RodrÍguez–garcÍa v. Municipality of Caguas

• Decision Date: 18 March 2011
• Docket Number: Civil No. 01–2525 (BJM).
• Citation: 787 F.Supp.2d 135
• Parties: Carmen L. RODRÍGUEZ–GARCÍA, Plaintiff,v.MUNICIPALITY OF CAGUAS, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

787 F.Supp.2d 135

Carmen L. RODRÍGUEZ–GARCÍA, Plaintiff,
v.
MUNICIPALITY OF CAGUAS, et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 01–2525 (BJM).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

March 18, 2011.

[787 F.Supp.2d 138]

Godwin Aldarondo–Girald, Laura Maldonado–Rodriguez, Laura Maldonado Law Office, Ericson Sanchez–Preks, Aldarondo Girald Law Office, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.Grisselle Gonzalez–Negron, Luis E. Pabon–Roca, Faccio & Pabon Roca, Claudia Latimer–Bengoa, Jose Enrico Valenzuela–Alvarado, Christian E. Pagan–Cordoliani, Departamento De Justicia, Salvador J. Antonetti–Stutts, O'Neill & Borges, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.ORDER AWARDING ATTORNEYS' FEES BRUCE J. McGIVERIN, United States Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff Carmen Rodríguez–García (“Rodríguez”) brought this civil rights action against her employer, the Municipality of Caguas (“Municipality”), its mayor, the late William Miranda–Marín (“Miranda”), and its vice-mayor, Wilfredo Puig, in their personal and official capacities, for retaliation and political discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) and other provisions of federal and Puerto Rico law. (Docket No. 1). After three appeals and two jury trials, plaintiff ultimately prevailed against the Municipality and Miranda in his personal capacity on a Section 1983 claim of retaliation for exercising her First Amendment free speech right. (Docket Nos. 303, 304, 323, 324, 325). Plaintiff now seeks $769,966.37 in attorneys' fees and expenses incurred over nine years of litigation, pursuant to the fee-shifting provision of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (“Section 1988”). (Docket No. 326). Defendants oppose (Docket No. 350), plaintiff replies (Docket No. 353–1), and defendants sur-reply. (Docket No. 367). Plaintiff also requests reconsideration of the Clerk of Court's taxation of costs on behalf of plaintiff. (Docket No. 339). After close examination, the court grants in part plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees and denies plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of taxation of costs, as explained in more detail below.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The facts of this case are well-known by this juncture, so I will recite only the procedural history as relevant to the requested fee award. Plaintiff filed the instant complaint on November 7, 2001, against the Municipality and Miranda and Puig in their personal and official capacities, claiming violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 (“Section 1981”), 1983, and 1985 (“Section 1985”) and the constitution and laws of Puerto Rico. (Docket No. 1). After the court granted summary judgment for defendants on limitations grounds, plaintiff appealed, and the First Circuit vacated and remanded, awarding costs to plaintiff. Rodríguez–García v. Municipality of Caguas, 354 F.3d 91 (1st Cir.2004) ( Rodríguez I ).

On remand, this court granted summary judgment for defendants on plaintiff's Section 1981 and 1985 claims and her Section 1983 political discrimination claim. (Docket No. 74). Plaintiff went to trial against Puig and Miranda on a Section 1983 retaliation claim, on a theory that their actions subjected the municipality to liability as well. The court granted judgment for Miranda as a matter of law, and

[787 F.Supp.2d 139]

the jury found the municipality, but not Puig, liable on the retaliation claim. Finding the jury's verdict inconsistent with plaintiff's theory of the case, the court entered judgment as a matter of law for the municipality, and plaintiff appealed. The First Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment on the political discrimination claim, the judgment in favor of Puig on the retaliation claim, and the vacation of the jury award against the municipality, but reversed and remanded for a new trial on the retaliation claim against Miranda and the municipality. The parties were ordered to bear their own costs. Rodriguez–Garcia v. Municipality of Caguas, 495 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.2007) ( Rodriguez II ).

After the second appeal, plaintiff proceeded to a jury trial before me on the retaliation claim as well as (for the first time) a claim under Puerto Rico's whistleblower statute, Law 115, 29 L.P.R.A. § 194 et seq. , which provides for double damages. The jury found in plaintiff's favor against both Miranda and the municipality and awarded $350,000 in compensatory damages. However, I subsequently found that plaintiff had waived any Law 115 claim prior to the first trial and thus did not double the damages award in entering an amended judgment for plaintiff. (Docket No. 303). On the parties' cross-appeals, the First Circuit affirmed in all respects and ordered each party to bear its own costs. Rodríguez–García v. Miranda–Marín, 610 F.3d 756 (1st Cir.2010) ( Rodríguez–Garcia III ). The instant motion followed. (Docket No. 326). Defendants unsuccessfully petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. Miranda–Marin v. Rodriguez–Garcia, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 1016, 178 L.Ed.2d 829 (2011) (mem.).

