Rodriguez v. Smithfield Packing Co., Inc.

Decision Date14 March 2008
Docket NumberNo. RWT 06cv2811.,RWT 06cv2811.
PartiesJacquelin Mendoza RODRIGUEZ, Plaintiff v. SMITHFIELD PACKING CO., INC., Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Maryland

Alan Lescht, Susan Laiken Kruger, Alan Lescht and Associates PC, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

James Phillip Naughton, James Richard Theuer, Scot Allen Lewis Hinshaw, Hunton and Williams LLP, Norfolk, VA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ROGER W. TITUS, District Judge.

On September 20, 2004, Plaintiff Rodriguez felt ill and left work early. All that she told her supervisors at Smithfield Packing Co., Inc. ("Smithfield") was that she was "sick" and that she was leaving for a previously scheduled doctor's appointment. She claims that she called Smithfield the next morning and left a message that she "couldn't go to work at the time being." Rodriguez then missed eight scheduled shifts without contacting her employer directly, asserting that she instead sent messages to her supervisors through co-workers informing them that she was "sick." On September 29, 2004, Smithfield terminated Rodriguez's employment. Rodriguez claims that she was wrongfully discharged by Smithfield, in violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2612 et seq. Smithfield responds that Rodriguez forfeited any FMLA rights that she might have had because she simply left her job without any notice regarding the nature of her illness or the likely extent of her absence.

Smithfield now moves for summary judgment, arguing that (1) Rodriguez failed to give Smithfield adequate and timely notice of her need for FMLA leave; and, alternatively, (2) her rights were not violated because she was unable to work at the conclusion of the FMLA period.1 For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant Smithfield's motion.

I.

Rodriguez was employed by Smithfield at its Landover, Maryland, facility from December 1992 until September 29, 2004, when she was discharged, effective September 25. At the time of her discharge, Rodriguez was working as a packing room line leader on the first shift, earning $10.15 per hour. Under the applicable collective bargaining agreement, Rodriguez could be terminated if absent more than one consecutive day without notifying management of the reason for the absence. At her deposition, Rodriguez testified that she had requested and taken FMLA leave on three occasions prior to the incident in question, apparently without any interference by Smithfield.

Before leaving her shift early on September 20, 2004, Rodriguez claims to have informed a supervisor that she was "sick" and that she was leaving for a previously scheduled doctor's appointment, although she did not describe the nature of her illness. She did not tell anyone when she would return and she did not return to work that day. She was then absent from scheduled daily work shifts on September 21 through 25 and September 27 through 29, 2004. Rodriguez asserts that she called in on September 21 at 6:20 a.m. and left a voice mail message saying only that she was still ill and had doctor's appointments. Rodriguez claims to have attempted to call in on September 22 but declined to leave a message. She also states that she relayed messages that she was sick to her supervisors through three co-workers during her absences after September 20. It is undisputed, however, that Rodriguez did not personally attempt to contact Smithfield directly during the period September 23 through September 29. Plaintiff also testified that, during this period, she made phone calls to her doctors and attended medical appointments.

In a declaration accompanying her opposition memorandum, Rodriguez also describes certain leave taken just prior to the September 20-29 period. Specifically, she states that she (1) was absent from work for at least a portion of her shift on September 9, 2004, while she attended a previously scheduled doctor's appointment, (2) left work early on September 13, 2004, due to illness, and (3) missed work on September 14 and 15, 2004. Rodriguez reports that she had informed her supervisor about the September 9 appointment in advance and provided a medical excuse note upon her return to work that day. She also claims that she had told her supervisor on September 13 that she "was not well and ... needed to see a doctor immediately." Rodriguez Decl. ¶ 6. According to Rodriguez, she then called her supervisor on September 14, informing her that she would be absent that day and the next day because she did not feel well and had scheduled medical appointments. She states that, upon returning to work on September 16, she submitted documentation from her medical providers indicating various examinations and treatment, including diagnosis of a suspected peptic ulcer and an endoscopy procedure on September 15, 2004.

On September 30, the day after her termination, Rodriguez appeared at work to meet with the human resources manager, producing an excuse note from her physician. After a union grievance process, Smithfield offered to reinstate Rodriguez to a "vacation relief position paying $9.15 per hour, with fully restored seniority. Rodriguez refused the offer and eventually obtained employment in a restaurant more than seven months later in May 2005 with pay of $7.50 per hour.2

Rodriguez has stated that she was unemployed until February 2005 due to severe depression and anxiety. She adds in her Declaration that she would have returned to work on October 20, 2004, at the latest, if she had not been terminated. Rodriguez claims that the termination of her employment and loss of health insurance caused a further deterioration in her health condition, causing her additional stress, depression, and anxiety, such that she was unable to actively search for a job until May 2005.

II.

Summary judgment "should be rendered if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). "A material fact is one that `might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.'" Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, 242 F.3d 179, 183 (4th Cir.2001)(quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). A dispute of material fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 455 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

To avoid summary judgment on a properly supported motion, the nonmoving party "may not rest upon mere allegation or denials of his pleading, but must Set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Of course, the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Francis v. Booz, Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 452 F.3d 299, 302 (4th Cir.2006). Nevertheless, this Court recognizes the "affirmative obligation of the trial judge to prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding to trial." Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778-79 (4th Cir.1993)(quoting Felty v. Graves-Humphreys Co., 818 F.2d 1126, 1128 (4th Cir.1987), and Celotex Corp., U.S. at 323-324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (internal quotation marks omitted)).

III.

Before turning to the merits of Smithfield's motion for summary judgment, the Court must address certain evidentiary disputes.

A.

As a preliminary matter, Smithfield argues that the Court should not consider certain statements made in Rodriguez's Declaration and its accompanying exhibits filed with her opposition brief because they either contradict her prior deposition testimony, are inadmissible hearsay, or are unsworn or unauthenticated. Specifically, Smithfield contests: (1) Rodriguez's summary of a Department of Labor investigation of her case and a document purported to be a report on the same; (2) her statements concerning her actions and medical treatment prior to the September 20 absence; (3) her statements concerning her medical treatment on September 20; (4) her statements concerning her call to work and voicemail message on September 21; (5) various documents relating to her medical evaluation and treatment; (6) her statements reporting what her co-workers told her supervisors during her absence and what her supervisors knew regarding her condition, including signed statements by two co-workers; and (7) her statements that she would have returned to work on October 20, 2004, had her employment not been terminated.

First, the Court has not considered either Rodriguez's own statements summarizing the Department of Labor's findings or an attached document purporting to be a Department of Labor report. Although the Court recognizes the potential admissibility of such a report, see Fed. R.Evid. 803(8)(C)(declaring admissible "reports ... of public offices or agencies, setting forth ... factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law, unless the courses of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness"), the document offered here is unauthenticated and its genuineness is otherwise doubtful as it consists of three typewritten pages containing no indication of its source, the name of the investigator, or even an indication that it was issued by the Department of Labor. In addition, the investigator's recommendations, referenced exhibits, and — as best the Court can tell — the investigator's signature are redacted.3 Such an unsigned and uncertified document, bearing no indication of its source, provides no evidence to establish that it is what Plaintiff claims it is. See Fed.R.Evid. 901 & 902. As such, it would be inadmissible at trial and the Court may not consider it here. See Maryland Highways Contractors...

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