Roe v. Com.
| Citation | 628 S.E.2d 526 |
| Decision Date | 21 April 2006 |
| Docket Number | Record No. 050909. |
| Parties | George Julious ROE v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Virginia |
Andrea C. Long (David E. Boone; Boone, Beale, Cosby & Long, on brief), Richmond, for appellant.
Eugene Murphy, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Judith Williams Jagdmann, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Present: HASSELL, C.J., LACY, KEENAN, KOONTZ, KINSER, and LEMONS, JJ., and COMPTON,* S.J.
In this appeal, we consider whether the Commonwealth may prosecute a criminal defendant for certain crimes when the circuit court had previously granted the Commonwealth's motion to dismiss indictments alleging the same crimes.
The facts relevant to our disposition of this appeal are not in dispute. In 2002, a grand jury for the City of Richmond indicted George Julious Roe for the following offenses: abduction, use of a firearm in the commission of abduction, shooting into an occupied dwelling, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The defendant was scheduled to be tried in the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond on October 3, 2002. On that date, the Commonwealth's attorney and the defendant's counsel were present in the circuit court. However, the defendant was not present because he was in the custody of the United States Government, and the Commonwealth had not made arrangements to procure his presence.
Upon the Commonwealth's motion for a continuance, the circuit court considered evidence and arguments of counsel and denied the motion. The Commonwealth made a motion to dismiss the above-referenced offenses. The circuit court granted the motion and entered an order that stated in part:
Subsequently, another grand jury for the City of Richmond indicted Roe for these same offenses. The trial for these offenses was conducted on September 17, 2003. Before the commencement of the trial, Roe moved to dismiss the indictments because the charges had been dismissed by the circuit court's order dated October 3, 2002.
Defendant's counsel argued before the circuit court, with a different judge presiding, that the Commonwealth was not entitled to proceed with these charges because they were dismissed in October 2002. Defense counsel informed the circuit court that the Commonwealth made a motion to continue the trial in October 2002 because the Commonwealth was not prepared to proceed with its case and that the victim had repeatedly failed to appear. The defendant also asserted that the Commonwealth chose not to request a nolle prosequi pursuant to Code § 19.2-265.3, but instead the Commonwealth specifically moved to dismiss the charges. The Commonwealth responded that even though it made a motion to dismiss during the October 3, 2002 proceeding, the motion was in the nature of a motion for a nolle prosequi and that the dismissal was not with prejudice.
The circuit court reviewed the above-referenced order and ruled:
The circuit court denied the motion to dismiss and conducted a bench trial. At the conclusion of the trial, the defendant was convicted of abduction, use of a firearm in the commission of a felony, and possession of a firearm by a felon. The defendant was sentenced to a total of 13 years with five years suspended.
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant's convictions. Roe v. Commonwealth, 45 Va.App. 240, 609 S.E.2d 635 (2005). The Court of Appeals held that the circuit court's ruling that the October 3, 2002 dismissal order constituted a nolle prosequi is a reasonable interpretation of that order and that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion. Id. at 249, 609 S.E.2d at 639. Roe appeals.
The defendant argues in this Court that the circuit court erred by failing to dismiss the indictments that were the subject of the second prosecution. The defendant states that the Commonwealth requested and received a dismissal of those charges in October 2002 as stated in the circuit court's dismissal order. Continuing, the defendant asserts that the circuit court's subsequent ruling that the dismissal order constituted a nolle prosequi is erroneous and that the Court of Appeals erred by affirming the judgment of the circuit court. The Commonwealth responds that its motion to dismiss granted in the October 2002 order was the equivalent of a nolle prosequi and that the circuit court's interpretation of the October 2002 order is reasonable. We disagree with the Commonwealth.
It is well established in this Commonwealth that a circuit court speaks only through its written orders. We have consistently applied this well-established principle. Rose v. Jaques, 268 Va. 137, 147, 597 S.E.2d 64, 70 (2004); Upper Occoquan Sewage Authority v. Blake Construction Co., 266 Va. 582, 588, 587 S.E.2d 721, 724 (2003); Commonwealth v. Williams, 262 Va. 661, 668, 553 S.E.2d 760, 763 (2001); Berean Law Group, P.C. v. Cox, 259 Va. 622, 626, 528 S.E.2d 108, 111 (2000); Walton v. Commonwealth, 256 Va. 85, 94, 501 S.E.2d 134, 140 (1998).
Another well-established principle in our jurisprudence is that circuit courts have the authority to interpret their own orders. Fredericksburg Constr. Co. v. J.W. Wyne Excavating, Inc., 260 Va. 137, 143-44, 530 S.E.2d 148, 152 (2000); Rusty's Welding Service, Inc. v. Gibson, 29 Va.App. 119, 129, 510 S.E.2d 255, 260 (1999). However, a circuit court's authority to interpret its order is...
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