Rodriguez v. Great American Indemnity Company
Decision Date | 13 June 1957 |
Docket Number | No. 16426.,16426. |
Citation | 244 F.2d 484 |
Parties | Maria RODRIGUEZ, individually and as next friend of Antonio and Evangelina Rodriguez, minors, and Daniel Rodriguez, Appellants, v. GREAT AMERICAN INDEMNITY COMPANY, Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Charles J. Lieck, San Antonio, Tex., for appellants.
Carl Wright Johnson, Nat L. Hardy, San Antonio, Tex., for appellee.
Before HUTCHESON, Chief Judge, and BORAH and TUTTLE, Circuit Judges.
Brought under the Texas Workmen's Compensation Act, Vernon's Ann.Civ.St. art. 8306 et seq., by the widow and child of the deceased employee, the suit was for death benefits provided by the Act for compensable injuries.
The claim was that, though the death had occurred not during, but after, working hours and not at his place of work, but as a result of a fire in his lodgings after he had retired for the night, decedent's death was, nevertheless, compensable under the statute as one occurring in the course of, and originating in, his employment within the meaning of the controlling provisions of the Act, because it occurred when in order to work at his job he was required to be away from his home.
The defense wag that, since the hours and the rate of pay per hour were fixed by his contract of employment and the employee was free to and did select his own lodging place, the death of the deceased did not have to do with and originate in the work of his employer, and the defendant was not liable as insurer because the death was not a compensable injury under the Act.
Tried to the court without a jury on a stipulation and on undisputed deposition testimony, the district judge, finding the facts1 in accordance therewith, concluded:
From the judgment entered in accordance with this conclusion, plaintiffs have appealed. Here, in support of their position that, though if the injury had occurred in San Antonio, where Rodriguez lived, he would not have been covered while away from his work and asleep, he was covered at Del Rio because his case comes within the away from home exception to the general rule, appellant cites cases of salesmen, collectors, and others employed on a 24 hour basis, whose employment carried them away from their home and kept them on general call, such as Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Harbuck, Tex.Civ.App., 73 S.W. 2d 113 and Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n. v. Cobb, Tex.Civ.App., 118 S.W.2d 375, and presses upon us the argument that Rodriguez's case fits the pattern with which they deal.
Appellee, on its part, citing Associated Employers' Reciprocal v. Simmons, Tex. Civ.App., 273 S.W. 686; Wynn v. Southern Surety Co., Tex.Civ.App., 26 S.W.2d 6912 (writ of error refused); Smith v. Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n., 129 Tex. 573, 105 Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Sparrow, 134 Tex. 352, 133 S.W. 2d 126. Insisting that the facts in this case are entirely different from the facts in the cases cited by appellant, it points to the difference inherent in what was required by the work here and what was required to be done and was done in the Harbuck and Cobb cases. So pointing, appellee, calling attention to the fact that in each of those cases the employer was held by the court to be generally employed on a twenty-four hour basis, without fixed time, place, or pay per hour for doing the work, thus states its case:
From the above contrary contentions of the parties, it is apparent that the correct decision of the question presented here requires a preliminary statement of the applicable law and we think we cannot do it better than by quoting from the very well considered opinion of this court in New York Casualty Co. v. Wetherell, 5 Cir., 193 F.2d 881, 882, an opinion in which, though there was a dissent, it was based upon a disagreement not with the statement of the controlling legal principles but with their application to the particular facts of that case.
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