Rodriguez v. State

• Decision Date: 09 May 2007
• Docket Number: No. PD-1013-06.,PD-1013-06.
• Citation: 232 S.W.3d 55
• Parties: Gustavo RODRIGUEZ, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

232 S.W.3d 55

Gustavo RODRIGUEZ, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas.

No. PD-1013-06.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

May 9, 2007.

Rehearing Denied August 22, 2007.

Richard A. Henderson, Fort Worth, for Appellant.

Michael R. Casillas, Asst. Criminal District Atty., Fort Worth, Matthew Paul, State's Atty., Austin, for State.

OPINION

COCHRAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which KELLER, P.J., PRICE, JOHNSON, KEASLER, HERVEY, and HOLCOMB, JJ., joined.

Appellant was charged with Possession of Cocaine with Intent to Deliver. He filed a pre-trial motion to suppress claiming that the affidavit supporting the search warrant did not contain sufficient facts to establish probable cause to search his garage. The trial judge denied the motion to suppress, but the court of appeals reversed appellant's conviction and held that the trial court abused its discretion in not granting appellant's motion to suppress.¹ We hold that the affidavit did support the magistrate's finding of probable cause.²

I.

The evidence at trial showed that, in November of 2003, an informant notified Fort Worth police officers that appellant's uncle, Eduardo Cantu, was selling and transporting large quantities of cocaine in Fort Worth. Numerous narcotics officers began surveillance of Cantu and followed his car to a house at 4316 Goddard Street in Fort Worth. This house belonged to appellant. The officers watched Cantu drive into the driveway and pull around to the rear of the house next to a detached garage. They saw Cantu get out of his car and walk into the garage. A short while later, Cantu came out of the garage. He was carrying a package in his right hand. Looking around nervously, Cantu threw that package into the backseat of his car and drove away.

One of the undercover surveillance officers followed Cantu for a few blocks in an unmarked car. When he saw Cantu fail to use a turn signal, he contacted a nearby uniformed patrol officer and asked that officer to stop Cantu for the traffic violation. During that traffic stop, Cantu gave his written consent to search his car. The patrol officer found a brown paper sack containing three brick-like objects that looked like packaged cocaine on the floor board of the left backseat. Cantu then told both the patrol and undercover officers that the three kilos of cocaine in his car came from the garage on Goddard Street and that there was more cocaine at that garage. After arresting Cantu, the undercover officer radioed the other surveillance officers, who were still watching the Goddard Street house and garage, that Cantu had told him that there were at least ten more kilos of cocaine at that location.³

One surveillance officer then left to obtain a search warrant. The remaining officers could hear "tool noises, metal on metal banging" coming from the garage. The officers therefore decided to secure the scene to prevent any destruction of evidence. They opened the garage door and saw appellant and two other males taking apart a tool box on the bed of a pickup truck. The officers had the three males sit in one area of the garage until they received confirmation that the magistrate had issued a search warrant. They then searched the garage, found forty-three kilos of cocaine, and arrested appellant.

Appellant was indicted for possession of more than 400 grams of cocaine with the intent to distribute it. After the trial court denied appellant's motion to suppress, a jury convicted him, and the trial judge sentenced appellant to forty-seven years' imprisonment.

The Fort Worth Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress, concluding that the affiant's "mere belief that the residence on Goddard Street was being used to store large amounts of cocaine is not enough to support the issuance of the search warrant."⁴ It also concluded that the facts set out in the affidavit,⁵ while they "may lead to a suspicion that contraband might be located at the residence," did not suffice to give the magistrate "a substantial basis for concluding that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing."⁶

II.

