Rogers v. Mississippi

• Decision Date: 24 August 2016
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:15-CV-53-LG-RHW
• Parties: R.L. ROGERS PLAINTIFF v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI DEFENDANTS
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi

R.L. ROGERS PLAINTIFF v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI DEFENDANTS

CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:15-CV-53-LG-RHW

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI SOUTHERN DIVISION

August 24, 2016

PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Before the Court is R.L. Rogers' petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Doc. [1]. According to the evidence and testimony presented at trial, on April 24, 2010, a man wearing a hat, sunglasses, and black jacket, entered the Advance America cash advance business located in Gulfport, Mississippi brandishing a pistol. Rogers v. State of Mississippi, 130 So.3d 544 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013). He pushed patron Megan Smith out of his way, pointed the gun at store manager Josephine Hurt, and demanded money. After the man retrieved $1,310 from the store's cash register, he ordered Smith and Hurt to get on the floor then left the store. Shortly thereafter, Gulfport Police Officers received a call about a man in a nearby neighborhood who matched the robber's description. When officers arrived to the reported location they found Rogers hiding in a bush. Rogers attempted to flee, but was quickly apprehended. Police officers discovered a pair of sunglasses, a black jacket, a chrome .22 Jennings pistol, and $1,310 in cash in the area where Rogers had been hiding.

Officer Matthew Thomas, an investigator with the Gulfport Police Department testified that, when asked if he wanted to make a statement, Rogers replied, "You guys found the money, my clothes[,] and the gun. Why do I need to make a statement[?]" Doc. [11-3] at 79-80. At the conclusion of the trial, by way of an oral stipulation between Rogers and the State, the jury was given the following instruction:

The Court instructs the jury that the Defendant has stipulated to the fact that he has a felony conviction that occurred on a date prior to April 24, 2010. The Court instructs the jury that this prior conviction of the Defendant may not be considered as evidence that the Defendant has committed the offense with which he is currently charged in Count 2 of the Indictment. It may, however, be used for the limited and sole purpose of proving the prior conviction element of the crime of unlawfully possessing a firearm after having previously been convicted of a felony.

Doc. [11-1] at 54.

The jury found Rogers guilty of armed robbery and unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Doc. [11-1] at 61-62. The trial court sentenced Rogers as an habitual offender and imposed consecutive sentences of twenty-three (23) years for armed robbery and ten (10) years for unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Doc. [11-1] at 62. Rogers filed a direct appeal. The Mississippi Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence. See Rogers v. State of Mississippi, 130 So.3d 544 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013).

Rogers then filed a Motion for Post-Conviction Collateral Relief with the Mississippi Supreme Court in which he raised the following assignments of error: (1)(a) with respect to the unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon charge, the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, through constitutionally sufficient evidence, every element of habitual offender status pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-81; (1)(b) the trial court erred in allowing the jury to determine habitual offender status absent a bifurcated trial; (2) the trial court committed plain error in allowing the State to introduce a statement made by Rogers before he was advised of his constitutional right to remain silent as per Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966); (3) the trial court erred in failing to declare a mistrial when the jury began its deliberations during the testimony of the State's first witness; (4) he received an illegal sentence; and (5) he receivedineffective assistance of counsel. Doc. [10-2] at 1. The Mississippi Supreme Court denied Rogers' motion for post conviction relief. Specifically, the Court concluded that claims (1)(a), (1)(b), and (3) were barred by the doctrine of res judicata because they were raised on direct appeal. Further, the Court found no arguable basis for claims (2) and (4), and held that Rogers' ineffective assistance of counsel claim (5) failed to satisfy the requisite prongs of deficient performance and prejudice defined in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct 2052 (1984). The Court denied Rogers' petition for writ of certiorari. Doc. [10-2] at 1.

Rogers then filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus. The claims raised in this petition parallel the claims raised in his motion for post conviction relief. Specifically, he asserts: (1)(a) with respect to the unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon charge, the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, through constitutionally sufficient evidence, each and every element of habitual offender status pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-81; (1)(b) the trial court erred in allowing the jury to determine habitual offender status absent a bifurcated trial; (2) the trial court committed plain error in allowing the State to introduce a statement made by Rogers before he was advised of his Miranda rights; (3) the trial court erred in failing to declare a mistrial when the jury began its deliberations during the testimony of the State's first witness; and (4) ineffective assistance of counsel. Doc. [1] at 2.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Standard of Review

The issues presented in the instant petition were presented to the Mississippi Court of Appeals and to the Mississippi Supreme Court. Accordingly, this Court will follow the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), which provides that:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim--

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

When reviewing state court habeas decisions, a federal court employs a highly deferential standard to evaluate state-court rulings. Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447, 455 (2005).

Issue 1(a): Sufficiency Of The Evidence

Rogers argues that his sentencing as an habitual offender pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-81 should be overturned because the State failed to produce sufficient evidence of prior felony convictions. Although less clear, it appears that Rogers challenges his conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Miss. Code Ann. § 97-37-5(1)) on the same basis. Rogers contends that the State failed to provide the trier of fact with evidence to verify defense counsel's stipulation to Rogers' prior felony convictions.

In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a state conviction, a federal habeas court must inquire, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, whether "any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); West v. Johnson, 92 F.3d 1385, 1393 (5th Cir. 1996). The State indicted Rogers for violations of Miss. Code. Ann. § 97-3-79 (armed robbery), § 97-37-5 (unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon), and § 99-19-81 (habitual offender). Rogers does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence with respectto the armed robbery conviction. He only challenges whether the state met its burden of proving his prior felony convictions as they relate to unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and as they relate to his status as an habitual offender.

In relevant part, § 97-37-5(1) states that:

It shall be unlawful for any person who has been convicted of a felony under the laws of this state, any other state, or of the United States to possess any firearm . . . unless such person has received a pardon for such felony, has received a relief from disability pursuant to Section 925(c) of Title 18 of the United States Code, or has received a certificate of rehabilitation pursuant to subsection (3) of this section.

To convict Rogers under §97-37-5(1) the State therefore, was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Rogers (1) was a convicted felon and (2) had been in possession of a firearm. The habitual offender statute under § 99-19-81 provides:

Every person convicted in this state of a felony who shall have been convicted twice previously of any felony or federal crime upon charges separately brought and arising out of separate incidents at different times and who shall have been sentenced to separate terms of one (1) year or more in any state and/or federal penal institution, whether in this state or elsewhere, shall be sentenced to the maximum term of imprisonment prescribed for such felony, and such sentence shall not be reduced or suspended nor shall such person be eligible for parole or probation.

The State was relieved of its burden of proving that Rogers was a convicted felon under either § 97-37-5(1) or § 99-19-81 when Rogers, through counsel, stipulated to prior felony convictions by means of a jury instruction. As noted by the Mississippi Court of Appeals, "Rogers's attorney explicitly stipulated into the record that Rogers had previously been convicted of a felony. During a pretrial hearing, before voir dire, and during the hearing on Rogers's motion for a directed verdict, Rogers's attorney repeatedly expressed her preference that the stipulation appear in a jury instruction." Rogers, 130 So.3d at 550. In the federal criminalcontext, courts have held that stipulations provide sufficient evidence to prove prior felony convictions . See ...