Rogers v. City of Detroit
| Decision Date | 05 May 1998 |
| Docket Number | Docket Nos. 103667,103668 and 105631,Nos. 3-4,s. 3-4 |
| Citation | 579 N.W.2d 840,457 Mich. 125 |
| Parties | Carol ROGERS, Personal Representative of the Estate of John Rogers, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, Cross-Appellant, v. CITY OF DETROIT and City of Detroit Police Department, Defendants Third-Party, Plaintiffs-Appellants, Cross-Appellees, and Keith Montgomery, Third-Party, Defendant-Appellee. Deborah Ann EWING, Individually and as Next Friend of Krystal Thompson, a Minor, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. CITY OF DETROIT, a municipal corporation, Detroit Police Department, Defendants-Appellants, and Police Officer Michael Malott, Police Officer John Doe And Police Office Richard Roe, jointly and severally, Defendants, and CITY OF DETROIT, a municipal corporation, and Police Officer Michael Malott, Defendants and Third-Party Plaintiffs, v. Jay Dean McGUIGAN, Third-Party Defendant. Calendar |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Fieger, Fieger & Schwartz by Geoffrey N. Fieger, Southfield (Robb, Messing & Palmer by Dean A. Robb, Traverse City, and Bendure & Thomas by Mark R. Bendure, Detroit, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellee in Rogers.
Law Office of Jeffrey H. Feldman, P.C. by Jeffrey H. Feldman, Southfield (John A. Lydick, Detroit, of counsel), for plaintiffs in Ewing.
Garan, Lucow, Miller, Seward & Becker, P.C. by Rosalind Rochkind and Matthew A. Seward, Detroit, for defendant in Rogers.
Sullivan, Ward, Bone, Tyler & Asher, P.C. by Ronald S. Lederman, Southfield, for defendants in Ewing.
Granzotto & Nicita, P.C. by Mark Granzotto, Detroit, for amici curiae Michigan Trial Lawyers Association.
Plunkett & Cooney, P.C. by Christine D. Oldani and Mary Massaron Ross, Detroit, for amici curiae Michigan Municipal League and Michigan Municipal Liability and Property Pool.
This appeal is a consolidation of two cases. In each, the primary issue is whether the Supreme Court should overrule or modify its decision in Fiser v. City of Ann Arbor, 417 Mich. 461, 339 N.W.2d 413 (1983).
The cases involve automobile chases in which the pursued vehicles, operated by individuals fleeing police officers, crashed into vehicles occupied by innocent parties. Under Fiser, if the police pursuit constitutes negligent operation of the police vehicle, then the motor vehicle exception applies 1 and the municipality is not immune from tort liability. Fiser, supra at 469, 339 N.W.2d 413.
The motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity allows a governmental agency to be held liable for its employee's negligent operation of a government-owned vehicle. M.C.L. § 691.1405; M.S.A. § 3.996(105) states in pertinent part:
Governmental agencies shall be liable for bodily injury and property damage resulting from the negligent operation by any officer, agent, or employee of the governmental agency, of a motor vehicle of In Ewing v. Detroit (On Remand), 2 defendants appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals that reversed the trial court's grant of summary disposition in their favor. The Court of Appeals held that plaintiffs in that personal injury case had presented sufficient evidence to raise genuine issues of fact regarding negligence and proximate causation.
which the governmental agency is owner....
However, defendants contend that the conduct of the police officers cannot be a proximate cause of plaintiffs' injuries. They argue that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court's decision, because plaintiffs had failed to present a prima facie case of negligence. We disagree with defendants.
Rather, we adopt the reasoning outlined by Justice Ryan in his concurrence in Fiser at 479-480, 339 N.W.2d 413. Justice Ryan stated, "It is for the factfinder to determine whether the actions of the operators of the pursuing vehicles were causes in fact of the plaintiff's injuries." Id. at 479, 339 N.W.2d 413. Thus, we hold that the high-speed pursuit of the McGuigan vehicle by the police may have proximately caused or proximately contributed to the injuries plaintiffs allege.
The appeal in Rogers arises out of a wrongful death suit in which the jury awarded $6,132,993 in favor of the widow of John Rogers. 3 Defendants argue that they can be held liable for no more than the officers' negligent operation of their vehicle, not for their decision to commence or continue pursuit. They claim that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's decision that allowed plaintiff to proceed to trial on theories of liability because they are barred by governmental immunity. We disagree.
We find that the trial court did not err in admitting evidence pertaining to defendants' police-pursuit policies. Under Fiser, a police officer must exercise reasonable care 4 and may exceed the speed limit only "so long as he does not endanger life or property." 5 Id. at 471, 339 N.W.2d 413. Accordingly, we find that the trial court correctly denied defendants' motion for directed verdict.
In Rogers, we granted leave to appeal, not only on the immunity issue, but also on issues concerning the verdict itself and various errors alleged to have occurred at trial. We also granted plaintiff's cross-application on the issues of apportionment of fault and collateral source setoffs. We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals regarding the misconduct issues, but reverse it concerning the apportionment of fault and collateral source setoffs.
