Roemer v. Jacob Schmidt Brewing Company
| Decision Date | 28 April 1916 |
| Docket Number | 19,592 - (39) |
| Citation | 157 N.W. 640,132 Minn. 399 |
| Parties | L. J. ROEMER v. JACOB SCHMIDT BREWING COMPANY |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Action in the district court for Freeborn county to recover $10,000 for slander. The case was tried before Kingsley, J., who when plaintiff rested denied defendant's motion to dismiss the action, and a jury which returned a verdict for $3,000. Defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was denied, and its motion for a new trial was granted unless plaintiff consented to a reduction of the verdict to $2,000. From the order denying its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial defendant appealed. Reversed.
Liability of employer for slander by agent.
1. The liability of a corporation for a slander uttered by its agent is governed and determined by the same rule which determines its liability in case of a libel published by such agent, and it is responsible for a slander uttered by such agent in the course of his employment and while engaged in furthering the business of the corporation.
Evidence.
2. The evidence is sufficient to sustain the finding of the jury that the slanderous words were heard by other persons as well as by plaintiff.
New trial -- excessive damages.
3. New trial granted on the ground that the verdict is so excessive as to indicate that it was given under the influence of passion or prejudice.
M. J Ryan, Paul G. Bremer, John F. D. Meighen and Bennett O. Knudson, for appellant.
Dunn & Carlson, for respondent.
Defendant is a corporation having its principal office and place of business in St. Paul, but having a branch office and warehouse at Albert Lea. Plaintiff, who had been in charge of the branch office at Albert Lea for about three years, requested defendant to check up and audit his accounts. Defendant employed one Sullivan, an accountant, and sent him to Albert Lea to do this work. Ill will arose between plaintiff and Sullivan, and one evening in a saloon Sullivan made some disparaging remarks to plaintiff and plaintiff knocked him down. Two days later, J. H. Nicolin, who had charge for defendant of all its branch establishments, came to Albert Lea, discharged plaintiff and took possession of the office and warehouse. Plaintiff claims that immediately after his discharge he turned to Sullivan, who was in the office, and asked for the balance due on his salary; and that Sullivan in refusing to pay it stated that plaintiff had embezzled $6,000 from defendant. Thereafter plaintiff brought this action against defendant for slander and recovered a verdict. Defendant made the usual alternative motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial and appealed from the order denying its motion.
1. Although admitting the well-established rule that a corporation is responsible for the torts of an agent or servant committed in the course of his employment and while engaged in furthering the business of his principal or master, and that a libel published by an agent or servant falls within the rule, defendant contends that a slander spoken by an agent or servant is governed by a different rule, and that a corporation is not liable therefor unless it expressly authorized, ratified or approved the defamatory statement.
The authorities are conflicting. Several courts make a distinction between libel and slander, and hold that a corporation may be responsible for the publication, by its agent, of a libel which it neither authorized nor ratified, but is not responsible for the utterance of a slander by such agent, unless it expressly authorized or ratified the defamatory utterance. See McIntyre v. Cudahy Packing Co. 179 Ala. 404, 60 So. 848; Lindsey v. St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. Co. 95 Ark. 534, 129 S.W. 807; Southern Ry. Co. v. Chambers, 126 Ga. 404, 55 S.E. 37, 7 L.R.A. (N.S.) 926; Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Heuchtker, 148 Ky. 228, 146 S.W. 423; Flaherty v Maxwell Motor Co. (Mich.) 153 N.W. 45; Kane v. Boston Mut. Life Ins. Co. 200 Mass. 265, 86 N.E. 302.
Other courts hold that there is no sound distinction between liability for libel and liability for slander, and take the position that a corporation is responsible for a slander uttered by an agent to the same extent that it would be responsible for a libel published by such agent, or for any other tort committed by him. Rivers v. Yazoo & M.R. Co. 90 Miss. 196, 43 So. 471, 9 L.R.A. (N.S.) 931; Hypes v. Southern Ry. Co. 82 S.C. 315, 64 S.E. 395, 21 L.R.A. (N.S.) 873, 17 Ann. Cas. 620; Empire Cream Separator Co. v. De Laval Dairy Supply Co. 75 N.J. Law, 207, 67 A. 711; Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Bridwell, 103 Ark. 345, 147 S.W. 64, Ann. Cas. 1914 B, 837; Sawyer v. Railroad, 142 N.C. 1, 54 S.E. 793, 115 Am. St. 716, 9 Ann. Cas. 440; International Text-Book Co. v. Heartt (C.C.A.) 136 F. 129, 69 C.C.A. 127.
The courts which hold that a corporation is not liable for a slander uttered by its agent unless it had expressly authorized or approved such utterance, concede, as a thoroughly established modification of that rule, that where the relation between the corporation and the person aggrieved created a duty on the part of the corporation to see that such person did not suffer injury or indignity, as in the case of carrier and passenger, merchant and customer, and the like, it is liable for defamatory statements made by its agent or servant, even if made contrary to express instructions.
To support their conclusion that a different rule should be applied in respect to slander from that applied in respect to libel and other torts, these courts argue that slanderous words, usually spoken in excitement or anger, are so peculiarly the expression of the personal feeling or opinion of the one who utters them that his principal who has neither authorized nor ratified his statement ought not to be liable therefor.
It is difficult to see why a similar argument could not be advanced with equal force to relieve the principal from liability where his agent or servant assaults another, or institutes a malicious prosecution, or commits any wrongful act involving the element of malice; yet it is well settled in this state and is the general rule, that the principal may be made to respond in damages in such cases, although he neither authorized nor approved the act of his agent or servant. Smith v. Munch, 65 Minn. 256, 68 N.W. 19 (false imprisonment); Lesch v. Great Northern Ry. Co. 93 Minn. 435, 101 N.W. 965 (unlawful search); Robie v. Canadian N. Ry. Co. ...
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