Rodriguez v. Madden

• Decision Date: 14 November 2022
• Docket Number: 3:22-cv-01437-DMS-KSC
• Parties: JOHN C. RODRIGUEZ, CDCR #BB-8937, Plaintiff, v. R. MADDEN, Warden; VALENCIA, Correctional Officer, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of California

JOHN C. RODRIGUEZ, CDCR #BB-8937, Plaintiff,
v.
R. MADDEN, Warden; VALENCIA, Correctional Officer, Defendants.

No. 3:22-cv-01437-DMS-KSC

United States District Court, S.D. California

November 14, 2022

ORDER: (1) GRANTING MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS [ECF NO. 2] (2) DISMISSING DEFENDANT MADDEN AS A PARTY PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(E)(2)(B)(II) AND 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(B)(1) AND (3) DIRECTING U.S. MARSHAL TO EFFECT SERVICE UPON DEFENDANT VALENCIA PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(D) AND FED. R. CIV. P. 4(C)(3)

Hon. Dana M. Sabraw, Chief Judge

On August 5, 2022, Plaintiff John C. Rodriguez, who is currently incarcerated at California State Prison-Los Angeles County (“LAC”) and proceeding pro se, filed this rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the Central District of California, together

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with a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”). See ECF Nos. 1 & 2. Because Rodriguez claims correctional officials at Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”) in San Diego violated his Eighth Amendment rights in December 2020 while he was housed there, the Honorable Fred W. Slaughter found venue was proper in the Southern District, but not the Central District of California pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), and transferred the case here in the interests of justice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). See ECF No. 6. Judge Slaughter expressly declined to rule on Rodriguez's pending Motion to Proceed IFP, and made no determination as to whether his Complaint survives the sua sponte screening required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). Id. at 3.

I. MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $402.^[1]See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff's failure to prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, the Prison Litigation Reform Act's (“PLRA”) amendments to § 1915 require that all prisoners who proceed IFP to pay the entire fee in “increments” or “installments,” Bruce v. Samuels, 577 U.S. 82, 83-84 (2016); Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), and regardless of whether their action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Section 1915(a)(2) requires all persons seeking to proceed without full prepayment of fees to file an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets possessed and demonstrates an inability to pay. See Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015). In

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support of this affidavit, the PLRA also requires prisoners to submit a “certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for ... the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having custody of the prisoner collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding month's income, in any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); Bruce, 577 U.S. at 84.

In support of his IFP Motion, Rodriguez complied with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) by submitting a copy of his CDCR Inmate Trust Account Statement Report. See ECF No. 2 at 4-5; see also S.D. Cal. CivLR 3.2; Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119. This Report shows Rodriguez maintained an average monthly balance of $51.83, and had $120.60 in average monthly deposits credited to his account over the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of his Complaint. Rodriguez's available balance at the time his Report was generated was $52.39. See ECF No. 2 at 4.

Based on this accounting, the Court GRANTS Rodriguez's Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 2) and assesses an initial partial filing fee of $24.12 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). However, this initial fee need be collected only if sufficient funds are available in Rodriguez's account at LAC the time this Order is executed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); Bruce, 577 U.S. at 86; Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner's IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay ... due to the lack of funds available to him when payment is ordered.”). Whatever balance remains of

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the $350 total fee owed in this case must be collected by the agency having custody of Rodriguez and forwarded to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

II. SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)

A. Standard of Review

Because Rodriguez is a prisoner proceeding IFP, his Complaint requires a preliminary screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b). Under these statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner's IFP complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of § 1915A is to ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quote marks omitted).

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that § 1915A screening “incorporates the familiar standard applied in the contest of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] ... a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or unadorned, “the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id. at 678-79.

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B. Plaintiff's Allegations

On or about December 14, 2020, while Rodriguez was housed in the “Upper G section” of RJD's Ad-Seg Unit in Building #7, Defendant Correctional Officer Valencia was assigned to escort him to the yard. See Compl. at 4. At his cell door, Rodriguez reported to Valencia that he was “very dizzy all morning.” Id. Valencia asked: “Are you going to go to yard or not?” Rodriguez agreed and “cuffed up.” Id. When the two reached the stairs, Rodriguez asked Valencia to help him down the stairs. However, Valencia “did not even have a hand on as per CDCR rules of escorting Ad-Seg inmates.” Id. When Rodriguez took his first step, he fell down the staircase while in handcuffs. Id. Rodriguez contends his fall was recorded on video, and he suffered a “life-threatening injury” as a result. Id.

Attached to Rodriguez's Complaint are a CDCR 602 Health Care Grievance, Log No. HDSP-HC-21000-781, which he appears to have filed after he was transferred to High Desert State Prison, id. at 9-14, and portions of a UC San Diego Health trauma evaluation and radiology records. Id. at 15-22. These exhibits indicate Rodriguez underwent “same day cervical spine and head CT examinations” after his December 14, 2020 fall which revealed an “extensive right front scalp hematoma control laceration extending into the pre and periorbital soft tissues,” an “associated fracture of the superior right orbital rim,” an “additional hairline fracture deformity of the right anteroinferior frontal bone transgressing the anterior and posterior cortex of the frontal sinus,” and “minimally displaced bilateral anterior nasal bone fractures,” but “no fracture or dislocation [of his] thoracic or lumbar spine.” Id. at 16, 19, 21.

Rodriguez claims Valencia's actions amounted to cruel and unusual punishment as prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 4. He seeks nearly $2 million in general and punitive damages, and an injunction preventing “any from of retaliation.” Id. at 8.^[2]

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C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 is a “vehicle by which plaintiffs can bring federal constitutional and statutory challenges to actions by state and local officials.” Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006). To state a claim under section 1983, Rodriguez must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the...