We recognize that innocent people are endangered by police pursuits of fleeing vehicles. Also the Legislature has not taken steps to statutorily overturn our decision in Fiser. Consequently, we adhere to the principle of stare decisis and uphold the rule as articulated in that case.
On November 29, 1990, thirty-seven-year-old Deborah Ewing was driving a van through her residential neighborhood in northwest Detroit. Her four-year old daughter, Krystal, was with her. Ms. Ewing was eastbound on Florence going twenty to twenty-five miles an hour. She slowed as she approached the intersection of Florence and Shaftsbury, an "open" residential intersection three blocks south of McNichols.
As she entered the intersection, a 1985 Dodge Ram pickup truck broadsided her van. The truck had been traveling southbound on Shaftsbury at a high rate of speed, variously estimated at sixty to seventy and ninety to one hundred miles an hour. It was driven by Jay McGuigan who, at the time, was fleeing police officers.
As a result of the collision, both vehicles were rendered nondriveable. Mr. McGuigan The facts surrounding the police chase are as follows: Officer Michael Malott worked in the Detroit Police ministation section as part of a backup arrest unit for a surveillance crew. He was alone in a car designated as the "scout car." The car was without police markings, but was equipped with red and blue grille lights, rear deck lights, and a siren. Several other surveillance units were nearby. They were manned by Officers Dettore, Robbins, and White. The units were conducting a surveillance of a known stolen pickup truck parked in a driveway on Margareta in a residential neighborhood.
fled from his vehicle on foot, but was chased, apprehended, and arrested by police officers. Ms. Ewing was rendered unconscious. Both she and her daughter suffered severe injuries. 6
The cars and their backups were in closed-channel radio communication with one another. When Officer White radioed to the others that the pickup truck was occupied and moving, they replied that they were going to stop the stolen vehicle. Officer Malott began to drive to the location to assist in the arrest. However, before he arrived, he learned that the driver of the pickup truck had escaped 7 and was being chased by another unit.
A high-speed chase ensued down Shaftsbury through single-family residential neighborhoods. The pursued vehicle and, at times, the chasing police vehicle disregarded traffic signs and signals. Eventually, the pursuit ended with the collision of the pickup truck and the van driven by Ms. Ewing. Testimony established that the police vehicle was approximately one-half block away at the time of collision.
Ms. Ewing brought suit against the defendant, City of Detroit, and its police officers, pleading negligent operation of government vehicles and gross negligence on the part of the individual police officers. Defendants filed a third-party complaint against Mr. McGuigan.
The city moved for summary disposition against Ms. Ewing, alleging governmental immunity and failure by plaintiffs to state an actionable claim and a dispute of fact submissible to a jury. The trial court granted summary disposition in favor of the city on both counts.
Plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals. The panel 8 peremptorily reversed the summary disposition in favor of the city and its police department, but affirmed summary disposition in favor of the individual police officers.
The city then appealed to this Court. We issued a remand order on May 2, 1995. 448 Mich. 928, 534 N.W.2d 519. It stated:
In lieu of granting leave to appeal, the portion of the July 6, 1994, order of the Court of Appeals reversing the grant of summary disposition to the defendants City of Detroit and Detroit Police Department is vacated, and the case is remanded to that Court for plenary consideration only of the portion of plaintiff's appeal from the Wayne Circuit Court's order granting summary disposition to those defendants on plaintiff's theory under M.C.L. § 691.1405; M.S.A. § 3.996(105).
On remand, the Court of Appeals again reversed the trial court's grant of summary disposition to the city and its police department. Defendants appealed to this Court and we granted defendants' application for leave to appeal. 9
This appeal arises out of a wrongful death suit in which the jury awarded $6,132,993 in Plaintiff brought suit against the city, its police department, and the police officers...
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Ewing v. City of Detroit
...In response to this Court's opinion in Ewing, defendants again appealed to our Supreme Court. The Supreme Court consolidated Ewing with Rogers v. Detroit and therein explicitly declined to overrule or otherwise modify its decision in Fiser and thus affirmed this Court's decision in Ewing. ......
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Donajkowski v. Alpena Power Co.
...exceedingly poor indicator of legislative intent. Justice Taylor took great pains to point this out last term in Rogers v. Detroit, 457 Mich. 125, 163-166, 579 N.W.2d 840 (1998), and his remarks regarding the majority opinion in that case apply equally to the dissent [The majority's legisla......
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...that our citizens, in the face of lawful authority, will comply with the demands made unto them. Rogers v. Detroit, 457 Mich. 125, 166-167, 579 N.W.2d 840 (1998)(Taylor, J., dissenting). And yet they do not today give our citizens the benefit of the same presumption within the sanctity of t......
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...N.W.2d 41; Donajkowski v. Alpena Power Co., 460 Mich. 243, 258–261, 596 N.W.2d 574 (1999), quoting Rogers v. Detroit, 457 Mich. 125, 163–166, 579 N.W.2d 840 (1998) (Taylor, J., dissenting); Autio v. Proksch Constr. Co., 377 Mich. 517, 527–539, 141 N.W.2d 81 (1966); Van Dorpel v. Haven–Busch......