Rodriguez v. S. Health Partners
| Decision Date | 02 December 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 3:20-CV-0045-D |
| Parties | IRENE RODRIGUEZ, individually and as parent and legal guardian of A.R. and B.R., Plaintiff, v. SOUTHERN HEALTH PARTNERS, INC., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
In the court's prior memorandum opinion and order in this case, it concluded that plaintiff had failed to state plausible federal-law claims against defendants on which relief could be granted, dismissed those claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), declined to reach plaintiff's state-law claims, and granted plaintiff leave to replead. See Rodriguez v. S. Health Partners, Inc. ("Rodriguez I"), 2020 WL 2928486, at *1 (N.D. Tex. June 3, 2020) (Fitzwater, J.). Plaintiff has filed a second amended complaint, and, in two motions, defendants move anew to dismiss.1 For the reasons that follow, the court grants one motion, grants in part one motion, dismisses this action with prejudice as to one defendant by Rule54(b) final judgment, and denies in part one motion as to the other moving defendants.
Plaintiff Irene Rodriguez ("Rodriguez"), individually and as parent and legal guardian of A.R. and B.R.,2 brings this lawsuit on behalf of herself individually and as parent and legal guardian of her prematurely-born twins. She alleges that defendants Navarro County, Southern Health Partners, Inc., ("SHP"), Grady Shaw, M.D. ("Dr. Shaw"), and Linda Hullett, R.N. ("Hullett") (SHP, Dr. Shaw, and Hullett are sometimes referred to collectively as the "SHP Defendants") failed to provide proper prenatal care to Rodriguez while she was a pretrial detainee at the Navarro County Jail (the "Jail").3 Rodriguez brings a federal-law claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Navarro County and SHP, alleging that they deprived her of her rights and privileges under the Eighth and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and by other laws of the United States by failing to provide constitutionally adequate medical treatment. Rodriguez asserts a federal-law claim under § 1983 against Hullett, alleging that she was deliberately indifferent to Rodriguez's serious medical needs. And Rodriguez brings a state-law negligence claim against the SHP Defendants.
In support of her claims, Rodriguez alleges the following.4 On December 22, 2017, when she was approximately 25 to 26 weeks pregnant with twins, Rodriguez was arrested and detained at the Jail. At the time of her arrest, Rodriguez informed Jail personnel, including Hullett, that she was pregnant with twins. Rodriguez also informed Hullett that she had a previously-scheduled doctor appointment on December 28, 2017.
On December 27, 2017 Rodriguez notified Hullett that she was beginning to show signs of premature labor,5 and asked to be taken to a hospital. Instead of being taken to a hospital, Rodriguez was seen at the Jail that day by Dr. Shaw, a general physician contracted by SHP to provide ad hoc care. Dr. Shaw measured Rodriguez's stomach, but he did not otherwise examine her, even though Rodriguez told him that she had recently passed her mucus plug and had experienced some contractions. Dr. Shaw did, however, note that Rodriguez had an appointment scheduled with her obstetrician the next day, and he left an order that Rodriguez be seen by an obstetrician as soon as possible. Nevertheless, Hullett did not allow Rodriguez to attend her December 28 appointment.
On December 29, 2017 Hullett examined Rodriguez and confirmed that she was having contractions approximately three minutes apart. Rodriguez told Hullett again that sheneeded to go to the hospital or see an obstetrician, but Hullett refused. Instead, Hullett telephoned Charles Cook, M.D. ("Dr. Cook"), a local obstetrician, that day. Dr. Cook told Hullett that Rodriguez should be taken to a hospital immediately if she continued to have contractions or other concerns about her pregnancy. Although Rodriguez continued to have contractions and repeatedly expressed concerns about the likelihood of premature labor, Hullett did not allow Rodriguez to go to the hospital or to be examined by an obstetrician.
On January 2, 2018 a night-shift nurse examined Rodriguez and confirmed that she was having contractions at regular intervals approximately three minutes apart. The nurse did not allow Rodriguez to see a physician or go to the hospital but instead returned her to her cell. At the time of this examination, Hullett had not recorded in Rodriguez's medical records Rodriguez's prior contractions or Dr. Cook's instructions.