ANALYSIS

Section 1988 permits the court to allow the prevailing party in a Section 1983 action “a reasonable attorney's fee.” 42 U.S.C. § 1988. “[P]laintiffs may be considered prevailing parties for attorney's fee purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit sought in bringing suit.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983) (quoting Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278–79 (1st Cir.1978); internal quotations omitted). Here, plaintiff's political discrimination and Section 1981 and 1985 claims were dismissed on summary judgment prior to the first trial, and I disallowed the Law 115 claim after the second trial. However, plaintiff succeeded against two defendants on her Section 1983 retaliation claim—the primary theory on which she went to trial both times—and was awarded $350,000 in compensatory damages. Accordingly, I find that she is a prevailing party for Section 1988 fee-shifting purposes. I turn, then, to the determination of a reasonable fee amount.

The court has “great discretion in deciding what claimed legal services should be compensated.” Brewster v. Dukakis, 3 F.3d 488, 492 (1st Cir.1993). Plaintiffs who substantially prevail may not necessarily recover the totality of their requested fees. See Culebras Enters. Corp. v. Rivera–Rios, 846 F.2d 94, 102 (1st Cir.1988). Instead, the court calculates a reasonable fee award using the “lodestar” method: a reasonable hourly rate multiplied by the number of hours reasonably spent on the litigation. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933. Under the lodestar approach, the judge first calculates the time counsel spent on the case, subtracts duplicative, unproductive, or excessive hours, and then applies prevailing hourly billing rates in the community, taking into account counsel's qualifications, experience, and specialized competence.

[787 F.Supp.2d 140]

Gay Officers Action League v. Puerto Rico, 247 F.3d 288, 295 (1st Cir.2001). Once calculated, “the lodestar represents a presumptively reasonable fee, although it is subject to upward or downward adjustment in certain circumstances.” Lipsett v. Blanco, 975 F.2d 934, 937 (1st Cir.1992).

Plaintiff seeks compensation for $744,642.50 in attorneys' fees based on 2,425.75 hours of work, and $25,323.87 in litigation expenses, for a total of $769,966.37. Plaintiff's motion is supported by timesheets, affidavits, and curricula vitae for the three plaintiff's attorneys, Godwin Aldarondo Girald (“Aldarondo”), Laura Maldonado Rodríguez (“Maldonado”), and Ericson Sánchez Preks (“Sánchez”). The requested fees and expenses cover the time period from the commencement of the representation on September 18, 2001 through the date of oral argument in the third appeal, November 5, 2009. (Docket Nos. 326, 326–1, 326–2, 326–3, 326–4, 326–5, 326–6). Plaintiff's attorneys claim the following hours and hourly rates (in court/out of court): Aldarondo, 186.00 at $350/1,064.75 at $300; Maldonado, 174.50 at $350/341.75 at $300; Sánchez, 108.50 at $270/550.25 at $240.¹ (Docket No. 326, p. 19).

Defendants oppose the fee motion, arguing that the time entries are too vague, the rates claimed are too high and should be reduced, and the court should disallow, inter alia, all hours claimed for appeals work and all of attorney Sánchez's hours. (Docket No. 350). I will address each of defendants' arguments for downward reductions in the fee award in turn, using the timesheets provided by plaintiff. (Docket Nos. 326–1, 326–2).

1. Hourly Rates

The lodestar method requires the court to employ an hourly rate in line with the prevailing rate in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation.² Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984). In the fee-shifting context, the court concerns itself primarily with the market value of counsel's services, so the rate that private counsel actually charges for services, while not conclusive, is a reliable indicium of market value. See United States v. One Star Class, 546 F.3d 26, 28 (1st Cir.2008). The court may also rely upon its own knowledge of attorneys' fees in the community in reaching its determination. Rodriguez v. Int'l Coll. of Bus. & Tech., Inc., 356 F.Supp.2d 92, 96 (D.P.R.2005) (citing Missouri v. Jenkins by Agyei, 491 U.S. 274, 285, 109 S.Ct. 2463, 105 L.Ed.2d 229 (1989)).

Defendants argue that the hourly billing rates claimed by plaintiff's counsel are excessive. They ask the court to reduce Aldarondo's and Maldonado's rates to $125 and Sánchez's to $100 (for both in-court and out-of-court work), based on what defendants contend are the prevailing rates for government and private practice attorneys whose experience is comparable to

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that of the three plaintiff's attorneys.³ (Docket No. 350, p. 7–9). Both parties have cited recent fee award orders from this court and the First Circuit that support their respective claims of reasonable hourly rates. (Docket Nos. 326, p...