Rodriguez v. Kijakazi

• Decision Date: 05 August 2022
• Docket Number: Civil Action 21-1512
• Parties: DEANNA L. RODRIGUEZ v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, ACTING COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana

DEANNA L. RODRIGUEZ
v.
KILOLO KIJAKAZI, ACTING COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

Civil Action No. 21-1512

United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana

August 5, 2022

SECTION “I” (3)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

DANA M. DOUGLAS UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff Deanna Rodriguez filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for review of the final decision of the Commissioner denying his claims for a period of disability and Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act ("SSA"). The matter has been fully briefed on cross-motions for summary judgment. The issues are thus ripe for review. For the following reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment be DENIED, the Commissioner's cross-motion be GRANTED, and Plaintiff's case be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

I. BACKGROUND

On June 23, 2017, Deanna Rodriguez (“Plaintiff”) filed a Title II application for DIB, alleging disability beginning January 4, 2014, alleging “neck with advanced degenerative disease, bilateral ulnar neuropathies in the arms, carpal tunnel syndrome, arthritis, CFS (chronic fatigue syndrome) with depression, headaches from TMJ (temporomandibular joint), tenosynovitis of foot and ankle, bladder leaks and IC (interstitial cystitis).” (Rec. Doc. No. 11-3, p. 2). At the hearing, Plaintiff amended her alleged onset date to February 28, 2018. (Rec. Doc. No. 7, p. 14). Plaintiff's earnings indicated she had sufficient quarters of coverage to remain insured through December 31, 2018, her date last insured (“DLI”). Her claim was initially denied on February 20, 2018. Id. Plaintiff requested a hearing, which was held on October 13, 2020, before an administrative law

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judge (“ALJ”). Id. The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision finding that the Plaintiff was not disabled on January 8, 2021. Id.

The ALJ analyzed Rodriguez's claim pursuant to the five-step sequential evaluation process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i-v). At the first step, the ALJ found that the Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since February 28, 2018, her amended onset date, through December 31, 2018, her DLI. (Rec. Doc. No. 7, p. 16). At the second step, the ALJ found that Plaintiff's degenerative disc disease of the lumbar and cervical spine with prior cervical fusion was a severe impairment. Id. At the third step, the ALJ found that the impairment or combination of impairments failed to meet or equal a listed impairment for presumptive disability under the regulations. Id. at 19.

Next, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b), except:

[S]he should never climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds, and can occasionally climb ramps and stairs. She should avoid workplace hazards including unprotected height and dangerous moving machinery. The claimant should not be required to drive as a condition of her employment. She can occasionally reach overhead with her left, non-dominant upper extremity The claimant can frequently handle bilaterally and frequently reach bilaterally. She can frequently rotate her neck from side to side

(Rec. Doc. No. 7, p. 19). At step four, the ALJ found that through her DLI, Plaintiff was unable to perform her past relevant work as an accountant. Id. at 23. At step five, upon consideration of testimony from the vocational expert, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled because she was capable of performing other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy, including routing clerk, marker, and photocopy machine operator. Id. at 24. Accordingly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not under a “disability” as defined in the Act from February 28, 2018 through December 31, 2018, her DLI. Id. at 25.

On June 29, 2021, the Appeals Council denied a request to review the ALJ's decision,

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making the unfavorable decision the final decision of the Commissioner. (Rec. Doc. No. 11-3, p. 2). Plaintiff filed the present civil action to challenge that decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Judicial review of the Commissioner's decision to deny benefits is limited to determining whether that decision is supported by substantial evidence and whether the proper legal standards are applied to evaluate the evidence. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Copeland v. Colvin, 771 F.3d 920, 923 (5th Cir. 2014); Ripley v. Chater, 67 F.3d 552, 555 (5th Cir. 1995). Substantial evidence means more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). In other words, substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a responsible mind might accept to support a conclusion.” Harris v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 413, 417 (5th Cir. 2000).