Each morning between January 2 and 9, 2018, when Hullett brought prenatal vitamins to Rodriguez, she told Hullett that she needed to go to the hospital or see her obstetrician because she was still having contractions and discharging fluid. Hullett ignored Rodriguez and told her that she was lying. During this time, Rodriguez also sent Hullett numerous written requests for help, which Hullett ignored. Frustrated with the lack of response from Hullett, Rodriguez began submitting written requests to the Jail lieutenant, the Jail captain, a judge, her probation officer, and others.
On January 8, 2018 Rodriguez was allowed to speak with the Jail captain. She explained her symptoms and expressed concerns about going into premature labor. The Jail captain responded that he would talk to Hullett and default to Hullett's judgment. Later thatevening, the night-shift nurse informed Rodriguez that the Jail captain had spoken to Hullett but that she had refused to authorize an evaluation by an obstetrician.
On January 9, 2018, at approximately 3:00 a.m., Rodriguez notified the guards on duty that her contractions had become so strong that she needed urgent medical attention. Because no medical staff or Jail personnel with medical training were present at the Jail, the guards on duty called Hullett. Hullett insisted that Rodriguez remain at the Jail. By 4:50 a.m. Rodriguez's contractions were fewer than three minutes apart and increasing in strength, which Rodriguez alleges is a strong indicator of impending childbirth. Nonetheless, Rodriguez was not allowed to go to the hospital or see a physician. By 5:15 a.m. Jail staff informed Hullett that Rodriguez's contractions were just one minute apart, but Hullett still refused to allow Rodriguez to be taken to the hospital.
At approximately 5:30 a.m. Rodriguez began to give birth to A.R., the first of her twins. At this point the Jail staff on duty called Emergency Medical Services ("EMS"). Before EMS arrived, however, A.R. was born and stopped breathing multiple times. A correctional officer attempted to find a nasal aspirator to clear the mucus from A.R.'s airway, but he was unable to find one. EMS eventually arrived and cleared A.R.'s airway, but this was after critical minutes had been lost. Because A.R. required emergency breathing treatment, which Rodriguez alleges is common in preterm births, it was necessary for a second ambulance to be dispatched for Rodriguez, who was giving birth to B.R., so that A.R. could be immediately transported to the hospital in the first ambulance. Rodriguez's second twin, B.R., was delivered in a jail cell at 5:50 a.m. Rodriguez, A.R., and B.R. were thentransported to Navarro Regional Hospital ("NRH"). Later that same day, Rodriguez, A.R., and B.R. were transported to Baylor Scott & White Medical Center in Dallas, where it was noted in Rodriguez's medical records that her pregnancy was complicated by "late limited prenatal care." 2d Am. Compl. ¶ 51. A.R. and B.R. were later diagnosed with cerebral palsy, brain injuries, renal failure, respiratory failure, and other serious short- and long-term health issues. Rodriguez alleges that defendants' failure to provide proper prenatal care, including access to a hospital and/or physician when they knew it was very likely that Rodriguez was at a heightened risk of going into premature labor, caused the serious harms to A.R. and B.R.
Rodriguez later filed the instant lawsuit against Navarro County, SHP, Dr. Shaw, Hullett, and NRH. In her first amended complaint, she alleged claims under § 1983 for unlawful conditions of confinement against Navarro County and SHP, and for deliberate indifference against Dr. Shaw and Hullett. She also alleged a Texas-law claim for negligence against the SHP Defendants. The court granted defendants' motions to dismiss Rodriguez's § 1983 claims under Rule 12(b)(6), declined to reach her state-law negligence claim, and granted Rodriguez leave to replead. See Rodriguez I, 2020 WL 2928486, at *1. Rodriguez then timely filed her second amended complaint. In separate motions, Navarro County and the SHP Defendants move anew to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Rodriguez opposes both motions.
Under Rule 12(b)(6), the court evaluates the pleadings by "accept[ing] 'all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.'" In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) ). To survive a motion to dismiss, Rodriguez must allege enough facts "to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant[s] [are] liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556); see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (). "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere...
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