Rodriguez v. Rodriguez
| Citation | 334 S.E.2d 595,1 Va.App. 87 |
| Decision Date | 17 September 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 0117-84,0117-84 |
| Parties | Julius Joseph RODRIGUEZ v. Ida Lee (King) RODRIGUEZ. Record |
| Court | Virginia Court of Appeals |
John E. Gullette, Woodbridge, for appellant.
Thomas O. Murphy and J. Edward Flournoy, Manassas, for appellee.
Present: KOONTZ, C.J., and JOSEPH E. BAKER and KEENAN, JJ.
Ida Lee Rodriguez obtained a divorce a vinculo matrimonii from Julius Joseph Rodriguez by decree entered on February 9, 1977, in the Circuit Court of Prince William County. On September 13, 1975, these parties had entered into a "property settlement and custody agreement in accordance with § 20-109, 1950 Code of Virginia." This agreement in pertinent part provided that Ida would have custody of the two children of the parties "until such time as the said children arrive at the age of twenty-five years of age" and, further, that Julius would pay child support in the amount of $160.00 per week "until such time as both children shall arrive at the age of twenty-five years, at which time the support of the children shall be extinguished automatically and without application to any court of law." At the time of this agreement the children were ages nine and four.
Over the objection of Julius, who challenged the validity of this agreement, the Chancellor's divorce decree contained the following provision:
And it further appears to the court that the parties hereto have entered into an agreement in writing for the settlement of their respective marital property rights dated the 13th day of September, 1975, it is further
ADJUDGED, ORDERED and DECREED that the terms of said agreement settling property be and are hereby approved, ratified, and confirmed, and the marital rights of eahc (sic) in the property of the other are hereby extinguished. (emphasis added).
Numerous hearings were held during the ensuing years for increases or decreases in the amount of child support. Finally, by order entered on November 23, 1984, the Chancellor held that Julius remained obligated and ordered him to continue to pay child support for both children even though one child was over the age of eighteen. This order contains the following language:
Defendant remains obligated to support the child, Durwin J. Rodriguez, who has attained the age of eighteen as required by the property settlement and custody agreement of September 13, 1975, which was approved, ratified and confirmed in the final decree of divorce entered February 9, 1977.
It is from the entry of this order that Julius appeals to this Court.
The issue presented in this case is whether the language of the 1977 divorce decree sufficiently complies with the provisions of Code § 20-109.1 so as to make the child support provisions of the parties' agreement of 1975 a term of the decree and enforceable in the same manner as any provision of that decree. We hold that it does not.
Code § 20-109.1 provides that a court may affirm, ratify and incorporate by reference in its decree any valid agreement between the parties, or provisions thereof, concerning the conditions of the maintenance of the parties, or either of them and the care, custody and maintenance of their minor children, or establishing or imposing any other condition or consideration, monetary or nonmonetary. This language does not mandate the court to incorporate the agreement in whole or in part. More significantly, the court is expressly permitted to incorporate selected provisions of the agreement. Where the court does affirm, ratify and incorporate the agreement or provisions thereof, it shall be deemed for all purposes to be a term of the decree and enforceable as such. This code section facilitates enforcement of the terms of an incorporated agreement by the contempt power of the court. Morris v. Morris, 216 Va. 457, 459, 219 S.E.2d 864, 866-67 (1975).
The Supreme Court in Shoosmith v. Scott, 217 Va. 789, 232 S.E.2d 787 (1977), distinguished the effect of a...
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Pursley v. Pursley, No. 2001-SC-0936-DG.
...v. Morrison, 14 Kan.App.2d 56, 781 P.2d 745 (1989); McLendon v. McLendon, 847 S.W.2d 601 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1992); Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 1 Va.App. 87, 334 S.E.2d 595 (1985). 24. Rupley v. Rupley, Ky.App., 776 S.W.2d 849 (1989); McGowan v. McGowan, Ky.App., 663 S.W.2d 219 (1983); Peterson v.......
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Shoup v. Shoup, Record No. 0098-00-4.
...of the maintenance of the parties. . . and the care, custody and maintenance of their minor children." Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 1 Va.App. 87, 90, 334 S.E.2d 595, 596 (1985). "Where the court does ... incorporate the agreement or provisions thereof, it shall be deemed for all purposes to be a......
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Walden v. Pursley, No. 2001-SC-0936-DG (KY 9/23/2004), 2001-SC-0936-DG.
...Morrison v. Morrison, 781 P.2d 745 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989); McLendon v. McLendon, 847 S.W.2d 601 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992); Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 334 S.E.2d 595 (Va. Ct. App. 1985). 24. Rupley v. Rupley, Ky. App., 776 S.W.2d 849 (1989); McGowan v. McGowan, Ky. App., 663 S.W.2d 219 (1983); Peterso......
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Shoup v. Shoup
...agreement in whole" but "expressly permit[s] [the court] to incorporate selected provisions of the agreement." Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 1 Va.App. 87, 90, 334 S.E.2d 595, 597 (1985). Moreover, pursuant to Code § 20-108, the divorce court retains its long recognized "continuing jurisdiction af......