The Fourth Amendment commands that no warrants, either for searches or for arrests, shall issue except upon probable cause,⁷ and it reflects our constitutional preference for the warrant process in which police officers present their facts to a neutral magistrate to decide if there is probable cause to issue that warrant. As Justice Jackson famously stated,

The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.⁸

In Aguilar v. Texas,⁹ the Supreme Court stated that "[a]n evaluation of the constitutionality of a search warrant should begin with the rule that `the informed and deliberate determinations of magistrates empowered to issue warrants . . . are to be preferred over the hurried action of officers . . . who may happen to make arrests.'"¹⁰ Indeed, in United States v. Ventresca,¹¹ the Court declared that "in a doubtful or marginal case [of probable cause] a search under warrant may be sustained where one without one would fail."¹²

The Supreme Court has repeatedly reminded reviewing courts that they should "not invalidate the warrant by interpreting the affidavit in a hypertechnical, rather than a commonsense, manner. Although in a particular case it may not be easy to determine when an affidavit demonstrates the existence of probable cause, the resolution of doubtful or marginal cases in this area should be largely determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants."¹³ Thus, even in close cases we give great deference to a magistrate's determination of probable cause to encourage police officers to use the warrant process rather than making a warrantless search and later attempting to justify their actions by invoking some exception to the warrant requirement.¹⁴

The cornerstone of the Fourth Amendment and its Texas equivalent is that a magistrate shall not issue a search warrant without first finding "probable cause" that a particular item will be found in a particular location.¹⁵ The definition of the term "probable cause" is, unfortunately, frequently beauty in the eye of the beholder. It is easier to explain what "probable cause" is not, rather than what it is. For example, in Bower v. State,¹⁶ this Court stated that a "magistrate is not bound by such finely tuned standards as proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence; rather his sole concern should be probability."¹⁷ The test is whether a reasonable reading by the magistrate would lead to the conclusion that the affidavit provided a "substantial basis for the issuance of the warrant[,]"¹⁸ thus, "[t]he magistrate's sole concern should be probability."¹⁹ Probable cause exists when, under the totality of the circumstances, there is a "fair probability" that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found at the specified location.²⁰ It is a "flexible and nondemanding" standard.²¹

Neither federal nor Texas law defines precisely what degree of probability suffices to establish probable cause, but that probability cannot be based on mere conclusory statements of an affiant's belief.²² An affiant must present an affidavit that allows the magistrate to independently determine probable cause and the magistrate's "`action[s] cannot be a mere ratification of the bare conclusions of others.'"²³

On the other hand, when reviewing a magistrate's decision to issue a warrant, trial and appellate courts apply a highly deferential standard in keeping with the constitutional preference for a warrant.²⁴ Thus, when an appellate court reviews an issuing magistrate's determination, that court should interpret the affidavit in a commonsensical and realistic manner, recognizing that the magistrate may draw reasonable inferences.²⁵ When in doubt, we defer to all reasonable inferences that the magistrate could have made.

Just last term, in Davis v. State,²⁶ this Court addressed the level of specificity required in an affidavit for a magistrate to find probable cause to issue a search warrant. In Davis, the defendant was arrested for the manufacture of methamphetamine seized under a search warrant.²⁷ The magistrate had issued the warrant based on the affiant's statement that a patrol officer drove past the defendant's residence and "could smell a strong chemical odor he has associated with the manufacture of methamphetamine emitting from the residence."²⁸ The court of appeals held that the magistrate did not have a sufficient basis for issuing a search warrant because the affiant did not specifically describe the officer's "expertise or experience in recognizing the odor associated with the manufacture of methamphetamine."²⁹ This Court rejected that logic. We stated that it was a reasonable inference that a police officer who smells something that he "`associat[es]' with the manufacture of methamphetamine" has had prior experience with methamphetamine.³⁰ Otherwise he would not recognize the smell of methamphetamine. We concluded that when this statement and its supporting inferences were combined with the other facts in the affidavit (including an informant's tip), the totality of the information provided enough support for the magistrate's decision to issue a warrant.³¹ The inquiry for reviewing courts, including the trial court, is whether there are sufficient facts, coupled with inferences from those facts, to establish a "fair probability" that evidence of a particular crime will likely be found at a given location. The issue is not whether there are other facts that could have, or even should have, been included in the affidavit; we focus on the...