Rodriguez v. Stephens
| Decision Date | 18 August 2016 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:15-CV-291 |
| Parties | DAVID TRIGO RODRIGUEZ, Petitioner, v. WILLIAM STEPHENS, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
Petitioner is an inmate in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice-Correctional Institutions Division ("TDCJ-CID") and is currently incarcerated at the Polunsky Unit in Livingston, Texas. Proceeding pro se, Petitioner filed this petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on June 29, 2015.1 (D.E. 1, Pages 1 and 12). The subject of the petition is a 2014 Duval County conviction for burglary where Petitioner pleaded guilty and received a 20-year sentence.2 (D.E. 1, Pages 2-3).
On March 18, 2016, Respondent filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (D.E. 17). Petitioner failed to file a response in accordance with Local Rule 7.4. However, theundersigned will consider the substance of the pending Motion as Petitioner is proceeding pro se. As discussed more fully below, it is recommended that Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED and Petitioner's actions for habeas corpus relief be DISMISSED. It is further recommended that a Certificate of Appealability be DENIED.
Jurisdiction and venue are proper in this Court because Petitioner was convicted in Duval County, Texas, which is within the Corpus Christi Division of the Southern District of Texas. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d); Wadsworth v. Johnson, 235 F.3d 959, 961 (5th Cir. 2000); 28 U.S.C. § 124(b)(6). This case has been referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for case management, ruling on non-dispositive motions and furnishing a recommendation on dispositive motions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
On January 27, 2014, Petitioner pleaded guilty to burglary of a habitation and was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment in accordance with a plea bargain.3 (D.E. 14-3, Pages 37-46 and D.E. 14-5, Pages 37-40). Petitioner did not file a direct appeal. (D.E. 14-3, Page 37).
On November 12, 2014, Petitioner filed an application for state habeas relief. (D.E. 14-3, Pages 4-20).4 On February 2, 2015, the 229th District Court of Duval County, Texas received Petitioner's application, and on May 20, 2015, Petitioner's application was denied without written order by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (hereinafter the ) (D.E. 14-3 and D.E. 14-1). On July 30, 2015, Petitioner filed a second application for state habeas corpus relief, challenging the same conviction, which was dismissed as successive by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals on October 21, 2015. (D.E. 14-5, Pages 4-20 and D.E. 14-4). Petitioner filed this federal habeas petition on June 29, 2015, and amended petition on October 21, 2015, alleging three grounds for relief: (1) his conviction resulted from the use of an illegal photo array; (2) he was denied effective assistance of counsel; and (3) the trial court erred by appointing Petitioner's previously retained counsel as his court-appointed counsel. (D.E. 1, Page 12 and D.E. 9, Page 5; Case No. 2:15-cv-410, D.E. 1). Petitioner requests his guilty plea be voided and he be granted a new trial. (D.E. 9, Page 5).
Federal habeas relief is available to a state prisoner only if he is being held in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. Boyd v. Scott, 45 F.3d 876, 881 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (citation omitted). Under AEDPA, a state prisoner may not obtain relief with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim:
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)
Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the U.S. Supreme Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the Court on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the "unreasonable application" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the Court's decisions but unreasonably applies the principle to the facts of the prisoner's case. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-413 (2000). Although "unreasonable" is difficult to define, the Court noted it is an objective, rather than subjective, standard and emphasized that there is a critical difference between an unreasonable application of federal law and a merely "incorrect" or "erroneous"application of federal law. Neal v. Puckett, 239 F.3d 683, 687 (5th Cir. 2001)(citing Williams, U.S. 362 at 412-413).
"A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fair minded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011)(quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). A federal habeas court must determine what theories or arguments supported, or could have supported, that state court's decision. Then it must ask whether it is possible that fair minded jurists could disagree that the arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of the Supreme Court. Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786. Even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable. Id. (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003)).
The standard is very difficult to meet. Id. "[A] state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fair minded disagreement." Id. at 786-787. In addition, if a decision by a state court is silent as to the reasons for the refusal, a federal habeas courtcan "look through" the decision and evaluate the last reasoned state court decision. Bledsue v. Johnson, 188 F.3d 250, 256 (5th Cir. 1999).
A state court's factual findings are presumed to be correct and a petitioner has the burden of rebutting the presumption with clear and convincing evidence. Garcia v. Quarterman, 454 F.3d 441, 444 (5th Cir. 2006). This deference extends not only to express findings of fact, but to the implicit findings of the state court. Id. In addition, "where a state court's decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas petitioner's burden still must be met by showing there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief." Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 784.
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the district court must determine whether the pleadings, discovery materials, and the summary judgment evidence show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56. Once the movant presents a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to show with significant probative evidence the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Hamilton v. Segue Software, Inc., 232 F.3d 473, 477 (5th Cir. 2000)(citation omitted).
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally applies to federal habeas corpus cases. Clark v. Johnson, 202 F.3d 760, 764-65 (5th Cir. 2000)(citations omitted); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 81(a)(4)("These rules apply to proceedings for habeas corpus...."). While summary judgment rules apply with equal force in a § 2254 proceeding, the rules only apply to the extent that they do not conflict with the federalrules governing habeas proceedings. Therefore, Section 2254(e)(1), which mandates that a state court's findings are to be presumed correct, overrides the summary judgment rule that all disputed facts must be construed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Accordingly, unless a petitioner can rebut the presumption of correctness of a state court's factual findings by clear and convincing evidence, such findings must be accepted as correct by the federal habeas court. See Smith v. Cockrell, 311 F.3d 661, 668 (5th Cir. 2002), overruled on other grounds by Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274 (2004).
As a preliminary matter, Petitioner pled guilty and has failed to demonstrate that his plea was not entered into voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. Petitioner alleges (1) his conviction resulted from an illegal photo array; (2) he was denied effective assistance of counsel and; (3) the trial court erred by appointing Mr. Barrera as his court-appointed counsel. The state habeas court denied these grounds for relief. Upon review, Petitioner has failed to show the state court's determination was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of federal law, or was an unreasonable determination of the facts based on the evidence in the record. Lastly, to the extent Petitioner alleges he is actually innocent of the crimes he pled guilty to, he has failed to provide the Court any new evidence to establish this claim. Therefore, for the reasons stated below, it is respectfully recommended Petitioner is not entitled to relief and Respond...
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