Rogers v. Efird's Exterminating Co., Inc., 22226

Decision Date09 January 1985
Docket NumberNo. 22226,22226
Citation325 S.E.2d 541,284 S.C. 377
CourtSouth Carolina Supreme Court
PartiesJack ROGERS, Respondent, v. EFIRD'S EXTERMINATING CO., INC., Appellant. . Heard

William Douglas Gray of Watkins, Vandiver, Kirven, Gable & Gray, Anderson, for appellant.

Harold P. Threlkeld of McIntosh, Threlkeld, Glenn & Sherard, Anderson, for respondent.

CHANDLER, Justice:

Efird's Exterminating Co., Inc. (Efird) appeals from a jury verdict for damages allegedly caused by it to the residence of Respondent (Rogers).

We affirm.

The sole issue presented is whether or not the trial judge erred in his jury instruction on the accrual time of a cause of action under the "discovery rule." We hold he did not.

In April, 1970, Efird contracted to perform termite extermination of Roger's residence. In the process, support wall blocks underneath the front porch were removed but not replaced by Efird. Within the statutory six year period for commencing an action, Rogers noticed cracks in the joints between the house wall and porch slab. He testified, however, that what he observed appeared to be normal settlement and that it was not until 1979 that the damage was sufficient to call for an investigation of its cause. On June 29, 1981, he instituted this action, in answer to which Efird plead the Statute of Limitations in bar.

In its brief Efird concedes that failure to replace the blocks caused the front porch to separate from the residence, necessitating repairs and resulting in damages.

The parties agree that the "discovery rule" applies to determine when Roger's cause of action accrues. Brown v. Sandwood Development Corporation, 277 S.C. 581, 291 S.E.2d 375 (1982); Campus Sweater v. M.B. Kahn, 515 F.Supp. 64 (D.C.S.C.1979). Efird's sole contention is that the trial judge erred in charging the jury that, under the rule, one must know not only that he has been injured but also "what or who proximately caused that injury." Efird argues that "causation" is not an element of the rule as adopted in S.C.Code Ann. § 15-3-535 (1976 & Supp.1983).

When the jury charge is viewed as a whole, the language complained of was not erroneous. In the next sentence the trial judge charged "In other words, you have to be able to not only discern that an injury has resulted, but you have to be able to discern that someone else proximately caused that injury." (Emphasis supplied).

In Snell v. Columbia Gun Exchange, Inc., 276 S.C. 301, 278 S.E.2d 333 (1981) ...

To continue reading

Request your trial
6 cases
  • Moriarty v. Garden Sanctuary Church
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • June 26, 2000
    ...Inc., 677 F.Supp. 406 (D.S.C.1987) (asbestos case); True, supra (legal malpractice action by client); Rogers v. Efird's Exterminating Co., 284 S.C. 377, 325 S.E.2d 541 (1985) (action by homeowner against termite extermination company); Brown v. Pearson, 326 S.C. 409, 483 S.E.2d 477 (Ct.App.......
  • McKinney v. Bailey
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
    • March 22, 2022
    ... ... Griffith v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. , No ... 2:12-cv-00239-DCN, 2012 WL ... Am ... Cancer Soc'y, SC Div., Inc. , 386 S.E.2d 798, 800 ... (S.C. Ct. App. 989) (citing Rogers v. Efird's ... Exterminating Co., Inc. , ... ...
  • Roe v. Doe
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit
    • June 29, 1994
    ...citing Austin v. Conway Hosp. Inc., 292 S.C. 334, 339, 356 S.E.2d 153, 156 (Ct.App.1987), quoting Rogers v. Efird's Exterminating Co., Inc., 284 S.C. 377, 379, 325 S.E.2d 541, 542 (1985). Plaintiff argues that the objective standard of the South Carolina statute should not apply to represse......
  • Stokes-Craven Holding Corp. v. Scott L. Robinson & Johnson Mckenzie & Robinson, LLC
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • September 9, 2015
    ...Burgess v. Am. Cancer Soc'y S.C. Div., Inc., 300 S.C. 182, 186, 386 S.E.2d 798, 800 (Ct. App. 1989) (citing Rogers v. Efird's Exterminating Co., 284 S.C. 377, 325 S.E.2d 541 (1985)). Thus, under this objective standard, the statutory period of limitations may begin to run before the client ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT