Rogers v. Imeri
| Decision Date | 02 April 2013 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 5–11–0546. |
| Citation | 369 Ill.Dec. 76,985 N.E.2d 1062,2013 IL App (5th) 110546 |
| Parties | Roy Dean ROGERS II and Teresa Rogers, Individually and as Coadministrators of the Estate of Roy Dean Rogers III, and Teresa Rogers as Mother and Next Friend of Darian Rogers and Haylee Rogers, Plaintiffs–Appellees, v. Gani IMERI, Individually and d/b/a Johnny's Bar and Grill, Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Hugh C. Griffin, of Hall, Prangle & Schoonveld, LLC, of Chicago, and Jon R. Shelton, of Shelton & Madrid, LLC, of St. Louis, Missouri, for appellant.
Christopher A. Koester, of Taylor Law Offices, P.C., of Effingham, for appellees.
[369 Ill.Dec. 77]¶ 1 The plaintiffs, Roy Dean Rogers II and Teresa Rogers, filed a petition under the Dramshop Act (235 ILCS 5/6–21 (West 2008)) after their son was fatally injured in a collision with a drunk driver. Because the defendant's dramshop liability insurance carrier was insolvent, the defendant was represented in this action by the IllinoisInsurance Guaranty Fund. Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion for a summary determination of the extent to which his liability was to be offset by automobile insurance proceeds the plaintiffs had recovered. The defendant asked the court to rule that his liability was to be reduced to the statutory cap under the Dramshop Act and then further reduced by the amounts recovered from other insurance policies. The court denied the motion. The court subsequently granted the defendant's motion to certify the question for interlocutory review pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308(a) (eff. Feb. 26, 2010). We answer the certified question and affirm the trial court's ruling.
¶ 2 The salient facts are not in dispute. In October 2009, the plaintiffs' son, Roy Dean Rogers III, sustained fatal injuries when the vehicle he was driving was involved in a head-on collision with a vehicle driven by John E. Winterrowd. Rogers died later the same day. He was 18 years old. According to the allegations of the complaint, Winterrowd was intoxicated after consuming alcohol served to him at Johnny's Bar and Grill, an establishment owned by the defendant, Gani Imeri. The plaintiffs received $26,550 from Winterrowd's liability insurance policy. They also received $80,000 from their own automobile insurance policy ($75,000 under the underinsured motorist provision and $5,000 under a medical coverage provision).
¶ 3 The plaintiffs subsequently filed the instant action under the Dramshop Act (235 ILCS 5/6–21 (West 2008)). They alleged that Winterrowd was intoxicated as a result of drinking alcoholic beverages at Johnny's Bar and Grill and that his intoxication contributed to the collision. They sought damages for the loss of the decedent's companionship, property damage to the vehicle, medical bills, and the decedent's pain and suffering before he died.
¶ 4 At the time the accident occurred, the defendant maintained a dramshop liability policy with Constitutional Casualty Company. The policy provided a policy limit of $130,338.51, the statutory cap under the Dramshop Act. See 235 ILCS 5/6–21 (West 2008). However, while this matter was pending, Constitutional Casualty Company was declared insolvent and liquidated. Consequently, the Illinois Insurance Guaranty Fund (hereinafter Guaranty Fund or Fund) took over the defense of this litigation.
¶ 5 The defendant filed a “motion for summary adjudication of the amount that liability must be reduced under 215 ILCS 5/546.” See 735 ILCS 5/2–1005(d) (West 2008) (). The defendant argued that his maximum dramshop liability is $130,338.51, the statutory damage cap, and that amount must therefore be reduced by the $106,550 received from other insurance companies under section 546 of the Illinois Insurance Code (hereinafter the Illinois Insurance Guaranty Fund statute) (215 ILCS 5/546(a) (West 2008) ()).
¶ 6 The court denied the defendant's motion, finding that the setoff issue was premature. The court further found that the ruling requested by the defendant would “invade the jury's role as finder of fact.” The court noted that, if the jury found in favor of the plaintiffs, the defendant would then have the opportunity to request setoffs or other reductions.
¶ 7 The defendant filed a motion to reconsider that ruling or, in the alternative, to certify a question for appellate review pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308(a) (eff. Feb. 26, 2010). The plaintiffs agreed to the request for certification. The court granted the motion and certified the following question for review:
“Where the defendant in a dram shop case is being defended by the Illinois Insurance Guaranty Fund after defendant's liability insurer was declared insolvent, and where plaintiff has already made an insurance recovery from plaintiff's underinsured motorist insurer and from the alleged intoxicated person's liability insurer, and where the jury returns a verdict in excess of the defendant's maximum liability under the Dram Shop Act, is the reduction for ‘other insurance’ recoveries set forth in Section 546(a) of the Illinois Insurance Guaranty Fund Act applied against the jury's verdict or against the defendant's maximum dram shop liability?”
We granted the defendant's application for leave to appeal on January 11, 2012.
