Rodríguez–Díaz v. Cruz–ColóN

Decision Date23 July 2012
Docket NumberCivil No. 10–1764 (GAG).
Citation878 F.Supp.2d 333
PartiesAlex Eli RODRÍGUEZ–DÍAZ, Plaintiff, v. Ramon L. CRUZ–COLÓN, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Fernando L. Gallardo, Woods and Woods, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.

David R. Rodriguez–Burns, Marla Nikole Hadad, Eliezer Alberto Aldarondo–Lopez, Aldarondo & Lopez Bras, PSC, Guaynabo, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

GUSTAVO A. GELPÍ, District Judge.

Alex Eli Rodriguez–Diaz (Plaintiff) brought this action against the Office of the Commissioner of Insurance (the “OCI”), as well as Ramon L. Cruz–Colon (Cruz) and Ana Maria Lopez–Erquicia (“Lopez”), in their personal and official capacities as Insurance Commissioner and Sub–Commissioner, respectively (collectively Defendants), seeking redress for alleged acts of discrimination and deprivation of due process. Plaintiff's claims were brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; and the Civil Rights Act of Puerto Rico, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 1, §§ 13–19.

This matter is currently before the court on Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 38). The motion was opposed by Plaintiff (Docket No. 48). Defendantsfiled a reply brief (Docket No. 65). After reviewing the submissions and pertinent law, the court GRANTS Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 38).

I. Local Rule 56

Local Rule 56(c) states:

A party opposing a motion for summary judgment shall submit with its opposition a separate, short, and concise statement of material facts. The opposing statement shall admit, deny or qualify the facts supporting the motion for summary judgment by reference to each numbered paragraph of the moving party's statement of material facts. Unless a fact is admitted, the opposing statement shall support each denial or qualification by a record citation as required by this rule. The opposing statement may contain in a separate section additional facts, set forth in separate numbered paragraphs and supported by a record citation as required by subsection (e) of this rule.

L.CV.R. 56(c). Rule 56 continues in subsection (e) to state, “Facts contained in a supporting or opposing statement of material facts, if supported by record citations as required by this rule, shall be deemed admitted unless properly controverted.” L.CV.R. 56(e). Together, these rules require an opposing party to admit, deny or qualify the facts of the moving party, and to explain the reasons for any such denials or qualifications with record citations. If the opposing party wishes to include any additional facts to supplement the facts of the moving party, the opposing party must include those facts in a separate section. L.CV.R. 56(c).

The First Circuit and the judges of the District of Puerto Rico have made clear that adherence to this rule is compulsory, and failure to do so may result in the court disregarding any noncomplying fact. See Carreras v. Sajo, Garcia & Partners, 596 F.3d 25, 32–33 (1st Cir.2010) (affirming district court's decision to disregard facts the opposing party did not properly accept, qualify or deny); Gutierrez v. Toledo, 780 F.Supp.2d 171, 173 (D.P.R.2011) (holding moving party's statement of facts uncontested due to opposing party's failure to comply with Local Rule 56); Rivera–Cartagena v. Wal–Mart Puerto Rico, Inc., 802 F.Supp.2d 324, 330 n. 2 (D.P.R.2011) (disregarding opposing party's statement of facts that do not specifically address the facts of the moving party). When an opposing party merely submits its own statement of fact that is nonresponsive to the moving party's facts by not admitting, qualifying or denying the moving party's facts, the district court is free to deem the moving party's facts admitted and may disregard the opposing party's statement altogether. Caban Hernandez v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 486 F.3d 1, 6–7 (1st Cir.2007); Rivera–Cartagena, 802 F.Supp.2d at 330. The rules were implemented in order to ensure the court focuses its attention on genuinely controverted material facts. See Caban Hernandez, 486 F.3d at 7. It is not the court's task to sift through non-responsive statements of fact in order to discern whether any genuine issue of material fact exists. Rather, it is the court's role to determine whether a genuine issue exists after being properly briefed by the parties. This rule, along with the anti-ferreting rule, puts the onus on the parties to prepare motions for the court that make the actual issues of the case clear and provide citations to record in order to assist the court in reaching the correct conclusion.

