Rogers v. Miss. Dep't of Corr.
| Decision Date | 04 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:18-CV-257-RP |
| Parties | JOHN D. ROGERS PLAINTIFF v. MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al. DEFENDANTS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi |
John D. Rogers brought this action against the Mississippi Department of Corrections, as well as Pelicia E. Hall and Sean Smith in their individual capacities, seeking damages and other relief as a result of Rogers' termination from employment with the Mississippi Department of Corrections. The defendants now request summary judgment. Docket 47. Rogers has responded in opposition, the defendants have replied, and the matter is ripe for resolution. Having considered the parties' submissions, the court finds the defendants' motion is well taken and should be granted.
Summary judgment is warranted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) when evidence reveals no genuine dispute regarding any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The rule "mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
The party seeking summary judgment "bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions [of the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. The nonmoving party must then "go beyond the pleadings" and designate specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324. In reviewing the evidence, factual controversies are to be resolved in favor of the nonmovant, "but only when ... both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts." Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc). When such contradictory facts exist, the court may "not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2091, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000).
"Conclusory allegations and denials, speculation, improbable inferences, unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic arguments do not adequately substitute for specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial." TIG Ins. Co. v. Sedgwick James of Washington, 276 F.3d 754 (5th Cir. 2002). Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2s 202 (1986).
The investigative arm of the Mississippi Department of Corrections ("MDOC") is the Corrections Investigation Division ("CID"), which is responsible for investigating security threats, staff misconduct, gang activities, assaults, contraband violations, narcotics violations, escapes, and other matters. CID investigators are law enforcement officers empowered by statute to investigate and enforce all MDOC regulations related to the functions and missions of the department and all laws of the State of Mississippi. Miss. Code Ann. § 47-5-54. At all times relevant to this action, the plaintiff John D. Rogers was the Chief investigator for CID's investigative unit at the Mississippi State Penitentiary at Parchman, Mississippi ("MSP"). He reported to the CID Director, the defendant Sean Smith, who worked out of MDOC's central office in Jackson, Mississippi.
On November 21, 2016, Rogers received a report of an alleged assault on an inmate by a corrections officer and began an investigation. According to Rogers, while he was interviewing the suspect corrections officer, Superintendent of MSP Earnest Lee, the official responsible for overall operations at the facility, entered the interview room and attempted to interfere with the investigation by taking the suspect with him out of the interview room. The CID investigators who were present objected and a standoff ensued, during which a physical altercation occurred between Superintendent Lee and two of Rogers' CID investigators, including James Bobo. These events led to two separate CID investigations (neither by Rogers) - one concerning the alleged assault on an inmate by a corrections officer, and the other concerning the altercation between Superintendent Lee and the CID investigators.
In early March of 2017, Rogers became concerned that the defendant Pelicia E. Hall, then-Commissioner of MDOC and its top official, intended to cover up the investigation of the assault on the inmate and Superintendent Lee's attempted obstruction. Rogers communicated his concerns to FBI Special Agent Walter Henry, with whom Rogers had a close working relationship. At Agent Henry's request, Rogers provided Agent Henry with a copy of CID's investigative report regarding the assault on the inmate. Rogers did not provide Agent Henry with a copy of CID's investigative report regarding the altercation between Superintendent Lee and CID investigators.
A few days later, on March 13, 2017, Rogers testified in the Circuit Court of Sunflower County, Mississippi at a probable cause hearing on a criminal charge brought by Superintendent Lee against James Bobo for allegedly assaulting Lee during the subject incident.1 Called to the witness stand by counsel for Bobo, Rogers testified about his law enforcement background and his role as Chief of investigations at MSP; about receiving the report of an assault on an inmate by a corrections officer; about his investigation and his interview of the suspect corrections officer; about Superintendent Lee's actions that he believed interfered with his investigation; about his knowledge of the altercation between Superintendent Lee and Bobo; and about his understanding that the FBI would be investigating the alleged assault on the inmate.
In early June of 2017, at CID Director Smith's request on behalf of Commissioner Hall, Rogers provided Smith with a synopsis of all of Rogers' communications with the FBI. The synopsis mentioned Rogers' conversation with Agent Henry about the alleged November 21, 2016 assault on an inmate by a corrections officer, as well as Rogers' providing Agent Henry with a copy of the investigative report of the alleged assault.
Rogers was terminated from MDOC on June 24, 2017. CID Director Smith personally delivered the termination letter to Rogers and informed him of his termination. According to Rogers, Smith gave no explanation for the termination.2
Rogers appealed his termination to the Mississippi Employees Appeal Board ("MEAB"), which hears state employee appeals of adverse personnel actions. After a hearing, the MEAB concluded that Rogers was improperly terminated because he provided information to the FBIconcerning the alleged assault on an inmate by a corrections officer and Superintendent Lee's potential interference with that investigation.3 The MEAB reversed Rogers' termination and ordered that he be reinstated to his position with all rights and benefits restored, including back pay.
Rogers brought this action asserting a federal claim against Hall and Smith, in their individual capacities, for First Amendment Retaliation, and asserting a Mississippi tort claim against MDOC for retaliation in violation of public policy. The defendants have moved for summary judgment on all of Rogers' claims. The defendants argue, among other things, that Hall and Smith are entitled to qualified immunity and that MDOC is entitled to sovereign immunity. The court agrees.
Rogers claims that Hall and Smith violated his First Amendment right to free speech by terminating him in retaliation for providing information about the subject incident to the FBI and for testifying about the incident at Bobo's probable cause hearing. Hall and Smith assert they are entitled to qualified immunity against this claim.
"Qualified immunity gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments about open legal questions." Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011). Qualified immunity shields government officials from money damages unless a plaintiff shows (1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was "clearly established" at the time of the challenged conduct. Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 735. District courts have discretion to decide which of the two prongs of thequalified immunity analysis to tackle first. Id.
Under the second prong, "a defendant cannot be said to have violated a clearly established right unless the right's contours were sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in the defendant's shoes would have understood that he was violating it." Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 778-79, 134 S.Ct. 2012, 188 L.Ed.2d 1056 (2014). There must be controlling authority - or a robust consensus of persuasive authority - that defines the contours of the right in question with a high degree of particularity. Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 371-72 (5th Cir. 2011).
"A qualified immunity defense alters the usual summary judgment burden of proof." Brown v. Callahan, 623 F.3d 249, 253 (5th Cir. 2010). "When a defendant asserts qualified immunity, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that it is inapplicable." Waganfeald v. Gusman, 674 F.3d 475, 483 (5th Cir. 2012). The plaintiff has the burden to point out clearly established law. Clarkson v. White, 943 F.3d 988, 993 (5th Cir. 2019). The plaintiff also bears the burden of "raising a fact issue as...
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