Rogers v. Ford Motor Co.
| Decision Date | 21 January 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:94cv819 AS.,3:94cv819 AS. |
| Citation | 952 F.Supp. 606 |
| Parties | Gail ROGERS and Robert Rogers, Plaintiffs, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Bendix Safety Restraints, Inc., and AlliedSignal, Inc., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
Patrick F. O'Leary, Goshen, IN, for Gail Rogers and Robert Rogers.
Albert J. Dahm, Baker & Daniels, Fort Wayne, IN, Amy L. Mader, Baker and Daniels, South Bend, IN, for Ford Motor Co.
Eric A. Riegner, Lloyd H. Milliken, Locke Reynolds Boyd and Weisell, Indianapolis, IN, for Bendix Safety Restraints, Inc. and Allied Signal, Inc.
By order of May 16, 1996, this court denied the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment as to the issue of defective design, finding that application of the principles of collateral estoppel was inappropriate given the particular circumstances of the case. Additionally, the court granted the defendants' joint motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of punitive damages and denied defendants AlliedSignal and Bendix's motion for complete summary judgment based on the common law "contractor's defense."
Thereafter, defendants Bendix and AlliedSignal (collectively "AlliedSignal")1 and Ford Motor Company ("Ford") jointly moved for leave to file another motion for complete summary judgment, stating that they had not been given access to the plaintiffs' sole expert witness until two and a half months after the dispositive motion deadline. In an order dated July 23, 1996, this court granted the defendants' motion and continued the scheduled trial pending resolution of the motion for summary judgment. Because the defendants filed and served their proposed summary judgment motion and brief in support thereof as exhibits to their motion requesting leave to file the same, the court gave the plaintiffs fifteen days after the date of its order in which to file their response. After the court granted the plaintiffs two extensions of time in which to file their response (the latter of which extended the date to August 26, 1996), the Rogers belatedly filed their response on September 5, 1996.
In addition to the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs and defendants have jointly and independently filed a variety of other motions in this cause of action. It is the court's intention to deal at this time with all motions currently pending in this matter. Jurisdiction is conveyed on the court by diversity of citizenship pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
Plaintiff Gail Rogers was injured in an automobile accident on November 11, 1992, when the vehicle in which she was riding sustained a driver's side impact in a collision with another vehicle. She was a front-seat passenger in a 1988 Lincoln Town Car operated by her husband, plaintiff Robert Rogers. The Rogers's vehicle was manufactured by defendant Ford and contained seat belt assemblies manufactured by defendant AlliedSignal.
The plaintiffs claim that Gail Rogers sustained enhanced bodily injuries when the seat belt in the Rogers's vehicle inadvertently released during the accident, allowing Mrs. Rogers to strike the dashboard and windshield. Specifically, the plaintiffs contend that the seat belt assembly in their Lincoln Town Car was vulnerable to "inertial actuation," an engineering phenomenon which theoretically can occur when the housing of the seat belt buckle is abruptly accelerated from the back side while the spring-loaded seat belt button and attached portions of the latching mechanism remain momentarily at rest relative to the housing of the buckle, thereby simulating the ordinary depression of the button.2 The plaintiffs' complaint seeks compensatory damages for Mrs. Rogers's injuries and Mr. Rogers's loss of consortium.
Plaintiffs Gail and Robert Rogers claim that the defendants are strictly liable under Indiana law for their failure to design a seat belt that was not subject to the phenomenon of inertial actuation. In addition to their theory of strict liability, the plaintiffs contend that the defendants also are liable under a theory of common law negligence for their failure to conduct reasonable tests to discover the alleged defects and to undertake a recall campaign prior to the date of the Rogers's accident — i.e., for failure to warn the plaintiffs of the latent dangers in their Lincoln Town Car's seat belts.
With respect to the strict liability theory, the plaintiffs maintain that the seat belt failed to provide Gail Rogers with reasonable protection in the specific circumstances surrounding the accident, and that a feasible, more practicable design would have afforded better protection. AlliedSignal and Ford move for summary judgment on the grounds that (a) the plaintiffs' sole design defect expert is not qualified to testify under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), and his proposed testimony is neither relevant nor based on scientifically reliable methodologies pursuant to the mandates of Daubert; and (b) even assuming, arguendo, that the testimony of the plaintiffs' expert were admissible, the plaintiffs cannot meet their burden of proving that a feasible, more practicable design would have afforded better protection.
As a preliminary matter, AlliedSignal moves the court to strike the plaintiffs' response to the motion for summary judgment on the grounds that (1) it is untimely; (2) it fails to include a "Statement of Genuine Issues" as required by this court's local rules; and (3) it is not supported by any admissible evidence. Ford moves separately to strike the plaintiffs' response on the ground that it is untimely. Ford also moves the court to strike the exhibits attached to the plaintiffs' response on the ground that they are inadmissible hearsay.
In support of its argument to strike the plaintiffs' response, Ford suggests that the court forewarned the plaintiffs in its order of May 16, 1996, that failure to respond to a motion for summary judgment is "fatal." However, the defendant overlooks the context of the court's remark, which dealt with the consequences of a complete failure to file — not a delayed filing. Rogers v. Ford Motor Co., 925 F.Supp. 1413, 1422-23 (N.D.Ind.1996); see N.D.IND.R. 56.1. Moreover, it is well established that the decision whether to apply local rules strictly or to overlook such transgressions is a matter left to the sound discretion of the district court. Waldridge v. American Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 923 (7th Cir.1994). The same rule applies to AlliedSignal's argument that failure to include a "Statement of Genuine Issues" requires the court to strike the plaintiffs' response.
Finally, in support of its motion to strike, AlliedSignal argues that the plaintiffs' response is not supported by admissible evidence; Ford moves separately to strike the plaintiffs' exhibits on the same ground. The court notes that the attachments to the plaintiffs' response consist of a letter purportedly written by a representative of Ford and mailed to a director of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and an internal memorandum allegedly prepared by Ford's Restraints Engineering Department.
It is well established that materials submitted for summary judgment must be otherwise admissible. See Whitted v. General Motors Corp., 58 F.3d 1200, 1204 (7th Cir.1995). Rule 56(e) expressly states:
... [O]pposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith.
FED.R.CIV.P. 56(e). In the present cause, neither document submitted by the plaintiffs and attached to their response has been authenticated by affidavit or otherwise verified. Accordingly, Ford's motion to strike the exhibits attached to the response will be granted. AlliedSignal and Ford's motions to strike the plaintiffs' response will be denied.
However, the court's decision to strike the exhibits to the plaintiffs' response in no way renders inadmissible expert testimony based upon the information contained in those documents. "Under Rule 703 [of the Federal Rules of Evidence], expert opinion evidence is not objectionable even though the expert has relied upon underlying information which is itself inadmissible, as long as the inadmissible information is of a kind `reasonably relied upon by experts in the field.'"3 Cummins v. Lyle Indus., 93 F.3d 362, 371-72 (7th Cir.1996) (quoting Rule 703).
Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with any affidavits, show that there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED.R.CIV.P. 56; L.S. Heath & Son, Inc. v. AT & T Info. Sys., Inc., 9 F.3d 561, 566 (7th Cir.1993). The initial burden is on the moving party to demonstrate, with or without supporting affidavits, the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and that judgment as a matter of law should be granted in that party's favor. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). "A fact is material for purposes of summary judgment only if it might effect the outcome of a case under governing law." JPM, Inc. v. John Deere Indus. Equip. Co., 94 F.3d 270, 273 (7th Cir.1996); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
Once the moving party has met its initial burden, the opposing party must "go beyond the pleadings and ... designate ...
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