Rogers v. City of Richmond

• Decision Date: 23 March 2012
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 3:11CV620–HEH.
• Citation: 851 F.Supp.2d 983
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia
• Parties: Stacy ROGERS, Individually, and on behalf of all other similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF RICHMOND, VIRGINIA, Defendant.

851 F.Supp.2d 983

Stacy ROGERS, Individually, and on behalf of all other similarly situated, Plaintiffs,

v.CITY OF RICHMOND, VIRGINIA, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 3:11CV620–HEH.

United States District Court,

E.D. Virginia,

Richmond Division.

March 23, 2012.

Craig Juraj Curwood, Curwood Law Firm, Harris Dewey Butler, III, Zev Hillel Antell, Rebecca H. Royals Butler Royals PLC, Paul Mark Falabella, Williams & Skilling PC, Richmond, VA, for Plaintiffs.

Brian K. Telfair, The Telfair Law Firm, LLC, Richmond, VA, John Byron Flood, Joleen Roslyn Okun, Robert Ross Niccolini, Alfred Jr. Robinson, Damon Hart, Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak & Stewart PC, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

HENRY E. HUDSON, District Judge.

This action for unpaid overtime compensation is presently before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. The parties have submitted detailed memoranda in support of their respective positions, and the Commonwealth of Virginia (“the Commonwealth”) has filed an intervenor's brief in opposition. The Court heard argument on March 20, 2012. For the reasons set forth herein, the Motion will be denied.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs in this case are current and former law-enforcement officers (“Plaintiffs” or “the Officers”) of the City of Richmond Police Department. The Defendant City of Richmond (“Defendant” or “the City”) is a public entity with more than 900 persons presently in its employ, including approximately 750 police officers. For purposes of the motion at hand, the parties have stipulated to the facts that follow.

Police officers employed by the City are generally scheduled to work 80 hours within any given 14–day work period. At times, however, such personnel may be assigned additional hours of work. To date, the City's official policy has been to pay police officers at their regular rate for all hours of labor up to 86 per cycle, with certain exceptions not directly at issue here. That is, officers do not receive overtime compensation for any hours of work between 80 and 86 in a 2–week span.¹

On September 19, 2011, Plaintiffs filed a Collective and Class Action Complaint in this Court, alleging violations of both federal and state labor laws. Of particular relevance here, Count Two of the Complaint asserts that Defendant's practice of paying “straight time” rather than a premium rate for the “gap” of hours worked between 80 and 86 in a 14–day work cycle violates § 9.1–700 et seq. of the Virginia Code (the “Virginia Law”). In its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the City now argues that its duty under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA” or “the Act”), 29 U.S.C. § 207(k), and implementing regulations to pay overtime wages only for labor exceeding 86 hours in a 14–day work period overrides its more stringent state-law obligation.² In other words, the City contends that the Virginia Law's 80–hour overtime threshold is preempted by the 86–hour standard set by the FLSA, thus rendering the Officers' “gap pay” claim unsustainable as a matter of law. In response, the Officers and the Commonwealth ³ argue that the two laws are complementary, such that the City was not free to disregard the mandates imposed by the Virginia Law. The matter is now ripe for decision.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is proper where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Thus, a case that turns solely on a question of law may be resolved at the summary judgment stage. Nat'l City Bank of Ind. v. Turnbaugh, 463 F.3d 325, 329 (4th Cir.2006). In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in the non-movant's favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251–52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In this case, the parties agree, and the Court finds, that Defendant's preemption argument requires purely a legal determination and does not turn on any disputed material facts.

III. ANALYSIS

The sole question presented is whether § 207(k) of the FLSA preempts the potentially more generous provisions of the Virginia Law. Two settled principles of preemption jurisprudence guide this Court's analysis. First, “the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption case.” Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485, 116 S.Ct. 2240, 135 L.Ed.2d 700 (1996) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280, 107 S.Ct. 683, 93 L.Ed.2d 613 (1987) (“In determining whether a state statute is pre-empted by federal law and therefore invalid under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, our sole task is to ascertain the intent of Congress.”). Second, the Court begins with a strong presumption that Congress did not intend to override the power of the State to provide for the welfare of its people, especially “in a field traditionally occupied by the States,” such as labor law. Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 77, 129 S.Ct. 538, 172 L.Ed.2d 398 (2008); see also Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 21, 107 S.Ct. 2211, 96 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (“[P]reemption should not be lightly inferred in this area, since the establishment of labor standards falls within the traditional police power of the State.”); Anderson v. Sara Lee Corp., 508 F.3d 181, 193 (4th Cir.2007). The party claiming preemption therefore bears the heavy burden of demonstrating that it was “the clear and manifest purpose of Congress” to supersede “the historic police powers of the States.” Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565, 129 S.Ct. 1187, 173 L.Ed.2d 51 (2009) (quoting Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485, 116 S.Ct. 2240).

It is well settled that, under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, federal statutes “can nullify conflicting state or local actions.” College Loan Corp. v. SLM Corp., 396 F.3d 588, 595 (4th Cir.2005). Specifically, federal law preempts state law if (1) Congress expressly so states, (2) Congress enacts comprehensive laws that leave no room for supplementary state regulation, or (3) state law actually conflicts with federal law. Guerra, 479 U.S at 280–81, 107 S.Ct. 683. In this case, the City contends that the Virginia Law stands in direct and positive conflict with the FLSA. To satisfy its burden, Defendant must demonstrate that “compliance with both [the FLSA] and [the Virginia Law] is a physical impossibility,” Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43, 83 S.Ct. 1210, 10 L.Ed.2d 248 (1963), or that “the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives” of Congress. Worm v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 970 F.2d 1301, 1305 (4th Cir.1992) (quoting Silkwood v. Kerr–McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248, 104 S.Ct. 615, 78 L.Ed.2d 443 (1984)). For the reasons that follow, Defendant has failed to make either such showing here.

First, the FLSA and Virginia Law do not conflict. Rather, the two can—and by definition, must—operate in tandem: where the state law's protections end, the federal law's protections begin. As a general matter, “a state or locality's imposition of additional requirements above a federal minimum is unlikely to create a direct and positive conflict with federal law.” S. Blasting Servs., Inc. v. Wilkes Cnty., 288 F.3d 584, 591 (4th Cir.2002); see also Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 573, 129 S.Ct. 1187 (rejecting Wyeth's argument that “requiring it to comply with a state-law duty to provide a stronger warning about IV-push administration would obstruct the ... objectives of federal drug labeling regulation ... [and] interfere with Congress's purpose to ... strike a balance between competing objectives”). Instead, the Fourth Circuit has explained that “a conflict is more likely to occur when a state or locality provides that compliance with a federal standard is not mandated, or when compliance with federal law actually results in a violation of local law.” S. Blasting Servs., Inc., 288 F.3d at 591–92. Here, the Virginia Law is readily reconcilable with the function and purpose of the FLSA.

The state statute at issue provides that:

Employers shall pay ... law-enforcement employees overtime compensation or leave, as under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 207( o), at a rate of not less than one and one-half times the employee's regular rate of pay for all hours of work between the statutory maximum permitted under 29 U.S.C. § 207(k) and the hours for which an employee receives his salary, or if paid on an hourly basis, the hours for which the employee receives hourly compensation.

Va.Code Ann. § 9.1–701(A) (emphasis added). Thus, the Virginia Law deals solely with the “gap,” if any, between an employee's regular schedule of employment and the 86–hour federal overtime trigger established by § 207(k). ⁴ Simply put, an employee who works more than his normal hours, but less than the FLSA maximum, is entitled to overtime wages under state, but not federal, law. On the other hand, an officer is afforded only federal overtime pay for hours worked in excess of the FLSA's statutory maximum. In this respect, the two statutes form a complementary scheme. Cf. Pac. Merch. Shipping Ass'n v. Aubry, 918 F.2d 1409, 1424 (9th Cir.1990), cert. denied,504 U.S. 979, 112 S.Ct. 2956, 119 L.Ed.2d 578 (1992) ( “California's more protective overtime provisions are compatible with, rather than conflict with, the [FLSA].”).

Moreover, the more generous overtime policy embedded in the Virginia Law falls squarely within the “savings clause” of the FLSA, which states in pertinent part:

No provision of this Act or of any order thereunder shall excuse noncompliance with any ... State law ... establishing a minimum wage higher than the minimum wage established under this Act or...