 1].

3

LEGAL STANDARD

A defendant may remove any civil action over which the federal district courts enjoy subject matter jurisdiction. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr., 463 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1983). It must remove to the district court for the district and division embracing the location where the state court action is pending. Id., see also 28 U.S.C. § 1441.

Any defendant asserting diversity jurisdiction as the basis for removal must demonstrate that (1) no defendant is a citizen of the same state as any plaintiff and (2) the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b); 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).

“[T]he amount in controversy ... is determined by the complaint operative at the time of removal and encompasses all relief a court may grant on that complaint if the plaintiff is victorious.” Chavez v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 888 F.3d 413, 414-15 (9th Cir. 2018). This includes any compensatory or punitive damages alleged as well as any attorneys' fees that may be awarded under fee shifting statutes but does not encompass other “costs” of litigation or prejudgment interest. Gonzales v. CarMax Auto Superstores, LLC, 840 F.3d 644, 648-49 (9th Cir. 2016).

Importantly, the amount in controversy is “not a prospective assessment of [a] defendant's liability,” Lewis v. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc., 627 F.3d 395, 400 (9th Cir. 2010). Rather, it is the amount plaintiff places at issue in her complaint. Gonzales v. CarMax Auto Superstores, LLC, 840 F.3d 644, 648-49 (9th Cir. 2016). This means that a court conducting an amount-in-controversy inquiry should not deduct from plaintiff's demand any possible reductions defendants might achieve by asserting available defenses to her claims. See Geographic Expeditions, Inc. v. Estate of Lhota ex rel. Lhotka, 599 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010).

4

Where a plaintiff moves to return a removed action to state court on the grounds that the amount in controversy is not more than $75,000, defendant's burden in successfully resisting remand will vary depending on how plaintiff has drafted the underlying complaint. Guglielmino v. McKee Foods Corp., 506 F.3d 696, 698-99 (9th Cir. 2007). If the complaint alleges, “on its face,” a sufficient amount in controversy, defendant's burden is presumptively satisfied unless it appears to a “legal certainty” that the plaintiff cannot actually recover that amount. Id.; see also Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992).

If it is “unclear or ambiguous from the face of a state-court complaint whether the requisite amount in controversy is pled,” a “preponderance of the evidence standard” will apply. Guglielmino, 506 F.3d at 699, citing Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398, 404 (9th Cir. 1996). The amount-in-controversy inquiry will not be “confined to the face of the complaint.” Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 1115, 1117 (9th Cir. 2004). Rather, both sides may “submit proof,” which may include “summary-judgment-type evidence.” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 88 (2014); see also Chavez, 888 F.3d at 416. The court then considers each parties' evidence, the complaint, and the removal petition to determine if defendant has established that it is “more likely than not” that the amount placed in controversy satisfies the jurisdictional requirement. Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398, 404 (9th Cir. 1996).

DISCUSSION

A....