Roe v. Doe

• Decision Date: 09 June 1978
• Docket Number: 6859,Nos. 6425,s. 6425
• Parties: Jane ROE et al., Petitioners-Appellees, v. John DOE, Defendant-Appellant. Mary ROE et al., Petitioners-Appellants, v. James DOE, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Page 310

581 P.2d 310

59 Haw. 259

Jane ROE et al., Petitioners-Appellees, v. John DOE, Defendant-Appellant.

Mary ROE et al., Petitioners-Appellants, v. James DOE, Defendant-Appellee.

Nos. 6425, 6859.

Supreme Court of Hawai'i.

June 9, 1978.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Under HRS § 1-3 (1976 Repl.), no law operates retrospectively unless otherwise expressed or obviously intended by the legislature.

2. In view of the language of HRS § 584-7 (1976 Repl.), as well as the overall purpose behind HRS Chapter 584 (1976 Repl.), the legislature "obviously intended" the three-year statute of limitations period of HRS § 584-7 (1976 Repl.) to operate retrospectively.

3. Paternity actions, which do not impose a penalty but are intended to convert a father's moral obligation to support his illegitimate children into a legal obligation, serve the valid purpose of relieving the public of the burden of supporting an illegitimate child and to provide the mother with assistance in carrying out her obligation of support. Therefore, in order to foster these just and humane objectives, the legislature intended that for purposes of determining the applicable period of limitations in paternity actions, it is immaterial whether the child was born before or after the effective date of the newly enacted paternity statute.

4. Remedial legislation is to be construed liberally in order to accomplish the purpose for which it was enacted.

5. The lifting of the bar of a statute of limitations so as to restore a remedy lost through mere lapse of time is not unconstitutional per se.

6. Although courts often repeat the rule that subsequent extensions of a limitation period relating to a Statutory cause of action will not revive a claim previously barred by the period of limitations, the question remains one of legislative intent.

7. The right to defeat an action by the statute of limitations has never been regarded as a fundamental or vested right.

8. In view of the fact that statutes of limitation exist only by legislative grace and are subject to a relatively large degree of legislative control, a court must look to whether the actual retrospective effects of the statute will offend the Federal or State Constitutions.

9. Where a defendant has not acted in reliance upon the bar of a statute of limitations, he may not translate his prior statutory immunity from suit into a constitutional right. However, if a putative father, named in a paternity proceeding, is able to demonstrate that he acted in specific reliance on the bar of the statute of limitations and that special hardship or oppressive effects would follow from the lifting of the bar, retrospective application of HRS § 584-7 (1976 Repl.) might not be constitutionally permissible.

Henry T. Hirai, Honolulu, for defendant-appellant in No. 6425.

Claire M. Marumoto, Deputy Corp. Counsel, Honolulu, for petitioners-appellants in No. 6859.

Naomi S. Campbell, Deputy Corp. Counsel, Honolulu, for petitioners-appellees in No. 6425.

Paul E. DiBianco, Honolulu, for defendant-appellee in No. 6859.

Before RICHARDSON, C. J., and KOBAYASHI, OGATA, MENOR and KIDWELL, JJ.

OGATA, Justice.

These two appeals, No. 6425 and No. 6859, from the Family Court, raise questions concerning the statute of limitations provision of Hawaii's Uniform Parentage Act, HRS Chapter 584. ¹ The primary issue is whether a cause of action which was once barred by the expiration of the statute of limitations can be revived by a subsequent legislative enactment extending the original period of limitations.

In independent actions, two mothers petitioned the Family Court for a determination of the paternity of their minor children. The petitioners also sought payment of support for the children, as well as other expenses. Each defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that the statute of limitations constituted a bar to the action. In the first case, No. 6425, the Family Court (Judge Kokubun) ruled that the action was not barred by the statute of limitations, and it denied the defendant's motion to dismiss. In the second case, No. 6859, the Family Court (Judge Miho) found that the action was barred by the statute of limitations and it dismissed the petition. These cases were consolidated on appeal for disposition and opinion in view of the fact that they involve common questions of law.

We affirm No. 6425 and reverse No. 6859.

