Rogers v. City of Buffalo

• Decision Date: 07 October 1890
• Citation: 123 N.Y. 173,25 N.E. 274
• Parties: ROGERS v. CITY OF BUFFALO et al.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

123 N.Y. 173

25 N.E. 274

ROGERS

v.CITY OF BUFFALO et al.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Oct. 7, 1890.

Appeal from supreme court, general term, fifth department.

W. F. Seehan, for appellants.

Ansley Wilcox, for respondent.

PECKHAM, J.

Long prior to the passage of the first so-called ‘Civil Service Reform Act’ by the federal congress, the condition of that service, and the method of appointment thereto, had become the subject of most anxious thought on the part of many upright, intelligent, and experienced men. The semi-barbarous maxim that ‘to the victor belongs the spoils' had been the foundation stone upon which the system of appointments to the civil service of the nation had been placed for a number of years. The system had grown to such proportions under the necessary enlargement of the service, and it had become in practice so entirely the creature of political chiefs, that the appointing power was regarded merely as a formal means of registering and legalizing the appointments to office which had already been substantially made by them. Such a system took from the officer who was to make the appointment all sense of personal or official responsibility to the people of the country, and substituted in its stead the feeling that he was responsible only to his party to make such appointments to office as the leading men therein should choose to ask for. It is not to be wondered at that as the numbers of offices increased, and the numbers of applicants therefor increased in even greater proportion, a general scramble for office became the accompaniment of every change of administration; and to such an extent was it carried that the officers of the government had really not the time to spare for the discharge of the other duties pertaining to their office, because of the constant demand upon their time and attention made by office seekers and their supporters. The chief reason for an appointment was the political work done by the applicant, and his supposed power to do more, and thus an appointment to an office in the civil list was regarded as a fit and proper reward for purely political and partisan service. No one can believe that such a system was calculated to produce a service fit for the only purpose for which offices are created, viz., the discharge of duties necessary to be performed in order that the public business may be properly and efficiently transacted. The continuous and systematic filling of all the offices of a great and industrious nation by such means became conclusive proof, in the minds of many intelligent and influential men, that the nation itself had not in such matters emerged from the semi-barbarous state, and that it had failed to obtain the full benefits arising from an advanced and refined civilization. The government, it was said, in such case, where public offices are thus filled, is looked upon as an enemy's country, fit to be raided and conquered; and to obtain possession of it is a desirable thing, because all the offices within the gift of those who administer it are lawful spoil of war, and to be parceled out by the chiefs of the victorious party to their faithful followers, in recognition of past political services, or in expectation of future support of the same nature. Possession of office is to be the reward of party fidelity and party service. Contests between political parties under such circumstances, it was claimed by the opponents of this method of appointment to office, must, in the absence of some great and exceptional question, degenerate into mere struggles for the possession of the spoils of office. Struggles of this nature necessarily bring out every low, selfish, and sordid quality of the participants therein; and corruption and fraud at the elections become the usual accessories thereto. In these contests all principle is lost sight of, and a victory is regarded as a simple means by which to obtain or retain possession of office. Views of this nature were held by numbers of earnest and unselfish men long before any legislation upon the subject had become possible. The prevailing system finally became, as was alleged, so subversive of every right principle upon which the business of the public ought to be conducted that the attention of congress was at length so far drawn to it as to result in the passage by congress of the first statute upon the subject. It is not claimed that the federal legislation in regard to civil service reform has as yet proceeded very far, but it is a step in the direction of a change to another, and, as is thought by many, a much better system of filling the public offices.

Legislation in the same direction as that contained in the act of congress was soon inaugurated in this state. It had been with us precisely as it had been with the federal authorities, and we were in no manner behind them in a practical, prompt, and thorough adhesion to the truth of the maxim already quoted. The same force which had operated in the national congress, and had caused the federal civil service legislation, appeared in our state capitol; and legislation looking substantially to the same end as that of the acts of congress was enacted by our legislature. The fact must be fully recognized that the duties connected with the vast majority of offices in both the federal and state governments are in no sense political, and that a proper performance of those duties would give no one the least idea whether the incumbent of the office were a member of one political party or another. It was announced by its adherents and promoters as one of the most important of the principles of this new system of filling the civil offices that where the political views of the incumbent of public office could not rightfully affect, or in any manner determine, the means or method of the performance of his offical duties, and where he stood in no confidential position towards a superior, in such case his appointment to, or his tenure of, such office should in no way depend upon or be affected by his ‘politics.’ Instead of the old method of obtaining an appointment, a new one was proclaimed, which was to be based solely upon merit, to be proved by an open, public, and competitive examination, free to all candidates; and the person who was the best qualified, all proper circumstances being considered, should be appointed. Legislation looking to this end was enacted in New York. The full benefits of such a system have not yet, it is said, been given by the legislation in question, because it does not go far enough; but it is claimed that even such as has been enacted tends to give permanency of tenure to the appointee, and thus to relieve him from constant anxieties as to his future means of livelihood, and to give him on that account more inclination and ambition to discharge his duties well and efficiently. As to the appointing power, it is also said it would leave him at leisure to attend to the important duties of his own office, without a constant drain upon his time and his temper in attending to the claims of office seekers. If the system were to be carried out to its fullest extent by appropriate legislation, and if the laws thus enacted were to be enforced bona fide and with cordial heartiness by the men to whose hands it would necessarily be confined, it has been confidently predicted that the improvements in our entire civil service would be such that no unprejudiced citizen would ever give his consent to return to the old order of things.

I have stated in a somewhat summary manner the system which was in active operation concerning the appointment to civil office in the state and nation prior to the enactment of recent legislation upon the subject. That the former system was bad, very bad indeed, is a fact regarding which it is almost impossible to dispute. All intelligent, unprejudiced, and disinterested opinion runs most strongly in that direction. Legislation of the character of that under discussion is in this country and as yet somewhat experimental in its results. It is experimental because it has been so little tried up to this time; but that the results, if the legislation be fairly carried out, will be immeasurably superior to those obtained under the old system, is a prediction most confidently made by those whose knowledge upon the subject is the greatest. It is somewhat difficult to imagine a worse than the old system of appointments to civil office. That a letter carrier should lose his position because his views upon the question of the tariff were not in accordance with the ruling powers seems to be the very height of absurdity. An earnest desire for the general welfare would seem to suggest a fair trial of this new system. A strict and full enforcement of the legislation already enacted in this state on that subject would be the only means of making the experiment. But the defendant Diebold challenges the legislation in question, and asserts that it is unconstitutional, on several alleged grounds; and, if in error as to that, he asserts that there are other reasons why it is inapplicable to his case. If the legislative acts under consideration violate in any particular the constitution of our state, it is the duty of this court to so decide, without regard to consequences. In determining that question, however, we must be guided in the discussion by the rules of construction which are so well known, and which should control all courts. The act of the legislature must be plainly at variance with some provision of the constitution before a court will so declare it. Doubtful questions will be resolved in favor of the validity of the legislative act.

The defendant alleges that the acts are unconstitutional, because, among other reasons, they provide for the appointment by the governor, and for the confirmation by the senate, of three persons as state civil service commissioners, not more than two of whom shall be adherents of the...