Roger R. Ingraham v. John Ribar, Sheriff of Medina County

Decision Date13 May 1992
Docket Number2059,92-LW-2489
PartiesROGER R. INGRAHAM, Plaintiff-Appellant v. JOHN RIBAR, SHERIFF OF MEDINA COUNTY, Defendant-Appellee C.A.
CourtOhio Court of Appeals

DECISION

CACIOPPO P. J.

This Case is before the court on the trial court's denial of the. petitioner's request for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent, John Ribar, the Sheriff of Medina County, to release records relating to the 1977 death of Pamela Terrill. Petitioner brought the suit pursuant to R.C 149.43, commonly referred to as the Public Records Act.

Following the commencement of this suit, the respondent released numerous documents requested by the petitioner, but refused to release other documents claiming that they were excepted under R.C. 149.43. The trial court denied the petitioner's application for a writ of mandamus, holding that the respondent had met the burden of demonstrating that the materials in question were not subject to disclosure under R.C. 149.43.

Assignment of Error I

"The court erred in refusing to permit an examination of the balance of the records in the possession of the sheriff."

To secure a writ of mandamus in the case at bar, the petitioner must demonstrate 1) a clear right to the relief prayed for; 2) respondent is under a clear legal duty to perform the acts; and 3) petitioner has no adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. State, ex rel., Cincinnati Post v. Schweikert, 38 Ohio St. 3d 170, 172, rehearing denied (1988), 39 Ohio St. 3d 603.

The petitioner asserts that the records in question are public records under R.C. 149.43, which provides that such records shall be prepared and be made available to the public. R.C. 149.43(A)(1) defines a public record as:

"*** any record that is kept by any public office, including, but not limited to, state, county, city, village, township, and school district units, except medical records, records pertaining to adoption, probation, and parole proceedings, records pertaining to actions under section 2151.85 of the Revised Code and to appeals of actions arising under that section, records listed in division (A) of section 3107.42 of the Revised Code, trial preparation records, confidential law enforcement investigatory records, and records the release of which is prohibited by state or federal law."

The respondent asserts that the materials in question are excepted from disclosure by R.C. 149.43(A) (2) and (4), which provide:

"(2) 'Confidential law enforcement investigatory record' means any record that pertains to a law enforcement matter of a criminal, quasi-criminal, civil, or administrative nature, but only to the extent that the release of the record would create a high probability of disclosure of any of the following:
"(a) The identity of a suspect who has not been charged with the offense to which the record pertains, or of an information source or witness to whom confidentiality has been reasonably promised;
"(b) Information provided by an information - source or witness to whom confidentiality has been reasonably promised, which information would reasonably tend to disclose his identity;
"(c) Specific confidential investigatory techniques or procedures or specific investigatory work product;
"(d) Information that would endanger the life or physical safety of law enforcement personnel, a crime victim, a witness, or a confidential information source.
"***.
"(4) 'Trial preparation record' means any record that contains information that is specifically complied in reasonable anticipation of, or in defense of, a civil or criminal action or proceeding, including the independent thought processes and personal trial preparation of an attorney."

When a governmental body asserts that public records are excepted from disclosure and this assertion is challenged, the court must undertake an individualized scrutiny of the documents in question. State, ex rel., Nat'l. Broadcasting Co. v. Cleveland, 38 Ohio St. 3d 79, paragraph four of the syllabus, rehearing denied (1988), 39 Ohio St. 3d 701. Law enforcement records must be disclosed unless they are excepted from disclosure by R.C. 149.43. Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus. A governmental body refusing to release records has the burden of proving that record.s are excepted from disclosure by R.C. 149.43. Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus.

To determine whether records are exempt from public disclosure pursuant to R.C. 149.43, a two-step analysis is required. State, ex rel. Polovischak v. Mayfield (1990), 50 Ohio St. 3d 51, 52. First, it must be determined whether the records are confidential law enforcement records. Id. Second, it must be determined whether release of the records would create a high probability of disclosure of one of the four types of information specified in R.C. 149.43(A) (2). Id.; see also State ex rel. Jacobs v. Prudoff (1986), 30 Ohio App. 3d 89.

The primary exceptions relied upon by the respondent are 149.43(A)(2)(a), (A)(2)(c) and (A) (4).

R.C. 149.43(A)(2)(a) exempts records that identify a suspect who has not been charged or information sources whose confidentiality has been reasonably promised. We have reviewed all of the documents identifiable from the record which the respondent asserts identify a suspect and find that all but one do in fact identify a suspect. The statute, by referring to suspects, was intended to except documents that identified persons who were subject to ongoing investigation as to which no public arrest or citation had yet been taken. State, ex rel. Thompson Newspapers, Inc. v. Martin (1989), 47 Ohio St. 3d 28, 29. The remaining document, identified as document DD, a manila folder bearing the title "Preterm Clinic", contains a list of Preterm Clinic employees and as such does not appear to identify a suspect. Nor is there any indication that the person providing the list or the persons thereon were promised confidentiality. Accordingly, this document should be disclosed to the petitioner.

The respondent further seeks protection under R.C. 149.43(A)(2)(c), which protects confidential investigatory techniques or procedures or specific investigatory work product, and R.C. 149.43(A) (4), which protects trial preparation records. The specific work product exception protects an investigator's deliberative or subjective analysis, interpretation of the facts, theory of the case, and investigative plans. State, ex rel. Nat'l. Broadcasting Co., supra, at paragraph three of the syllabus. This exception does not encompass the objective facts and observations an investigator has recorded. Id. Factual material cannot be cloaked in secrecy under the guise of the work product exception. State, ex rel. Jester v. Cleveland (Jan. 17, 1990), Cuyahoga App. No. 56438, unreported, at 11. Investigatory plans, on the other hand, generally note steps that should be or will be taken to further the investigation. Id. at 12.

As to the trial preparation record exception contained in R.C 149.43(A) (4), the Supreme Court of Ohio has held that this exception is strictly limited in nature and that records compiled for multiple purposes do not qualify as trial preparation records. Id. at 14, citing State ex...

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