The present case is similar to that of Caban Hernandez and Rivera–Cartagena in that Plaintiff submitted his statement of uncontested material facts without any referenceto Defendants statement and without admitting, qualifying or denying any of Defendants' statements. ( See Docket No. 49.) Instead, Plaintiff's statement contains 309 facts that Plaintiff uses to rebut Defendants' statements, but neither makes reference to any Defendants' facts, nor categorizes these facts as additional facts. ( See id.) The court, thus, deems Defendants' facts admitted and disregards Plaintiff's facts due to Plaintiff's failure to adhere to Local Rule 56. By submitting completely non-responsive opposing statements of facts, Plaintiff asks the court to reconcile 404 statements of fact and then discern whether any genuine issue of material fact exists. That is not the proper role of the court and the court will not endeavor to do Plaintiff's work for him.1

II. Relevant Factual Background and Procedural History

Lopez holds a career position at the OCI. She began working at the OCI in 1996. ( See Docket No. 46–1 at 2.) Cruz was appointed as the commissioner of the OCI in January 2009. ( See id. at 62.) In April of 2009, Cruz appointed Lopez to be a sub-commissioner. ( See id. at 16–17.) The sub-commissioner is responsible for representing the OCI in the commissioner's absence and assisting in the day to day operation and administration. ( See id. at 5–6.) Lopez has the additional responsibility of handling the OCI's legal affairs. ( See id. at 6–7.) The commissioner is responsible for all hiring, transferring and terminating of employees at the OCI. ( See id. at 8.)

Cruz appointed Eddy Sanchez (“Sanchez”) to a trust position as the auxiliary commissioner of administration. ( See Docket No. 46–1 at 40–41.) Cruz also implemented a new functional organizational chart for the OCI, which was in place when Lopez was appointed sub-commissioner. ( See id. at 13 & 15.) This new organizational chart required the human resources department to be directly accountable to the commissioner and sub-commissioner. ( See id. at 46–2 at 1.) Previously, the human resources department was under the jurisdiction of the auxiliary commissioner for administration, the position Sanchez was appointed to. ( See Docket Nos. 46–2 at 2; 46–1 at 12.) The organizational chart was submitted to the office of management and budget in order to ensure the operation of this structure would not require excessive outlays of funds. ( See Docket No. 46–1 at 14.) Plaintiff is knowledgeable of the new organizational chart. ( See Docket No. 39–2 at 9.)

Prior to joining the OCI, Plaintiff held a career position with the Puerto Rico planning board. ( See Docket No. 46–1 at 114.) Plaintiff was recommended to be the director of human resources. ( See Docket No. 46–1 at 19.) Plaintiff was interviewed by Lopez, and later by Cruz for this position. ( See Docket Nos. 46–1 at 20, 67; 39–2 at 5.) At no time did Lopez and Cruz discuss Plaintiff's political affiliation. ( See Docket No. 46–1 at 21 & 65.) Ultimately, Cruz offered Plaintiff the position. ( See Docket No. 46–1 at 21.)

Plaintiff began working at the OCI on June 16, 2009 and Lopez was his immediate supervisor. ( See Docket Nos. 46–1 at 22, 28; 46–2 at 6.) Lopez assigned Plaintiff most of his daily tasks and both Lopez and Cruz verbally informed Plaintiff of the new organizational chart, which required all matters regarding human resources to be funneled through them, as opposed to the auxiliary commissioner as stated by the previous organizational chart. ( See Docket Nos. 39–2 at 8; 46–1 at 32–33, 101–02, 143.) Plaintiff understood this directive and that he should not report to Sanchez. ( See Docket No. 39–2 at 12–13.) These instructions only pertained to confidential or discretionary matters. ( See id. at 7.) All employee files at the OCI are kept under lock and Plaintiff was informed on June 22, 2009 that he would receive one of two keys to gain access to these files. ( See Docket Nos. 46–1 at 82; 46–2 at 7.) Cruz would keep the other key. ( See id.)

During his employment at the OCI, Cruz and Lopez instructed Plaintiff to preside over a pretermination hearing for Diana Calero (“Calero”), a former employee of OCI. ( See Docket Nos. 46–1 at 45; 46–2 at 20.) While Plaintiff was instructed to produce a report regarding this pre-termination hearing, Plaintiff failed to do so. ( See Docket Nos. 46–1 at 45; 46–2 at 20.) While conducting interviews for the director of consumer services at the OCI, Plaintiff interviewed Arlene Pabon, the daughter of Plaintiff's friend. ( See Docket No. 39–2 at 19.) Plaintiff never informed Lopez or Cruz of his relationship with Pabon prior to the interview. ( See id. at 20.) Lopez admonished Plaintiff verbally for his failure to accomplish the requested tasks, but admits there is no written documentation of this admonishment. ( See Docket No. 46–1 at 28.)

Plaintiff received an e-mail from Sanchez on August 13, 2009, requesting him to prepare a certificate of employment for Jaime Solla. ( See Docket Nos. 39–2 at 15; 46–2 at 10.) Sanchez signed the certificate the next day. ( See Docket No. 46–2 at 9–10.) Plaintiff did not inform Defendants about the instructions from Sanchez. ( See Docket No. 46–2 at 15.)

Also on August 14, 2009, Lopez met with Plaintiff and...

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