Roe v. Doe
Decision Date | 07 July 1999 |
Parties | John ROE, Respondent, v. Jane DOE, Appellant. |
Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Margaret H. Leek Leiberan, Portland, argued the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs was Leiberan & Gazeley.
Wayne Mackeson, Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent.
Before De MUNIZ, Presiding Judge, and HASELTON and LINDER, Judges.
Defendant "Jane Doe" appeals from the trial court's order that granted plaintiff "John Roe's" motion for a new trial and set aside a summary judgment it had previously entered for Doe. ORCP 64 C. Doe contends, principally, that the court erred in allowing that relief because the original summary judgment was correct and, thus, was not the product of an "[e]rror in law occurring at the trial and objected to or excepted to by the party making the application." ORCP 64 B(6). We agree with Doe and, consequently, reverse and remand for reinstatement of the original judgment.
This is an action for breach of the terms of a settlement of a prior lawsuit between the parties. In March 1995, Doe brought an action against Roe for tortiously infecting her with herpes. On May 21, 1996, the parties agreed to settle the underlying case before the Multnomah County trial court. In colloquy before the trial court, counsel recited the terms of the settlement:
On August 16, 1996, the trial court signed a final judgment that incorporated by reference that oral description of the terms of the settlement agreement. On August 28, 1996, less than two weeks after the entry of the judgment incorporating the settlement, newspapers and broadcast media in the Portland metropolitan area published accounts detailing Doe's allegations against Roe and the settlement. On August 29, 1996, Roe brought this action against Doe for breach of the settlement agreement, alleging that Doe "disclosed sealed or otherwise non-disclosable information to the press and others" and that "[c]ertain disclosures and conduct by the Defendant [were] in breach" of the settlement agreement.
Doe subsequently moved for summary judgment, submitting, inter alia, her own affidavit that acknowledged that she had disclosed information concerning her claims and the settlement to third parties, including press entities, but that indicated that the documents she had disclosed did not include documents sealed pursuant to the settlement agreement. Doe asserted that her disclosures were explicitly permitted under the terms of the settlement and, thus, that there was no breach. Roe opposed summary judgment, submitting his unsigned affidavit in which he recited his subjective understanding that, under the settlement agreement, documents in the tort case were to be sealed and that information in those documents was not to be disclosed to the press. Roe further asserted that such disclosure was "harassment" in breach of the settlement agreement. The trial court granted summary judgment for Doe, determining, in part:
On November 13, 1996, the trial court entered judgment for Doe.
The trial court subsequently entered its order allowing Roe's motion:
On appeal, ORS 19.205(2)(d),2 Doe challenges the trial court's disposition on three grounds: (1) To the extent that the trial court purported to allow the new trial motion merely to obtain more time to consider the merits of the motion, that constituted an abuse of discretion. (2) The trial court erred in denying Doe's motion to strike Roe's evidentiary exhibits that were submitted, for the first time, with Roe's new trial motion. (3) The trial court erred in allowing the new trial motion in that Roe failed to establish any of the bases for that relief. ORCP 64 B(1) to (6); ORCP 64 C.
Doe's first argument is based on the trial court's oral comments following argument on the new trial motion. See 161 Or. App. at 481, 984 P.2d at 346-347. From those comments, Doe interpolates that the trial court's sole reason for setting aside the summary judgment was to give the court more time to review the new trial motion. Doe contends that that is not a permissible ground for granting a new trial under ORCP 64 B, and that the trial court, in so ruling, impermissibly circumscribed and subverted the 55-day limit prescribed in ORCP 64 F.3
The short, and decisive, answer to Doe's argument is that it ignores the explicit language of the trial court's written order. Whatever the court's oral comments, that order was not an "interim" order subject to further consideration. Instead, the order finally and unconditionally granted the motion for a new trial. That writing controls. See, e.g., State v. Swain/Goldsmith, 267 Or. 527, 530, 517 P.2d 684 (1974)
( ); State v. Jackson, 141 Or. App. 123, 126, 917 P.2d 34 (1996) ( ). Accordingly, we review the allowance of the new trial to determine whether any of the grounds advanced in support of the motion was well-taken. Williams v. Laurence-David, 271 Or. 712, 718, 534 P.2d 173 (1975); Herrell v. Johnson, 136 Or.App. 68, 72, 899 P.2d 759 (1995).
We proceed to Doe's third assignment of error, which generally challenges the allowance of a new trial as unsupported by any of the grounds identified in ORCP 64 B(1) to (6).4 ORCP 64 B reads as follows:
ORCP 64 C reads:
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