¶ 8 In an interlocutory appeal under Supreme Court Rule 308(a), our review is limited to addressing the question certified by the trial court. Ordinarily, we do not look beyond the question to consider the propriety of the court's ruling on the underlying order. Hudkins v. Egan, 364 Ill.App.3d 587, 590, 301 Ill.Dec. 486, 847 N.E.2d 145, 148 (2006). To qualify for review under Rule 308(a), a certified question must present an issue of law. Solon v. Midwest Medical Records Ass'n, 236 Ill.2d 433, 439, 338 Ill.Dec. 907, 925 N.E.2d 1113, 1117 (2010). Thus, our review is de novo. Solon, 236 Ill.2d at 439, 338 Ill.Dec. 907, 925 N.E.2d at 1117;Hudkins, 364 Ill.App.3d at 590, 301 Ill.Dec. 486, 847 N.E.2d at 148.
¶ 9 The parties agree that the defendant is entitled to a setoff of the $106,550 the plaintiffs received from the two automobile insurance policies. The defendant argues that this amount is to be deducted from the statutory cap of $130,338.51. The plaintiffs argue that it must be deducted from the jury's verdict and then reduced to the statutory cap if necessary. We note that, as previously discussed, this case has not yet been tried. However, because it involves a death, it is likely that a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs will result in damages exceeding the statutory cap. This assumption is included in the question certified by the trial court and argued by the parties.
¶ 10 Resolution of the parties' contentions requires us to construe the language of two statutes—section 546 of the Illinois Insurance Guaranty Fund statute (215 ILCS 5/546 (West 2008)) and the Dramshop Act (235 ILCS 5/6–21 (West 2008)). In resolving questions of statutory construction, our primary objective is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature in enacting the statutes. Solon, 236 Ill.2d at 440, 338 Ill.Dec. 907, 925 N.E.2d at 1117. The best indicator of legislative intent is the express language of the statutes, which should be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Solon, 236 Ill.2d at 440, 338 Ill.Dec. 907, 925 N.E.2d at 1117. If statutes are clear and unambiguous, we must apply them as written without resorting to extrinsic aids in statutory construction. However, if statutory language is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, it is ambiguous and we may look beyond the express language to determine the legislature's intent. Solon, 236 Ill.2d at 440, 338 Ill.Dec. 907, 925 N.E.2d at 1117.
¶ 11 In interpreting statutes, we must read the relevant provisions in their entirety and consider the legislature's apparent intent in enacting them. Solon, 236 Ill.2d at 440, 338 Ill.Dec. 907, 925 N.E.2d at 1117. We must interpret statutes in a way that will not render any portion of them meaningless or superfluous. Solon, 236 Ill.2d at 440–41, 338 Ill.Dec. 907, 925 N.E.2d at 1117. We may also consider the consequences likely to result from our interpretation.Solon, 236 Ill.2d at 441, 338 Ill.Dec. 907, 925 N.E.2d at 1117. In doing so, we presume that the legislature did not intend an absurd or unjust result. Solon, 236 Ill.2d at 441, 338 Ill.Dec. 907, 925 N.E.2d at 1118.
¶ 12 Section 546 of the Illinois Insurance Guaranty Fund (Guaranty Fund) statute provides that an insured or claimant must “exhaust all coverage provided by any other insurance policy * * * if the claim under such other policy arises from the same facts, injury, or loss that gave rise to the covered claim against the Fund.” 215 ILCS 5/546(a) (West 2008). The statute further provides that “the Fund's obligation” is to be reduced by amounts recovered. 215 ILCS 5/546(a) (West 2008). At issue in this case is an interpretation of the phrase “the Fund's obligation.”
¶ 13 The Guaranty Fund is intended “ ‘to place claimants in the same position that they would have been in if the liability insurer had not become insolvent.’ ” Gines v. Ivy, 358 Ill.App.3d 607, 609, 295 Ill.Dec. 487, 832 N.E.2d 937, 938 (2005) (quoting Lucas v. Illinois Insurance Guaranty Fund, 52 Ill.App.3d 237, 239, 10 Ill.Dec. 81, 367 N.E.2d 469, 471 (1977)). As we will discuss in more detail later in this decision, there are some circumstances under which the Guaranty Fund's liability may be less than that of the insolvent insurer. See Hasemann v. White, 177 Ill.2d 414, 420–21, 226 Ill.Dec. 788, 686 N.E.2d 571, 574 (1997). However, the Guaranty Fund is in essence a substitute for the insolvent insurer, not...
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Rogers v. Imeri
...(eff. Feb. 26, 2010). The appellate court held that the reduction should be applied against the jury's verdict. 2013 IL App (5th) 110546, 369 Ill.Dec. 76, 985 N.E.2d 1062. ¶ 2 For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand for further ¶ 3 BACKGROUND ¶ 4 In 2009, a vehicle driven by 18–y......
- Rogers v. Imeri