Rodriguez v. Petrilli

Decision Date28 June 1994
Docket NumberNo. 12719,12719
Citation34 Conn.App. 871,644 A.2d 381
CourtConnecticut Court of Appeals
PartiesSheila RODRIGUEZ et al. v. Anthony M. PETRILLI.

Sanford J. Plepler, with whom, on the brief, was Christine M. Murphy, Manchester, for appellants (plaintiffs).

Craig A. Fontaine, with whom, on the brief, was Paul J. Narducci, Hartford, for appellee (defendant).

Before HEIMAN, FREDERICK A. FREEDMAN and CRETELLA, JJ.

HEIMAN, Judge.

The plaintiffs 1 appeal from the judgment of the trial court, rendered after the court directed a verdict against them. The plaintiffs assert that the trial court improperly denied their motion to set aside the verdict, which they based on a claim that the court had abused its discretion in excluding the testimony of the plaintiffs' sole expert witness on the issue of the standard of care. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts are necessary to our resolution of this appeal. Sheila Rodriguez and her husband, Ronald Rodriguez, commenced this action seeking damages from the defendant for claimed acts of dental malpractice. The plaintiffs alleged that Sheila Rodriguez had consulted the defendant in 1985, and, on October 15, 1985, the defendant performed a surgical procedure known as an intraarticular surgery and meniscectomy bilateral with the insertion of a VITEK teflon prosthesis implant. On October 14, 1987, the defendant performed additional surgery on Sheila to remove the prosthesis because of an adverse reaction to the device. Subsequent to the second surgery, Sheila experienced a variety of complications including pain in the neck, head and jaw, an inability to chew, intermittent right temporomandibular joint (TMJ) swelling and other problems. All of these symptoms were reported to the defendant.

In July, 1989, Sheila's difficulties were diagnosed by another dental practitioner as being related to ongoing degenerative changes in both temporomandibular joints and the condylar fossa. In March, 1990, and June, 1992, she underwent reconstructive surgery, including a joint reconstruction.

The plaintiffs' claim is that Sheila's subsequent surgeries and disabilities resulted from the dental malpractice of the defendant in that he failed to diagnose and treat properly conditions that followed her surgery of October 14, 1987. Specifically, the plaintiffs assert that the defendant breached the duty of care owed to Sheila in both his surgical technique and the postoperative care rendered.

On August 6, 1991, the plaintiffs filed a notice of disclosure of an expert witness, pursuant to Practice Book § 220(D), 2 notifying the defendant of their intention to call Joseph H. Kronman as an expert witness. In the notice, the plaintiffs indicated that Kronman would testify to the care and treatment afforded to Sheila by the defendant and to the standard of care of a practicing oral surgeon as it related to the care and treatment afforded to Sheila with particular reference to the defendant's postoperative care in October, 1987. The notice also set forth the fact that Kronman's opinion was that the defendant deviated from that standard of care in one or more particular ways.

The notice claimed that Kronman's opinion was based on his review of the medical and dental records provided to him by counsel, and "his experience and expertise in the field of oral and maxillofacial surgery and in particular in the field of TMJ surgery and the implantation and removal of dental prosthesis such as that undertaken in this case. Dr. Kronman also based his opinion on his education and experience in the field of oral and maxillofacial surgery, as set forth in his curriculum vitae attached hereto."

On June 10, 1993, the defendant filed a motion in limine, seeking an order precluding the plaintiffs from "eliciting any expert opinion testimony from Joseph H. Kronman, D.D.S., concerning or relating to the standard of care of oral surgeons or to [the defendant's] alleged deviation therefrom for the reason that Dr. Kronman is not qualified to render any such opinion." After a full evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted the defendant's motion in limine finding that Kronman lacked the necessary qualifications to testify as to the standard of care of oral surgeons because of his lack of experience in the field, either practically or academically.

The plaintiffs sought a mistrial, but that motion was denied by the trial court. The plaintiffs disclosed to the trial court that Kronman was their only witness on the issue of standard of care and thereupon rested. The defendant's motion for a directed verdict was granted and judgment was rendered in his favor. A subsequent motion to set aside the verdict was denied by the trial court and this appeal followed.

The plaintiffs assert that the trial court improperly denied their motion to set aside the verdict because the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the testimony of their sole expert witness on the issue of the standard of care. Thus, the dispositive issue is whether the trial court correctly found that Kronman failed to meet the statutory criteria set forth in General Statutes § 52-184c. 3

The standard of care required to be established and the qualifications of expert witnesses who may testify to establish that standard, in claims for damages alleged to have been caused by the negligence of a health care provider, are controlled by General Statutes § 52-184c. "Whether a witness is qualified to testify as an expert is a matter that rests in the sound discretion of the trial court." DiBella v. Widlitz, 207 Conn. 194, 202, 541 A.2d 91 (1988); Weinstein v. Weinstein, 18 Conn.App. 622, 631, 561 A.2d 443 (1989). We have consistently held that the trial court's exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed unless it has been abused or the error is clear and involves a misconception of the law. Going v. Pagani, 172 Conn. 29, 35, 372 A.2d 516 (1976); Churchill v. Skjerding, 31 Conn.App. 247, 249, 624 A.2d 900, cert. denied, 226 Conn. 914, 628 A.2d 986 (1993). In the context of this case, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Kronman failed to qualify as an expert witness pursuant to General Statutes § 52-184c(d).

At the evidentiary hearing, the trial court heard testimony from Kronman about his activities in the field of oral and maxillofacial surgery. He testified that he does not function as an oral surgeon, does not consult in oral surgical techniques, nor has he been involved in postsurgical or follow-up care of patients who have undergone dental surgery. He had not been involved in the field of oral surgery, either as a practitioner or as a teacher, for more than thirty years. His area of expertise was in teaching anatomy and in fields other than oral and maxillofacial surgery. On the basis of the record, the trial court found that he lacked the statutorily mandated qualifications to testify as an expert.

We conclude, on the basis of the record, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony of Kronman. Here, the trial court found that the witness lacked...

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4 cases
  • Grondin v. Curi
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • March 18, 2003
    ...Hospital, 65 Conn. App. 738, 756-58, 783 A.2d 1085, cert. denied, 258 Conn. 938, 786 A.2d 425 (2001); Rodriguez v. Petrilli, 34 Conn. App. 871, 875-76, 644 A.2d 381 (1994); see also State v. Reid, supra, 254 Conn. 550. Indeed, § 52-184c merely sets out minimum qualification standards for ex......
  • Squeglia v. Squeglia
    • United States
    • Connecticut Court of Appeals
    • September 20, 1994
  • Ruff v. Yale-New Haven Hosp., Inc.
    • United States
    • Connecticut Court of Appeals
    • May 2, 2017
    ...is clear and involves a misconception of the law." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Rodriguez v. Petrilli , 34 Conn.App. 871, 875–76, 644 A.2d 381 (1994)."[T]he test for admissibility of expert testimony involves, inter alia, a determination as to whether the witness ha......
  • Carusillo v. Associated Women's Health Specialists, PC
    • United States
    • Connecticut Court of Appeals
    • September 3, 2002
    ...and (3) evidence of a causal relationship between the deviation and the claimed injury." (Emphasis added.) Rodriguez v. Petrilli, 34 Conn. App. 871, 877, 644 A.2d 381 (1994); see also Marchell v. Whelchel, 66 Conn. App. 574, 582, 785 A.2d 253 (2001). "All medical malpractice claims, whether......
1 books & journal articles
  • The Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act,
    • United States
    • Connecticut Bar Association Connecticut Bar Journal No. 69, January 1994
    • Invalid date
    ...1314 (1994). 31. Id. at 854, n.3. 32. The phrase is translated as "False in one thing, false in everything." 33. Id. at 854-55. 34. 34 Conn. App. 871, 644 A.2d 381 (1994). 35. 33 Conn. App. 673, 638 A.2d 1073 (1994). 36. Interesting y, however, the Appellate Court also held that the statute......

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