In No. 6425, a mother filed against the same defendant two separate petitions under HRS Chapter 584 for a determination of the paternity of her two minor children. Both petitions were filed on February 27, 1976. One of the minor children had been born on July 31, 1970, and the other minor child had been born on September 16, 1971. The defendant who was named as the alleged father of the two children had been absent from the state from September, 1970, to October, 1973. ² Therefore, taking into account the period during which the alleged father had been absent from the state, the petition regarding the child born in 1970 was barred as of September, 1975, by the statute of limitations provision of now repealed HRS § 579-10 (1955). ³ The petition regarding the child born in 1971 was likewise barred under the statute of limitations provision of now repealed HRS § 579-10 (1955), for, taking into account the defendant's period of absence from the state subsequent to the child's birth, the limitations period for that child expired in late October, 1975. On July 28, 1976, the Family Court issued its decision and order denying the defendant's motion for dismissal. ⁴

No. 6859 similarly involves a petition filed under HRS Chapter 584 by a mother seeking a determination of the paternity of her minor child. The petition was originally filed on March 3, 1977, and an amended petition was filed on March 22, 1977, to include the minor child as a named petitioner. The minor child had been born on November 30, 1973. The action was thus barred as of November 30, 1975, by the two-year period of limitations of now repealed HRS § 579-10 (1955). ⁵ On November 2, 1977, the Family Court issued its order granting the defendant's motion to dismiss.

I.

The Uniform Parentage Act, HRS Chapter 584, was enacted in 1975 and became effective on January 1, 1976. Act 66, S.L.H. 1975. The purpose of the Act is "to provide substantive legal equality for all children regardless of the marital status of their parents." Hawaii House Journal, 1975, 8th Leg.2d Gen. Sess., S.C.Rep. 136 at 980. HRS Chapter 584, which now governs all paternity proceedings in this State, was preceded by HRS Chapter 579 (enacted in 1955) which was repealed when HRS Chapter 584 became effective. Act 66, S.L.H. 1975, §§ 4 and 7.

Under now repealed HRS Chapter 579 (1955), a two-year statute of limitations was imposed upon all petitions for determination of paternity. Thus, under that statute, no paternity proceeding could be commenced more than two years after the birth of the child. HRS § 579-10 (1955). However, HRS § 579-10 (1955) also provided that the running of the limitations period would be tolled for any period of time during which the person alleged to be the father of the child was absent from the state or was openly "cohabiting" with the mother of the child or was contributing to the support of the child.

Under current HRS Chapter 584, however, the period of limitations is extended to three years. A proceeding for a determination of paternity must thus be brought within three years of the birth of the child Or within three years after the effective date of Chapter 584, Whichever is later. HRS § 584-7. ⁶ However, as was provided under repealed HRS § 579-10 (1955), the running of the period of limitations is tolled whenever the putative father is absent from the state or is openly "cohabitating" with the mother of the child or is contributing to the support of the child. HRS § 584-6(a)(2).

The defendants below (hereinafter defendants) argue that once a cause of action is barred by a statute of limitations, the legislature cannot retrospectively revive that cause of action by means of a new statute which extends the original period of limitations. Defendants argue that retrospective application of the longer limitations period of HRS Chapter 584 would violate their rights to due process under the Federal and State Constitutions.

The petitioners below, on the other hand, argue that the legislature intended to in fact confer retrospectivity upon HRS § 584-7 and that no constitutional problems arise from such a reading of the statute. Therefore, they maintain that their actions were filed in a timely manner.

We first note the instructive comments which appear in Oleson v. Borthwick, 33 Haw. 766, 774 (1936):

There is no difference in principle between a retrospective law and a retroactive law, either of which is one which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under a different law or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty or attaches a new disability in respect to transactions or considerations already past. . . . While, therefore, it cannot be questioned that the legislature has the power to enact a retrospective law unless it contravenes some constitutional inhibition, it is also a recognized rule that retrospective laws are not favored and all laws will be construed as prospective unless the language employed imperatively requires a contrary construction.

Also, HRS § 1-3 provides:

Laws not retrospective. No law has any retrospective operation, unless otherwise expressed or obviously intended.

Upon consideration of both the language of HRS § 584-7 and the overall purpose behind HRS Chapter 584, we reach the conclusion that the legislature " obviously intended" that the three-year statute of limitations provision of HRS § 584-7 is to operate retrospectively.

HRS § 584-7 provides for two alternative three-year periods of limitation, and, as provided in that statute, the applicable period of limitations is whichever of the two...