Although a reviewing court must review the administrative record to ascertain whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's findings, it may not reweigh the evidence, try issues de novo, or substitute its own judgment for that of the Commissioner. Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 236 (5th Cir. 1994); Hollis v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 1378, 1383 (5th Cir. 1988). “If the Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence, then the findings are conclusive, and the Commissioner's decision must be affirmed.” Martinez v. Chater, 64 F.3d 172, 173 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing 42 U.S. § 405(g)). A reviewing court “may affirm only on the grounds that the Commissioner stated for [the] decision.” Copeland, 771 F.3d at 923.

The ALJ has a duty to fully and fairly develop the facts relating to a claim for disability benefits. See Ripley, 67 F.3d at 557 (citing Pierre v. Sullivan, 884 F.2d 799, 802 (5th Cir. 1989) (per curiam); Kane v. Heckler, 731 F.2d 1216, 1219 (5th Cir. 1984)). If this duty is not satisfied, the decision that results is not supported by substantial evidence. See id. However, the Court does not expect procedural perfection from the ALJ and will reverse as not supported by substantial

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evidence only if the failure to develop the record prejudiced Plaintiff. See Jones v. Astrue, 691 F.3d 730, 733 (5th Cir. 2012). In other words, the plaintiff “must show that he could and would have adduced evidence that might have altered the result.” Brock v. Chater, 84 F.3d 726, 728-29 (5th Cir. 1996).

III. ENTITLEMENT TO BENEFITS UNDER THE ACT

To be entitled to social security benefits, a claimant must show that she is disabled within the meaning of the Act. Leggett v. Chater, 67 F.3d 558, 563-64 (5th Cir. 1995); Villa v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1019, 1022 (5th Cir. 1990). A claimant must show an inability Ato engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §' 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Commissioner has promulgated regulations that provide procedures for evaluating a claim and determining disability. 20 C.F.R. '' 404.1501-404.1599 & Appendices, '' 416.901t-416.988 (1995). The regulations include a five-step evaluation process for determining whether an impairment prevents a person from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. Id. '' 404.1520, 416.920; Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 236 (5th Cir.1994).

In evaluating a disability claim, the Commissioner utilizes the five-step sequential process to determine whether: (1) the claimant is presently working; (2) the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) the impairment meets or equals an impairment listed in appendix 1 of the social security regulations; (4) the impairment prevents the claimant from doing past relevant work; and (5) the impairment prevents the claimant from doing any other substantial gainful activity. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; Audler v. Astrue, 501 F.3d 446, 447-48 (5th Cir. 2007).

Under the first four steps of the analysis, the burden lies with the claimant to prove he has

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a disability. Leggett, 67 F.3d at 564. Once the claimant satisfies his initial burden, the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five to show that the claimant can perform other gainful employment in the national economy. Greenspan, 38 F.3d at 236. If the Commissioner shows that other jobs are available to the claimant, the burden of proof shifts back to the claimant to rebut such a finding. Selders v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 614, 618 (5th Cir. 1990). “A finding that a claimant is disabled or is not disabled at any point in the five-step review is conclusive and terminates the analysis.” Lovelace v. Bowen, 813 F.2d 55, 58 (5th Cir. 1987).

A claimant is considered disabled only if a physical or mental impairment is so severe that the claimant is unable to do not only previous work, but cannot, considering age, education and work experience, participate in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in significant numbers in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the area in which the claimant lives, whether a specific job vacancy exists, or whether the claimant would be hired if she or he applied for work. 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a)(3)(B). If the ALJ determines that a plaintiff is not disabled under Step V of the five-part test, the ALJ must establish that the claimant has a Aresidual functional capacity@ (RFC), given the claimant's age, education, and past work experience, to perform other work available in the national economy. Leggett v. Chater, 67 F.3d 558, 564 n.11 (5th Cir. 1995). Step V also requires the Commissioner to use the medical-vocational guidelines to make a disability determination. Id. The four elements of proof weighed to determine whether evidence of disability is substantial are: (1) objective medical facts; (2) diagnoses and opinions of treating and examining physicians; (3) claimant's subjective evidence of pain and...