Rodriguez v. Smithkline Beecham Pharmaceutical

Decision Date08 July 1999
Docket NumberCivil No. 98-1649(JP).
Citation62 F.Supp.2d 374
PartiesHilda RODRIGUEZ, Plaintiff, v. SMITHKLINE BEECHAM PHARMACEUTICAL, PUERTO RICO, INC., et al., Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

José E. Colón Santana, San Juan, PR, for plaintiff.

Gregory T. Usera, Schuster Usera Aguiló & Santiago, San Juan, PR, for defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

PIERAS, Senior District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Before the Court are Defendant's SB Pharmco Puerto Rico, Inc.'s ("SmithKline") Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support thereof (docket No. 41), Plaintiff's Motion and Memorandum in Opposition thereto (docket No. 54), and SmithKline's Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition. Plaintiff brought the Complaint in the above-captioned case claiming that her employer SmithKline, in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, and the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) ("EPA"), discriminated against her because of her sex.

Plaintiff Hilda Rodríguez is a woman who lives in Cidra, Puerto Rico, and has worked at SmithKline since 1979. During her tenure at SmithKline, Plaintiff alleges that she has been the victim of gender-based discrimination. There are three parts to Plaintiff's case.

The first deals with an EPA claim. In 1986, Plaintiff began working at Smith-Kline's Documentation Department as a Senior Documentation Monitor at a Level E. At the time she started there, Plaintiff had to report to the Documentation Leader, Gloria Valés ("Valés"), who occupied a Level 7 position. Levels represent SmithKline's compensation scale. In 1989, Manuel Llivina ("Llivina") substituted Valés, who had been transferred to handle other duties within the company. Like Valés, Llivina occupied a Level 7 position and was then the person to whom Plaintiff had to report. In 1991, Rodoberto Feo ("Feo") was designated Manager at the Documentation Department. Feo, like Plaintiff, reported directly to Llivina but occupied a Level 8 position. In 1992, both Llivina and Feo were transferred out of the Documentation Department.

With Llivina and Feo gone, James Sanabia ("Sanabia"), Vice President for Quality Control/Quality Assurance, asked Plaintiff to propose a job description for a new position she would occupy, "Documentation Leader." According to Plaintiff, this position would consolidate Llivina and Feo's responsibilities with those she had in 1992. In January of 1993, Sanabia announced the approval of the job description. To Plaintiff's dismay, however, the position was approved at a Level 6. Plaintiff argues that because she was paid less than her predecessors at the Documentation Department and performed the same job, SmithKline discriminated against her because of her gender and therefore violated the EPA. Plaintiff adds that as a Documentation Leader, she had less resources but more responsibilities than her predecessors.

The second cause of action results from the hiring in 1995 of Edwin López as SmithKline's Analytical Services Leader. Plaintiff argues that SmithKline passed her over for the less experienced López and that such action constitutes a Title VII violation.

Third, Plaintiff states that as a result of organizational changes at SmithKline, both she and López were designated as Compliance Process Improvers. In September of 1996, however, Plaintiff learned that while both held the same position, López was paid more than she was. He was a Level 8 while she was a Level 6. Plaintiff asked the reason for this disparity and was told that López's title had been changed to "Strategist." Plaintiff says that this change in title was merely a pretext to cover that both she and López performed the same job and were paid differently. Plaintiff says that the disparity in pay was driven by a discriminatory animus in violation of Title VII and the EPA.

II. UNCONTESTED FACTS

Based on the pleadings, sworn statements, admissions, and uncontested documents on the record, the following facts are uncontroverted. Plaintiff Hilda Rodríguez began working at SmithKline in August of 1979 as an Analytical Chemist and a Level C employee. To this day, Plaintiff still works at SmithKline.

In December of 1985, Plaintiff was promoted to Senior Analyst as a Level E employee. In 1986, Plaintiff applied for the position of Senior Documentation Monitor in the Documentation Department with successful results, and was transferred there as a lateral change, not receiving an increase in salary. While at the Documentation Department, Plaintiff was reclassified as a Level F employee and worked under the supervision of the Documentation Manager Gloria Valés. In 1989, Valés was transferred out of the Documentation Department and was substituted by Manuel Llivina, who held a Level 7 position. Rodoberto Feo also worked as Records Management Leader at the Documentation Department and held a Level 8 position.

In January of 1991, Plaintiff was promoted to be the Administrator of the Quality Assurance Process Operation Management System. In 1992, Llivina was transferred out of the Documentation Department to Tablet Manufacturing. In January of 1993, Plaintiff was tapped as the candidate to fill the position of Documentation Leader. This position was approved at a Level 6. The Documentation Manager and Leader positions overlapped in some areas such as: reviewing, evaluating and approving standard operating procedures; maintaining records under strict control for their retrieval during audits; developing administrative and technical presentations; and serving as SmithKline's contact for Food and Drug Administration investigations. Notwithstanding this overlap, in creating the Documentation Leader position, SmithKline eliminated some of the responsibilities the Documentation Manager position had, such as being in charge of the Microfilming Program, handling new drug applications, preparing annual reviews, evaluating significant abnormalities reported in manufacturing operations, and deciding whether "a particular situation presented a potential recall and initiating the necessary action." (Def's Ex. 7).

On January 16, 1995, Edwin López was hired by SmithKline at a Level 8 as an Analytical Service Leader, the person in charge of managing SmithKline's Quality Control Laboratories. This position requires a master's degree in chemistry, a degree which López has and Plaintiff lacks. At one point, both López and Plaintiff were Compliance Process Improvers, for the Quality Control Area and Quality Assurance Area, respectively. While occupying the position of Compliance Process Improver, however, López retained his responsibilities of managing SmithKline's Quality Control Laboratory. The responsibilities of the Compliance Process Improver and the Analytical Service leader are different and Plaintiff has never managed any of SmithKline's laboratories. Thereafter, López's title was changed to Strategist.

On October 6, 1996, Plaintiff filed an intra-company discrimination claim in the form of a letter to Jan Leschly. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed an administrative complaint with the Puerto Rico Antidiscrimination Unit on June 13, 1997.

III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment serves to "assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for a trial." Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 50 (1st Cir. 1990). Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a summary judgment is in order when "the record, including the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, reveals no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Zambrana-Marrero v. Suárez-Cruz, 172 F.3d 122, 125 (1st Cir.1999) (stating that summary judgment is appropriate when, after evaluating the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the evidence "fails to yield a trialworthy issue as to some material fact"). Goldman v. First National Bank of Boston, 985 F.2d 1113, 1116 (1st Cir.1993); see Canal Insurance Co. v. Benner, 980 F.2d 23, 25 (1st Cir.1992). A fact is material if, based on the substantive law at issue, it might affect the outcome of the case. See Mack v. Great Atl. and Pac. Tea Co., Inc., 871 F.2d 179, 181 (1st Cir.1989). The Supreme Court has stated that "only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

In a summary judgment motion, the movant bears the initial burden of "informing the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the [record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Where the movant does not bear the burden of proof at trial, it must show that no reasonable fact-finder could find that the non-movant has established the requisite elements of its claim. Id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Once the moving party meets his burden of proof, the burden shifts to the non-movant, who may not "rest upon mere allegations or denials of ... the pleadings, but ... must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Goldman, 985 at 1116; see Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) The Court assesses the parties' arguments within this procedural structure.

IV. DISCUSSION
A. Timeliness of the Title VII Claim Regarding López's Hiring

Defendant argues that the Court should dismiss Plaintiff's Title VII claim relating to López's hiring as Analytical Service Leader as time-barred. López was hired on January 16, 1995, and...

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